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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 14:01:51 +0200
Message-ID: <CANEZrP0UT=QCDmKDaVcWcf++bJzXSiT83ubUXLmd0N8-6nvrrQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
To: Daryl Banttari <dbanttari@gmail.com>
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	<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] secure assigned bitcoin address directory
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Hi Daryl,

I think the reason nobody has done that is that BIP70 isn't really that
much work. It's basically just certs inside a protobuf, with a bit of extra
data. I'm not sure yet another way to do the same thing is worth much.


On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 2:59 AM, Daryl Banttari <dbanttari@gmail.com> wrote:

> Chris,
>
> Thank you for taking the time to look at my proposal.
>
> 1) pay to addresses are not fixed - ie you can have a different address
>> for each transaction (which is why BIP70 is necessary to allow per
>> transaction addresses via https.)
>>
>
> This is certainly true for a "published" address; however a new address
> (and URL) can be generated for each one-off peer-to-peer transaction.
>  However, I'd expect that most of the time this use case will be handed by
> BIP70.  Still, this could allow someone to implement a authenticated,
> non-repudiable payment request without having to go through the hassle of a
> full BIP70 implementation.
>
>
>> 2) unless you are already aware of the  public key of the signature, you
>> do not know if the signature is made by the person you think it is supposed
>> to be from. See recent concern over fake key for Gavin Andresen. Ie a
>> signature can always be verified with a valid public key, the question is
>> was it the real person's key. That is what WoT tried to resolve with
>> so-called "signing parties", nowadays keys posted to a public forum by a
>> known user, but it's not a standard and not ideal.
>>
>
> My proposal leverages the existing SSL key system (yes, PKI), so there is
> a reasonable expectation that if the signature verifies, it came from the
> party indicated on the cert.  While SSL (and the PKI system underpinning
> it) have its faults, the example you highlighted was specifically a problem
> with WoT, not PKI.  Can a compromised web server cause payments to be made
> to the wrong party?  Of course-- but that's already true.  And that's not
> something BIP70 solves (or attempts to solve) either.
>
> (To explain [better than I could] why I feel PKI is a pragmatic solution,
> I defer to Mike Hearn 's article:
> https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7)
>
> --Daryl
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Daryl,<div><br></div><div>I think the reason nobody has=
 done that is that BIP70 isn&#39;t really that much work. It&#39;s basicall=
y just certs inside a protobuf, with a bit of extra data. I&#39;m not sure =
yet another way to do the same thing is worth much.</div>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed,=
 Apr 2, 2014 at 2:59 AM, Daryl Banttari <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:dbanttari@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dbanttari@gmail.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
Chris,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>Thank you for taking the time to look at my proposal.</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"">

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div>1) pay to addresses are not fixed - ie you can have a=
 different address for each transaction (which is why BIP70 is necessary to=
 allow per transaction addresses via https.)</div>


<div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div><div>This is certainly tr=
ue for a &quot;published&quot; address; however a new address (and URL) can=
 be generated for each one-off peer-to-peer transaction. =C2=A0However, I&#=
39;d expect that most of the time this use case will be handed by BIP70. =
=C2=A0Still, this could allow someone to implement a authenticated, non-rep=
udiable payment request without having to go through the hassle of a full B=
IP70 implementation.</div>


</div><div class=3D""><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb=
(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>2) unless you =
are already aware of the =C2=A0public key of the signature, you do not know=
 if the signature is made by the person you think it is supposed to be from=
. See recent concern over fake key for Gavin Andresen. Ie a signature can a=
lways be verified with a valid public key, the question is was it the real =
person&#39;s key. That is what WoT tried to resolve with so-called &quot;si=
gning parties&quot;, nowadays keys posted to a public forum by a known user=
, but it&#39;s not a standard and not ideal.</div>


</blockquote></div></div><br>My proposal leverages the existing SSL key sys=
tem (yes, PKI), so there is a reasonable expectation that if the signature =
verifies, it came from the party indicated on the cert. =C2=A0While SSL (an=
d the PKI system underpinning it) have its faults, the example you highligh=
ted was specifically a problem with WoT, not PKI. =C2=A0Can a compromised w=
eb server cause payments to be made to the wrong party? =C2=A0Of course-- b=
ut that&#39;s already true. =C2=A0And that&#39;s not something BIP70 solves=
 (or attempts to solve) either.</div>


<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">(To explain=
 [better than I could] why I feel PKI is a pragmatic solution, I defer to M=
ike Hearn &#39;s article: =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://medium.com/bitcoin-secur=
ity-functionality/b64cf5912aa7" target=3D"_blank">https://medium.com/bitcoi=
n-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7</a>)</div>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">

<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">--Daryl</di=
v></font></span></div>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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