Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0E0D727 for ; Thu, 13 Jul 2017 00:26:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qk0-f180.google.com (mail-qk0-f180.google.com [209.85.220.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E31BAC for ; Thu, 13 Jul 2017 00:26:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qk0-f180.google.com with SMTP id d78so38427593qkb.1 for ; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 17:26:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:cc:references:from:to:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=cxZ67v/nNv+Wc8xdncqYpxr5yVCusw3y+uMfJqilkoE=; b=V5WyAREW6fiAtk/5ua4+V9k1h6y7/RB89NRNEhw5JI9/YurH5E3pOSA7g9PkkhE5iw xMr9MjKfJXnWZhINjlW8mQREraOnTdckOBuFrJEKWoD4wCr56il6/P14xzC4xLiQMwEb KJMeM4oP5LHPeeEYkZhnRafcPisSHJjOkgJYF89if3qxMCB1GytfxC+ZsZyVcjPm7gOr PUUxFaGTtEiqc6KwYZ0v5Lh8MYGyUp9XX5XV1hYrL56P0jD+NuHr6bqwo5mIKCF3BQII 247Nrqbjbf9QIuITWotL9aqOeJ5amIp310kWUwOuHIuYrbvh4goEn84X7rndh+3WTU2p EQYg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:cc:references:from:to:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=cxZ67v/nNv+Wc8xdncqYpxr5yVCusw3y+uMfJqilkoE=; b=jYSNTvwfM4EYYxcw87JlAPW0IeVS1AaKZRmbqd+SxGZnzwwAtiwoFJL6f3ZD1S6vJ2 Y9pS/JHvfjBr5LwKb3T1MtP4c/ELqCqLepZncrS2FTtDP8BbOefmNYybtA3+iCrMKrxY LeJEcb6zYptdLIt+hZ+3aNKHfO+YLIljeYfqqbcvlNpNvPbgDgDUXyj0ZZ20iUiWvJb6 hCFRrMoP/ntEGmp1k7F+VetxwL5dVzh5p3w85rpRdqN59uVb3rV21A4aGUlTcCmwsCyi H5AsIUJkIX98mLGk4gz6QMhne5yoYQ318UckRKuBtac1SK6wK0ONdVaZaHHBXocNRPx/ T9FQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AIVw111iUwzcwoWLVqjsL3tdQav68ZhjHTPD49fRGntkRxIrhHDLbdq2 ub76/15LF4CRi9tA X-Received: by 10.55.40.218 with SMTP id o87mr1496209qko.50.1499905615321; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 17:26:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.104] (ool-45726efb.dyn.optonline.net. [69.114.110.251]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id 143sm2899505qkf.8.2017.07.12.17.26.53 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 12 Jul 2017 17:26:53 -0700 (PDT) References: <24f2b447-a237-45eb-ef9f-1a62533fad5c@gmail.com> <83671224-f6ff-16a9-81c0-20ab578aec9d@gmail.com> <6764b8af-bb4c-615d-5af5-462127bbbe36@gmail.com> From: Paul Sztorc To: Tao Effect Message-ID: <117f6a96-6d90-778a-d87a-be72592e31c5@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 20:26:56 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------1EEDB2D43D9930B9651185F8" Content-Language: en-US X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.5 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 00:53:56 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 00:26:57 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------1EEDB2D43D9930B9651185F8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.= I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types of user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer): [DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is running, say, 0.13). However, they experience the effects of the new rules which miners add (as per the soft fork[s] to add drivechain functionality and individual drivechains). [DC#1] -- Someone who always upgrades to the latest version of the Bitcoin software, but otherwise has no interest in running/using sidechai= ns. [DC#2] -- Someone who upgrades to the latest Bitcoin version, and decides to also become a full node of one or more sidechains, but who ever actually uses the sidechains. [DC#3] -- Someone who upgrades their software, runs sidechain full nodes, and actively moves money to and from these. On 7/12/2017 6:43 PM, Tao Effect wrote: > > I am now looking closer again at step number 4 in the Drivechain > specification [2]: > > 4. Everyone waits for a period of, say, 3 days. This gives > everyone an opportunity to make sure the same WT^ is in both the > Bitcoin coinbase and the Sidechain header. If they=E2=80=99re diffe= rent, > everyone has plenty of time to contact each other, figure out what > is going on, and restart the process until its right. > > It seems to me that where our disagreement lies is in this point. > The Drivechain spec seems to claim that its use of anyone-can-pay is > the same as P2SH (and in later emails you reference SegWit as well). > Is this really true? FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up to several months. [DC#0] Yes [DC#1] Yes [DC#2] Yes [DC#3] Yes Because if a node doesn't have the sidechain's information, it will just assume every withdrawal is valid. This is comparable to someone who still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, in cases [DC#0] and [#1]. (And this is the main advantage of DC over extension blocks). > 2. Per the question in [1], it's my understanding that P2SH > transactions contain all of the information within themselves for full > nodes to act as a check on miners mishandling the anyone-can-spend > nature of P2SH transactions. However, that does not seem to be the > case with WT^ transactions. [DC#0] They do. [DC#1] They do. [DC#2] They do. [DC#3] They do. Again, from the perspective of a mainchain user, every withdrawal is vali= d. > In P2SH txns, there is no need for anyone to, as the Drivechain spec > says, "to contact each other, figure out what is going on". Everything > just automatically works. There is no *need* to this in Drivechain, either, for [DC#0] or [DC#1]. [DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in understanding what is going on, but that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this mailing list. > If the security of WT^ transactions could be brought up to actually be > in line with the security of P2SH and SegWit transactions, then I > would have far less to object to. Somehow I doubt it. Paul --------------1EEDB2D43D9930B9651185F8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.

