Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 22:09:52 +0000
To: Jonas Nick <jonasdnick@gmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: AdamISZ <AdamISZ@protonmail.com>
Reply-To: AdamISZ <AdamISZ@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] MuSig2 BIP
Precedence: list

Jonas, all,:

So I do want to ask a couple further clarifying questions on this point, bu=
t I got rather majorly sidetracked :)
I wonder can you (and other list readers!) take a look at my attempt here t=
o summarize what is described in Footnote 2 of the draft BIP (as it's relat=
ed to this discussion and also .. it's pretty interesting generally!):

https://gist.github.com/AdamISZ/ca974ed67889cedc738c4a1f65ff620b

(btw github gists have equation rendering now which is nice!)

Thanks,
waxwing/AdamISZ


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------- Original Message -------
On Monday, May 23rd, 2022 at 10:56, Jonas Nick via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev=
@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> Thank you for taking the time to look at the BIP and reference code, waxw=
ing. I
> don't know if you're overlooking anything, so let me try to restate the
> paragraph in the BIP draft that attempts to cover this topic [0].
>
> Suppose signers would just abort in the presence of identical public keys=
. In
> that case, a disruptive signer can permanently DoS-attack a session by si=
mply
> copying the public key of some other signer. Therefore, the BIP is much m=
ore
> useful if it can deal with identical public keys.
>
> The MuSig2 BIP draft requires some added complexity to handle identical p=
ublic
> keys (because of the MuSig2* optimization). But this solution naturally a=
llows
> identifying and removing disruptive signers, which ultimately reduces the
> complexity for MuSig2 users.
>
> [0] https://github.com/jonasnick/bips/blob/musig2/bip-musig2.mediawiki#pu=
blic-key-aggregation
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