Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52EBBC002D for ; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:12:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20D4A40CE0 for ; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:12:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 20D4A40CE0 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=SJGygwqF X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.088 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.088 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6-vg92sizSJf for ; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:12:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 100DE40CC6 Received: from mail-oa1-x29.google.com (mail-oa1-x29.google.com [IPv6:2001:4860:4864:20::29]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 100DE40CC6 for ; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:12:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oa1-x29.google.com with SMTP id 586e51a60fabf-134072c15c1so21024082fac.2 for ; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 08:12:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=x+F8Z/7KMP7MlR4IdwXRnRtZafdnNH1ZvPbk2nk1SNs=; b=SJGygwqFY7peEiL6Qd15fLBmAlgaz9EU0zB8XRKD5MnUa5A+anLb8cyP62rm63UVzS tNoB5NAnHAbyn/3xesC2R5ck8uGEYfQXPjUNpugXrHPlC9BwIO1jynrT686ui6hVdnvv LQDxz1u6dGVZKv6UvR1bddcu/gvItMv8hTN4e8Qym/mFyC7HS4c+3jfQ8PvZKKI9tonI rON9UDLcJv5Xgu/Vrdv6DOHKbPBFD/5uOHjduRfpWz2g1x2Mdx+Qarj7aVAtiP6pBuNN 7/LttWnN903HwhJ0uKV7eUPGQK24O71uUYdhCPE/Wgutxp5aEvrHQlKF6mdJaW5dLJUm ZFsQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=x+F8Z/7KMP7MlR4IdwXRnRtZafdnNH1ZvPbk2nk1SNs=; b=nh5VJrLWlL/NlV5BRXN12zHr8r8+UOSAosOuOAqVNUSU7uGm+kQVRFa/YyW7pd0UVs Xlh5liG5Dz+ddqA/Q+PGstlS9WKxf8yNBjHCrAaUh98Lr+xxwAQJn6FmCqc0Blw+nq3s mHEMeK951kUmAoib8ykSf/32lcz38qYWn9mZEo5lf1o1bTBeMcVrSiHS9ttuUaDWjbkR FxMvm5IA3qx4q2Y4x2Bv4mo3o6TSBuB1h0qrOnus6X/A3NlYvpDIWZeD/vHhXijLuep2 lRZose6IZTy0nDZBGOHLjtlX9AVbwGFBd7qs8VAF7aWlVImR62ptoPFD0YRS7XIyg7yl LiKw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACrzQf1LSEg1VLKLlRtGGOLR/AJmwt9ws7nzPg89uWVU5V08DbWyuh7B rXO670RP0fyttWclu6VdsuKiQi89JnkYUdP1YDs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMsMyM7AFzkWl/lecmgt+htCtZWSBdbCl9NQI0Io+ZonJjrPsf+CNeuWTsyJ9fAlJVydNQBRF7RLf+w+tSWw8Kk6h3c= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6870:b002:b0:131:ec02:b906 with SMTP id y2-20020a056870b00200b00131ec02b906mr5536647oae.222.1666192329866; Wed, 19 Oct 2022 08:12:09 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: "James O'Beirne" Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 11:11:57 -0400 Message-ID: To: Jeremy Rubin , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f302e805eb64a1ab" Cc: Greg Sanders Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Ephemeral Anchors: Fixing V3 Package RBF againstpackage limit pinning X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:12:13 -0000 --000000000000f302e805eb64a1ab Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I'm also very happy to see this proposal, since it gets us closer to having a mechanism that allows the contribution to feerate in an "unauthenticated" way, which seems to be a very helpful feature for vaults and other contracting protocols. One possible advantage of the sponsors interface -- and I'm curious for your input here Greg -- is that with sponsors, assuming we relaxed the "one sponsor per sponsoree" constraint, multiple uncoordinated parties can collaboratively bump a tx's feerate. A simple example would be a batch withdrawal from an exchange could be created with a low feerate, and then multiple users with a vested interest of expedited confirmation could all "chip in" to raise the feerate with multiple sponsor transactions. Having a single ephemeral output seems to create a situation where a single UTXO has to shoulder the burden of CPFPing a package. Is there some way we could (possibly later) amend the ephemeral anchor interface to allow for this kind of collaborative sponsoring? Could you maybe see "chained" ephemeral anchors that would allow this? On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 12:52 PM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Excellent proposal and I agree it does capture much of the spirit of > sponsors w.r.t. how they might be used for V3 protocols. > > The only drawbacks I see is they don't work for lower tx