From: Matt Whitlock <bip@mattwhitlock.name>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 17:14:58 -0400
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Cc: greg@xiph.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
	[BIP 1xx - Draft]
Precedence: list

On Tuesday, 25 August 2015, at 1:37 pm, Peter Todd wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 04:26:23PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
> > On Tuesday, 25 August 2015, at 1:16 pm, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev =
wrote:
> > > What would you think of an approach like John Dillon's proposal t=
o
> > > explicitly give the economic majority of coin holders a vote for =
the max
> > > blocksize? Miners could still vote BIP100 style for what max they=
 were
> > > willing to use, limited in turn by the vote of the economic major=
ity.
> >=20
> > What fraction of coin holders do you suppose will vote? And, of tho=
se, what fraction have the technical knowledge to make an informed vote=
? It would be like polling Toyota truck owners to see whether the 2017 =
Tacoma should increase its engine's cylinder displacement by 10%. Ordin=
ary users just aren't going to be able to vote meaningfully, and most w=
on't respond to the poll at all.
>=20
> Note that you can make the % of voters required adapt dyanmically to =
voter
> interest. Also, your example is rather misleading, as car buyers *do*=

> make those kinds of decisions though various market mechanisms.

Yes, car buyers do make those kinds of decisions through market mechani=
sms. An equivalent process for Bitcoin would be that the max block-size=
 limit (and other fundamental economic parameters) would be determined =
via a process of forking off altcoins (such as Bitcoin XT will do) and =
allowing the market to decide which coin is most valuable. This is the =
"default" mechanism for change (because it's what naturally happens whe=
n there is a lack of internal consensus), but it's not the least painfu=
l mechanism.

My point still stands that =E2=80=94 just as in democracy in general =E2=
=80=94 the voters are really in no position to cast informed votes, nor=
 should they be (cf. "rational ignorance" [1]). I do not oppose opening=
 up the determination of the max block-size limit to a popular "check" =
via stakeholder vote =E2=80=94 actually, I think this is an important c=
heck on miners' power =E2=80=94 but I do argue that the vote is likely =
to have drastically little participation and very low-quality results.

[1] Rational Ignorance: =C2=ABIgnorance about an issue is said to be "r=
ational" when the cost of educating oneself about the issue sufficientl=
y to make an informed decision can outweigh any potential benefit one c=
ould reasonably expect to gain from that decision, and so it would be i=
rrational to waste time doing so.=C2=BB <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/=
Rational_ignorance>