Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UDiPF-0003tr-2E for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 07 Mar 2013 21:31:17 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.210.178 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.210.178; envelope-from=lidstrom83@gmail.com; helo=mail-ia0-f178.google.com; Received: from mail-ia0-f178.google.com ([209.85.210.178]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1UDiPE-0006Ar-1y for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 07 Mar 2013 21:31:17 +0000 Received: by mail-ia0-f178.google.com with SMTP id o25so889193iad.9 for ; Thu, 07 Mar 2013 13:31:10 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.40.162 with SMTP id y2mr15647864igk.65.1362691870674; Thu, 07 Mar 2013 13:31:10 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.64.8.168 with HTTP; Thu, 7 Mar 2013 13:31:10 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <20130307110018.GA7491@savin> <20130307183035.GA9083@savin> Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 14:31:10 -0700 Message-ID: From: Daniel Lidstrom To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=14dae9341283e3d8d304d75c6c75 X-Spam-Score: -0.3 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (lidstrom83[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (lidstrom83[at]gmail.com) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1UDiPE-0006Ar-1y Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Large-blocks and censorship X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 21:31:17 -0000 --14dae9341283e3d8d304d75c6c75 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 My views on censorship resistance in the face of scaling: 1) I expect if I'm not careful about preserving my privacy with the way I use Bitcoin, then I will always run the risk of being censored by miners. This means connecting to the network anonymously, not reusing addresses, and perhaps even mixing my coins. The onus is on me here to avoid censorship, but I'm optimistic that this privacy preservation can be made pretty automatic. 2) I expect anonymity systems to scale to accommodate Bitcoin full nodes, not Bitcoin to stay small to avoid putting pressure on anonymity systems to scale. 3) If 2 is too tall an order, then mining in a pool is always an option. There should always be some countries in the world free enough to allow mining pools to operate, and miners in countries that ban Bitcoin can simply connect to these anonymously. If not, then Bitcoin is toast anyway, is it not? If these miners are really interested in avoiding censoring transactions, then they will do their due diligence and choose a pool that doesn't do this. But even if they don't, censorship can be personally avoided by following 1. On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: > As an aside, there's a paper coming out in perhaps a few months that > describes a new way to provide Chaum-style privacy integrated with > Bitcoin, but without the use of blinding and without any need for > banks. It's quite smart, I was reviewing the paper this week. > Unfortunately the technique is too slow and too complicated to > actually integrate, but you'd probably get a kick out of it. It's > based on zero knowledge proofs. You can talk to Ian Miers if you like, > perhaps he'll send you a copy for review. > > Back on topic. > > This idea is not new. I proposed the idea of regulating miners to > freeze certain outputs two years ago: > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=printpage;topic=5979.0 > > I concluded that it was not a real risk because both mining and > transactions can be done anonymously. > > Your argument rests on the assumption that you can't mine large blocks > anonymously because Tor doesn't scale. Even if we go along with the > idea that Tor is the only way to escape regulation (it's not), you > should maybe take up its inability to move data sufficiently fast with > the developers. Given that they routinely push two gigabits/second > today, with an entirely volunteer run network, I think they'll be > surprised to learn that their project is doomed to never be usable by > miners. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Symantec Endpoint Protection 12 positioned as A LEADER in The Forrester > Wave(TM): Endpoint Security, Q1 2013 and "remains a good choice" in the > endpoint security space. For insight on selecting the right partner to > tackle endpoint security challenges, access the full report. > http://p.sf.net/sfu/symantec-dev2dev > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --14dae9341283e3d8d304d75c6c75 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable My views on censorship resistance in the face of scaling:

1) I=20 expect if I'm not careful about preserving my privacy with the way I us= e Bitcoin, then I will always run the risk of being censored by miners.=A0= =20 This means connecting to the network anonymously, not reusing addresses, and perhaps even mixing my coins.=A0 The onus is on me here to avoid=20 censorship, but I'm optimistic that this privacy preservation can be=20 made pretty automatic.

2) I expect anonymity systems to scale to accommodate Bitcoin full=20 nodes, not Bitcoin to stay small to avoid putting pressure on anonymity=20 systems to scale.

3) If 2 is too tall an order, then mining in a=20 pool is always an option.=A0 There should always be some countries in the= =20 world free enough to allow mining pools to operate, and miners in=20 countries that ban Bitcoin can simply connect to these anonymously.=A0 If= =20 not, then Bitcoin is toast anyway, is it not?=A0 If these miners are=20 really interested in avoiding censoring transactions, then they will do=20 their due diligence and choose a pool that doesn't do this.=A0 But even= if they don't, censorship can be personally avoided by following 1.
On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Mike Hearn <mik= e@plan99.net> wrote:
As an aside, there's a paper coming out in perhaps a few months that describes a new way to provide Chaum-style privacy integrated with
Bitcoin, but without the use of blinding and without any need for
banks. It's quite smart, I was reviewing the paper this week.
Unfortunately the technique is too slow and too complicated to
actually integrate, but you'd probably get a kick out of it. It's based on zero knowledge proofs. You can talk to Ian Miers if you like,
perhaps he'll send you a copy for review.

Back on topic.

This idea is not new. I proposed the idea of regulating miners to
freeze certain outputs two years ago:

=A0 =A0https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=3Dpr= intpage;topic=3D5979.0

I concluded that it was not a real risk because both mining and
transactions can be done anonymously.

Your argument rests on the assumption that you can't mine large blocks<= br> anonymously because Tor doesn't scale. Even if we go along with the
idea that Tor is the only way to escape regulation (it's not), you
should maybe take up its inability to move data sufficiently fast with
the developers. Given that they routinely push two gigabits/second
today, with an entirely volunteer run network, I think they'll be
surprised to learn that their project is doomed to never be usable by
miners.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12 positioned as A LEADER in The Forrester
Wave(TM): Endpoint Security, Q1 2013 and "remains a good choice" = in the
endpoint security space. For insight on selecting the right partner to
tackle endpoint security challenges, access the full report.
http://p= .sf.net/sfu/symantec-dev2dev
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

--14dae9341283e3d8d304d75c6c75--