version > contracts, so there's still something to be desired there, and that the > requirement to sweep the output must be incentive compatible for the mine= r, > or else they won't enforce it (pass the buck onto the future bitcoiners). > The Ephemeral UTXO concept can be a consensus rule (see > https://rubin.io/public/pdfs/multi-txn-contracts.pdf "Intermediate UTXO") > we add later on in lieu of managing them by incentive, so maybe it's a > cleanup one can punt. > > One question I have is if V3 is designed for lightning, and this is > designed for lightning, is there any sense in requiring these outputs for > v3? That might help with e.g. anonymity set, as well as potentially keep > the v3 surface smaller. > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 11:51 AM Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> > does that effectively mark output B as unspendable once the child gets >> confirmed? >> >> Not at all. It's a normal spend like before, since the parent has been >> confirmed. It's completely unrestricted, not being bound to any >> V3/ephemeral anchor restrictions on size, version, etc. >> >> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 11:47 AM Arik Sosman via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> Hi Greg, >>> >>> Thank you very much for sharing your proposal! >>> >>> I think there's one thing about the second part of your proposal that >>> I'm missing. Specifically, assuming the scenario of a v3 transaction wi= th >>> three outputs, A, B, and the ephemeral anchor OP_TRUE. If a child >>> transaction spends A and OP_TRUE, does that effectively mark output B a= s >>> unspendable once the child gets confirmed? If so, isn't the implication >>> therefore that to safely spend a transaction with an ephemeral anchor, = all >>> outputs must be spent? Thanks! >>> >>> Best, >>> Arik >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022, at 6:52 AM, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>> >>> Hello Everyone, >>> >>> Following up on the "V3 Transaction" discussion here >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-September/= 020937.html >>> , I would like to elaborate a bit further on some potential follow-on w= ork >>> that would make pinning severely constrained in many setups]. >>> >>> V3 transactions may solve bip125 rule#3 and rule#5 pinning attacks unde= r >>> some constraints[0]. This means that when a replacement is to be made a= nd >>> propagated, it costs the expected amount of fees to do so. This is a gr= eat >>> start. What's left in this subset of pinning is *package limit* pinning= . In >>> other words, a fee-paying transaction cannot enter the mempool due to t= he >>> existing mempool package it is being added to already being too large i= n >>> count or vsize. >>> >>> Zooming into the V3 simplified scenario for sake of discussion, though >>> this problem exists in general today: >>> >>> V3 transactions restrict the package limit of a V3 package to one paren= t >>> and one child. If the parent transaction includes two outputs which can= be >>> immediately spent by separate parties, this allows one party to disallo= w a >>> spend from the other. In Gloria's proposal for ln-penalty, this is work= ed >>> around by reducing the number of anchors per commitment transaction to = 1, >>> and each version of the commitment transaction has a unique party's key= on >>> it. The honest participant can spend their version with their anchor an= d >>> package RBF the other commitment transaction safely. >>> >>> What if there's only one version of the commitment transaction, such as >>> in other protocols like duplex payment channels, eltoo? What about mult= i >>> party payments? >>> >>> In the package RBF proposal, if the parent transaction is identical to >>> an existing transaction in the mempool, the parent will be detected and >>> removed from the package proposal. You are then left with a single V3 c= hild >>> transaction, which is then proposed for entry into the mempool. In the = case >>> of another parent output already being spent, this is simply rejected, >>> regardless of feerate of the new child. >>> >>> I have two proposed solutions, of which I strongly prefer the latter: >>> >>> 1) Expand a carveout for "sibling eviction", where if the new child is >>> paying "enough" to bump spends from the same parent, it knocks its sibl= ing >>> out