Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1WLBMp-0001Xn-V0 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 05 Mar 2014 12:56:11 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.213.176 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.213.176; envelope-from=pieter.wuille@gmail.com; helo=mail-ig0-f176.google.com; Received: from mail-ig0-f176.google.com ([209.85.213.176]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1WLBMp-0004OW-3X for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 05 Mar 2014 12:56:11 +0000 Received: by mail-ig0-f176.google.com with SMTP id uy17so13225020igb.3 for ; Wed, 05 Mar 2014 04:56:05 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.60.103 with SMTP id g7mr34356782igr.20.1394024165715; Wed, 05 Mar 2014 04:56:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.50.141.135 with HTTP; Wed, 5 Mar 2014 04:56:05 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2014 13:56:05 +0100 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (pieter.wuille[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1WLBMp-0004OW-3X Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] New side channel attack that can recover Bitcoin keys X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 12:56:12 -0000 On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:49 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: > I am not currently aware of any efforts to make OpenSSL's secp256k1 > implementation completely side channel free in all aspects. Also, > unfortunately many people have reimplemented ECDSA themselves and even if > OpenSSL gets fixed, the custom implementations probably won't. As far as I know, judging from the implementation, there is hardly any effort to try to prevent timing attacks. -- Pieter