Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96ECDAC1 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 09:07:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f170.google.com (mail-io0-f170.google.com [209.85.223.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 64A10112 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 09:07:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodt126 with SMTP id t126so179437313iod.2 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 02:07:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc :content-type; bh=FBJMfdLIxmP36N771AH+AWPRJi+kYW6IAUJEM7T1auU=; b=DJ20lkf3biAAba63jb8Ubsrg0H1aOS2dNkUWwAIUgpb4HHGggiDhBLNHzoaEwXQ34k d4ITxqc+N6AWvmNFMmiP6NeLRimwikm6Upk+iQL79jMg8daAMXDcDR1y3hPRdofvJRoh IJcFUxfBW/1DE4wAQnMCSc4f5Jkqyae2nfLaLHQ13HMVeNWEaLOsRRAdutiWQe5jcsVi XVi5V/zgjAdZT/W15CYGSDoqozbUgT3UyRTyk+/pE6fFxQ5DOEoBQqC8Gs/XEw/B+zHa KA9FKjgNxxnkbeV+3EYyml0M5kZvP9cGJkQmitQkaqYMp8hvfwU6WC636lWp7NzBtfXE 0OYw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQk1j17aFZ9oD+8JTAL4h93dwp0JQyYOFh8ZtT6rTvu9MbEdezrTGu0Wokga+W0pFved3VQ9 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.19.94 with SMTP id b91mr20859668ioj.144.1440493639713; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 02:07:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.107.18.155 with HTTP; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 02:07:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [115.187.38.221] Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 14:37:19 +0530 Message-ID: From: Upal Chakraborty To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f3c70b25ba2051e1f0fd0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: greg@xiph.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap [BIP 1xx - Draft] X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 09:07:21 -0000 --001a113f3c70b25ba2051e1f0fd0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Github: https://github.com/UpalChakraborty/bips/blob/master/BIP-DynamicMaxBlockSize.mediawiki
  BIP: 1xx
  Title: Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
  Author: Upal Chakraborty 
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 2015-08-24
==Abstract== This BIP proposes replacing the fixed one megabyte maximum block size with a dynamically controlled maximum block size that may increase or decrease with difficulty change depending on various network factors. I have two proposals regarding this... i. Depending only on previous block size calculation. ii. Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners. ==Motivation== With increased adoption, transaction volume on bitcoin network is bound to grow. If the one megabyte max cap is not changed to a flexible one which changes itself with changing network demand, then adoption will hamper and bitcoin's growth may choke up. Following graph shows the change in average block size since inception... https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size?timespan=all&showDataPoints=false&daysAverageString=1&show_header=true&scale=0&address= ==Specification== ===Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation=== If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize Double MaxBlockSize Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize Half MaxBlockSize Else Keep the same MaxBlockSize ===Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners=== TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of first 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of second 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but one difficulty) TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of first 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of second 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but one difficulty) If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 > 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty > TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty > TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) ) MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty Else If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 < 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty < TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty < TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) ) MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty Else Keep the same MaxBlockSize ==Rationale== These two proposals have been derived after discussion on [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1154536.0 BitcoinTalk] and [http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010285.html bitcoin-dev mailing list]. The original idea and its evolution in the light of various arguements can be found [http://upalc.com/maxblocksize.php here]. ===Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation=== This solution is derived directly from the indication of the problem. If transaction volume increases, then we will naturally see bigger blocks. On the contrary, if there are not enough transaction volume, but maximum block size is high, then only few blocks may sweep the mempool. Hence, if block size is itself taken into consideration, then maximum block size can most rationally be derived. Moreover, this solution not only increases, but also decreases the maximum block size, just like difficulty. ===Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners=== This solution takes care of stable mining subsidy. It will not increase maximum block size, if Tx fee collection is not increasing and thereby creating a Tx fee pressure on the market. On the other hand, though the block size max cap is dynamically controlled, it is very difficult to game by any party because the increase or decrease of block size max cap will take place in the same ratio of average block size increase or decrease. ==Compatibility== This is a hard-forking change to the Bitcoin protocol; anybody running code that fully validates blocks must upgrade before the activation time or they will risk rejecting a chain containing larger-than-one-megabyte blocks. ==Other solutions considered== [http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf Making Decentralized Economic Policy] - by Jeff Garzik [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1078521.0 Elastic block cap with rollover penalties] - by Meni Rosenfeld [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0101.mediawiki Increase maximum block size] - by Gavin Andresen [https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 Block size following technological growth] - by Pieter Wuille [https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments] - by Joseph Poon & Thaddeus Dryja ==Deployment== If consensus is achieved, deployment can be made at a future block number at which difficulty will change. --001a113f3c70b25ba2051e1f0fd0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Github: https://github.com/UpalChakraborty/bips/blob/master/BIP-DynamicMaxBloc=
kSize.mediawiki
<pre>
  BIP: 1xx
  Title: Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
  Author: Upal Chakraborty <bitcoin=
@upalc.com>
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 2015-08-24
</pre>

=3D=3DAbstract=3D=3D

This BIP proposes replacing the fixed one megabyte maximum block size with =
a dynamically controlled maximum block size that may increase or decrease w=
ith difficulty change depending on various network factors. I have two prop=
osals regarding this...

i. Depending only on previous block size calculation.

ii. Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collec=
ted by miners.