of the mempool and takes the one child slot. This would solve it, b= ut >>> is a new eviction paradigm that would need to be carefully worked throu= gh. >>> >>> 2) Ephemeral Anchors (my real policy-only proposal) >>> >>> Ephemeral Anchors is a term which means an output is watermarked as an >>> output that MUST be spent in a V3 package. We mark this anchor by being= the >>> bare script `OP_TRUE` and of course make these outputs standard to rela= y >>> and spend with empty witness data. >>> >>> Also as a simplifying assumption, we require the parent transaction wit= h >>> such an output to be 0-fee. This makes mempool reasoning simpler in cas= e >>> the child-spend is somehow evicted, guaranteeing the parent will be as = well. >>> >>> Implications: >>> >>> a) If the ephemeral anchor MUST be spent, we can allow *any* value, eve= n >>> dust, even 0, without worrying about bloating the utxo set. We relax th= is >>> policy for maximum smart contract flexibility and specification simplic= ity.. >>> >>> b) Since this anchor MUST be spent, any spending of other outputs in th= e >>> same parent transaction MUST directly double-spend prior spends of the >>> ephemeral anchor. This causes the 1 block CSV timelock on outputs to be >>> removed in these situations. This greatly magnifies composability of sm= art >>> contracts, as now we can do things like safely splice directly into new >>> channels, into statechains, your custodial wallet account, your cold >>> wallet, wherever, without requiring other wallets to support arbitrary >>> scripts. Also it hurts that 1 CSV time locked scripts may not be minisc= ript >>> compatible to begin with... >>> >>> c) *Anyone* can bump the transaction, without any transaction key >>> material. This is essentially achieving Jeremy's Transaction Sponsors ( >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/= 018168.html) >>> proposal without consensus changes. As long as someone gets a fully sig= ned >>> parent, they can execute a bump with minimal wallet tooling. If a >>> transaction author doesn=E2=80=99t want a =E2=80=9Csponsor=E2=80=9D, do= not include the output. >>> >>> d) Lightning Carve-out( >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-October/= 002240.html) >>> is superseded by this logic, as we are not restricted to two immediatel= y >>> spendable output scenarios. In its place, robust multi-party fee bumpin= g is >>> possible. >>> >>> e) This also benefits more traditional wallet scenarios, as change >>> outputs can no longer be pinned, and RBF/CPFP becomes robust. Payees in >>> simple spends cannot pin you. Batched payouts become a lot less painful= . >>> This was one of the motivating use cases that created the term =E2=80= =9Cpinning=E2=80=9D in >>> the first place( >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February/0= 15717.html), >>> even if LN/L2 discussion has largely overtaken it due to HTLC theft ris= ks. >>> >>> Open Question(s): >>> >>> >>> 1. >>> >>> If we allow non-zero value in ephemeral outputs, does this open up a >>> MEV we are worried about? Wallets should toss all the value directly= to >>> fees, and add their own additional fees on top, otherwise miners hav= e >>> incentive to make the smallest utxo burn transaction to claim those = funds. >>> They just confirmed your parent transaction anyways, so do we care? >>> 2. >>> >>> SIGHASH_GROUP like constructs would allow uncommitted ephemeral >>> anchors to be added at spend time, depending on spending requirement= s. >>> SIGHASH_SINGLE already allows this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Hopefully this gives people something to consider as we move forward in >>> thinking about mempool design within the constraints we have today. >>> >>> >>> Greg >>> >>> 0: With V3 transactions where you have "veto power" over all the inputs >>> in that transaction. Therefore something like ANYONECANPAY is still bro= ken. >>> We need a more complex solution, which I=E2=80=99m punting for the sake= of progress. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --000000000000f302e805eb64a1ab Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'm also very happy to see this proposal, since i= t gets us closer to having a mechanism that allows the contribution to fee= rate in an "unauthenticated" way, which seems to be a very helpfu= l feature for vaults and other contracting protocols.