I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types of user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer):

[DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is running, say, 0.13). However, they experience the effects of the new rules which miners add (as per the soft fork[s] to add drivechain functionality and individual drivechains).
[DC#1] -- Someone who always upgrades to the latest version of the Bitcoin software, but otherwise has no interest in running/using sidechains.
[DC#2] -- Someone who upgrades to the latest Bitcoin version, and decides to also become a full node of one or more sidechains, but who ever actually uses the sidechains.
[DC#3] -- Someone who upgrades their software, runs sidechain full nodes, and actively moves money to and from these.


On 7/12/2017 6:43 PM, Tao Effect wrote:

I am now looking closer again at step number 4 in the Drivechain specification [2]:

4. Everyone waits for a period of, say, 3 days. This gives everyone an opportunity to make sure the same WT^ is in both the Bitcoin coinbase and the Sidechain header. If they’re different, everyone has plenty of time to contact each other, figure out what is going on, and restart the process until its right.
It seems to me that where our disagreement lies is in this point.
The Drivechain spec seems to claim that its use of anyone-can-pay is the same as P2SH (and in later emails you reference SegWit as well). Is this really true?
FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up to several months.

[DC#0] Yes
[DC#1] Yes
[DC#2] Yes
[DC#3] Yes

Because if a node doesn't have the sidechain's information, it will just assume every withdrawal is valid. This is comparable to someone who still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, in cases [DC#0] and [#1].

(And this is the main advantage of DC over extension blocks).


2. Per the question in [1], it's my understanding that P2SH transactions contain all of the information within themselves for full nodes to act as a check on miners mishandling the anyone-can-spend nature of P2SH transactions. However, that does not seem to be the case with WT^ transactions.
[DC#0] They do.
[DC#1] They do.
[DC#2] They do.
[DC#3] They do.

Again, from the perspective of a mainchain user, every withdrawal is valid.


In P2SH txns, there is no need for anyone to, as the Drivechain spec says, "to contact each other, figure out what is going on". Everything just automatically works.
There is no *need* to this in Drivechain, either, for [DC#0] or [DC#1].

[DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in understanding what is going on, but that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this mailing list.


If the security of WT^ transactions could be brought up to actually be in line with the security of P2SH and SegWit transactions, then I would have far less to object to.
Somehow I doubt it.


Paul
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