=3D=3DMotivation=3D=3D

With increased adoption, transaction volume on bitcoin network is bound to =
grow. If the one megabyte max cap is not changed to a flexible one which ch=
anges itself with changing network demand, then adoption will hamper and bi=
tcoin's growth may choke up. Following graph shows the change in averag=
e block size since inception...

https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size?t=
imespan=3Dall&showDataPoints=3Dfalse&daysAverageString=3D1&show=
_header=3Dtrue&scale=3D0&address=3D

=3D=3DSpecification=3D=3D

=3D=3D=3DProposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation=3D=
=3D=3D

  If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last=
 difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
      Double MaxBlockSize
  Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the=
 last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
      Half MaxBlockSize
  Else
      Keep the same MaxBlockSize

=3D=3D=3DProposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and prev=
ious Tx fee collected by miners=3D=3D=3D
 =20
  TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty =3D Sum of all Block size of first 2=
008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period
  TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty =3D Sum of all Block size of second 2008 b=
locks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from las=
t but one difficulty)
 =20
  TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty =3D Sum of all Tx fees of first 2008 blo=
cks in last 2 difficulty period
  TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty =3D Sum of all Tx fees of second 2008 blocks i=
n last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but o=
ne difficulty)
 =20
  If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 &g=
t; 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty > TotalTxFeeInLastB=
utOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty > TotalBlockSizeInL=
astButOneDifficulty) )
      MaxBlockSize =3D TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / Tota=
lBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty
  Else If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/40=
16 < 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty < TotalTxFeeIn=
LastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty < TotalBlockSi=
zeInLastButOneDifficulty) )
      MaxBlockSize =3D TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / Tota=
lBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty
  Else
      Keep the same MaxBlockSize

=3D=3DRationale=3D=3D

These two proposals have been derived after discussion on [https://bitcointalk.org/ind=
ex.php?topic=3D1154536.0 BitcoinTalk] and [http://lists=
.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010285.html bitc=
oin-dev mailing list]. The original idea and its evolution in the light of =
various arguements can be found [http://upalc.com/maxblocksize.php here].

=3D=3D=3DProposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation=3D=
=3D=3D

This solution is derived directly from the indication of the problem. If tr=
ansaction volume increases, then we will naturally see bigger blocks. On th=
e contrary, if there are not enough transaction volume, but maximum block s=
ize is high, then only few blocks may sweep the mempool. Hence, if block si=
ze is itself taken into consideration, then maximum block size can most rat=
ionally be derived. Moreover, this solution not only increases, but also de=
creases the maximum block size, just like difficulty.

=3D=3D=3DProposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and prev=
ious Tx fee collected by miners=3D=3D=3D

This solution takes care of stable mining subsidy. It will not increase max=
imum block size, if Tx fee collection is not increasing and thereby creatin=
g a Tx fee pressure on the market. On the other hand, though the block size=
 max cap is dynamically controlled, it is very difficult to game by any par=
ty because the increase or decrease of block size max cap will take place i=
n the same ratio of average block size increase or decrease.

=3D=3DCompatibility=3D=3D

This is a hard-forking change to the Bitcoin protocol; anybody running code=
 that fully validates blocks must upgrade before the activation time or the=
y will risk rejecting a chain containing larger-than-one-megabyte blocks.

=3D=3DOther solutions considered=3D=3D

[http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf Mak=
ing Decentralized Economic Policy] - by Jeff Garzik

[https://bi=
tcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D1078521.0 Elastic block cap with rollov=
er penalties] - by Meni Rosenfeld

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0101.mediawiki Increas=
e maximum block size] - by Gavin Andresen

[https://gist=
.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 Block size following technologica=
l growth] - by Pieter Wuille

[https://=
lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf The Bitcoin Lightning Net=
work: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments] - by Joseph Poon & Thaddeus =
Dryja

=3D=3DDeployment=3D=3D

If consensus is achieved, deployment can be made at a future block number a=
t which difficulty will change.
--001a113f3c70b25ba2051e1f0fd0--