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 <7B0D8EE4-19D9-4686-906C-F762F29E74D4@mattcorallo.com>
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From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= <jtimon@jtimon.cc>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:31:01 +0100
Message-ID: <CABm2gDrbKdxMuKdwYh0HBXNUxhqWtq1x2oLC0Ni=dbfP8b_a7Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Cc: Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yesterday's Taproot activation meeting on
 lockinontimeout (LOT)
Precedence: list

Sorry, I haven't read everything. I just want to say what I think is
the best option and why.
Let's say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation
after which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think
this is LOT=3Dtrue, but I don't remember what LOT stands for).
Some may argue than it's easier to move from LOT=3Dfalse to LOT=3Dtrue
than viceversa (I think I'm getting this right), but either way
different clients could interpret things more differently more easily
and, you know, that's really bad.
If anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do
is run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever
miners signal activation, blocks aren't valid so that it doesn't
happen.
That way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities
(assuming there's a community of users opposing the change) can stick
together with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2
chains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if
not, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for
pople who don't want it.

Just my two sats, please nobody ask me "why would anyone oppose
taproot?" or anything similar. Because I'm trying to generalize here,
if we're talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change
are kind of irrelevant.

Separately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.


On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au> wrote:
>
> =EF=BB=BFIf a lockinontimeout=3Dtrue node is requesting compact blocks fr=
om a
> lockinontimeout=3Dfalse node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase=
,
> I think that could result in a ban.
>
> More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other=
.
>
>
> (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there'd be bigger things to
> worry about...)
>
>
> I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow=
 consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a=
 fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over =
months. We can=E2=80=99t simply ignore that.
>
> I think the important specific case of this is something like "if a chain
> where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,
> miners with lockinontimeout=3Dtrue need to be well connected so they don'=
t
> end up competing with each other while they're catching back up".
>
>
> Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is m=
aterial  technical complexity hiding behind a =E2=80=9Cchange the consensus=
 rules=E2=80=9C option. Given it=E2=80=99s not a critical feature by any me=
ans, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn=E2=80=99t wort=
h it.
>
> Matt
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