Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3386B259 for ; Sat, 13 May 2017 16:43:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (zinan.dashjr.org [192.3.11.21]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0368AD for ; Sat, 13 May 2017 16:43:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:a45d:823b:2d27:961c]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DF1F938A0087; Sat, 13 May 2017 16:42:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Hashcash: 1:25:170513:pete@petertodd.org::UqGNN5PM2/8sUYHs:cYS3 X-Hashcash: 1:25:170513:ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com::OaaY9dvBWHwa4zwX:bu2eS X-Hashcash: 1:25:170513:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::V=GWOHpge3PWtSB3:dMZeF From: Luke Dashjr To: Peter Todd Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 16:42:44 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.9.16-gentoo; KDE/4.14.29; x86_64; ; ) References: <201705121922.57445.luke@dashjr.org> <201705130049.33798.luke@dashjr.org> <20170513124848.GC8884@fedora-23-dvm> In-Reply-To: <20170513124848.GC8884@fedora-23-dvm> X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-15" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201705131642.45124.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Block signal enforcement via tx fees X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 16:43:45 -0000 On Saturday 13 May 2017 12:48:48 PM Peter Todd wrote: > > You assume users will pay for signalling of softforks prematurely. So > > long as it waits until deployment of the softfork is widespread, this > > risk is minimal. At worst, it creates risks similar to a UASF. So long > > as UASF is the alternative, this way seems strictly better. > > I think you're assuming that the users paying for soft-fork signalling will > represent an economic majority; that's not necessarily the case. I'm assuming that if the economic majority hasn't consented to the softfork, at least as many users will make their transactions conditional on non- signalling.