<= div>One possible advantage of the sponsors interface -- and I'm curious= for your input here Greg -- is that with sponsors, assuming we relaxed the= "one sponsor per sponsoree" constraint, multiple uncoordinated p= arties can collaboratively bump a tx's feerate. A simple example would = be a batch withdrawal from an exchange could be created with a low feerate,= and then multiple users with a vested interest of expedited confirmation c= ould all "chip in" to raise the feerate with multiple sponsor tra= nsactions.

Having a single ephemeral output s= eems to create a situation where a single UTXO has to shoulder the burden o= f CPFPing a package. Is there some way we could (possibly later) amend the = ephemeral anchor interface to allow for this kind of collaborative sponsori= ng? Could you maybe see "chained" ephemeral anchors that would al= low this?


On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 12:52 PM Jeremy R= ubin via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Excellent proposal and I agree it does capture much o= f the spirit of sponsors w.r.t. how they might be used for V3 protocols.

The only drawbacks I see=C2=A0is they don't work for lower tx= version contracts, so there's still something to be desired there, and= that the requirement to sweep the output must be incentive compatible for = the miner, or else they won't enforce it (pass the buck onto the future= bitcoiners). The Ephemeral UTXO concept can be a consensus rule (see=C2=A0= https://rubin.io/public/pdfs/multi-txn-contracts.pdf "Inte= rmediate UTXO") we add later on in lieu of managing them by incentive,= so maybe it's a cleanup one can punt.

One question I have = is if V3 is designed for lightning, and this is designed for lightning, is = there any sense in requiring these outputs for v3? That might help with e.g= . anonymity set, as well as potentially keep the v3 surface smaller.
<= /div>
O= n Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 11:51 AM Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de= v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> does that effectively mark= output B as unspendable once the child gets confirmed?

= Not at all. It's a normal spend like before, since the parent has been = confirmed. It's completely unrestricted, not being bound to any V3/ephe= meral anchor restrictions on size, version, etc.

On Tue, Oct 18, 2022= at 11:47 AM Arik Sosman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org> wrote:
Hi Greg,

Thank yo= u very much for sharing your proposal!

I think the= re's one thing about the second part of your proposal that I'm miss= ing. Specifically, assuming the scenario of a v3 transaction with three out= puts, A, B, and the ephemeral anchor OP_TRUE. If a child transaction spends= A and OP_TRUE, does that effectively mark output B as unspendable once the= child gets confirmed? If so, isn't the implication therefore that to s= afely spend a transaction with an ephemeral anchor, all outputs must be spe= nt? Thanks!

Best,
Arik

On Tue, Oct 18, 2022, at 6:52 AM, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-= dev wrote:

Hello Everyone,


Following up on the "V3 Transaction" discussi= on here https://lists.linuxfoundation= .org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-September/020937.html , I would like to= elaborate a bit further on some potential follow-on work that would make p= inning severely constrained in many setups].


V3 transactions may solve bip125 rule#3 and rule#5 pinn= ing attacks under some constraints[0]. This means that when a replacement i= s to be made and propagated, it costs the expected amount of fees to do so.= This is a great start. What's left in this subset of pinning is *packa= ge limit* pinning. In other words, a fee-paying transaction cannot enter th= e mempool due to the existing mempool package it is being added to already = being too large in count or vsize.


Zooming into the V3 simplified scenario for sake of discussion, th= ough this problem exists in general today:


V3 transactions restrict the package limit of a V3 package= to one parent and one child. If the parent transaction includes two output= s which can be immediately spent by separate parties, this allows one party= to disallow a spend from the other. In Gloria's proposal for ln-penalt= y, this is worked around by reducing the number of anchors per commitment t= ransaction to 1, and each version of the commitment transaction has a uniqu= e party's key on it. The honest participant can spend their version wit= h their anchor and package RBF the other commitment transaction safely.


What if there's only one = version of the commitment transaction, such as in other protocols like dupl= ex payment channels, eltoo? What about multi party payments?<= /span>


In the package RBF proposal, if the pare= nt transaction is identical to an existing transaction in the mempool, the = parent will be detected and removed from the package proposal. You are then= left with a single V3 child transaction, which is then proposed for entry = into the mempool. In the case of another parent output already being spent,= this is simply rejected, regardless of feerate of the new child.


I have two proposed solutions, of w= hich I strongly prefer the latter:


1) Expand a carveout for "sibling eviction", where if th= e new child is paying "enough" to bump spends from the same paren= t, it knocks its sibling out of the mempool and takes the one child slot. T= his would solve it, but is a new eviction paradigm that would need to be ca= refully worked through.


= 2) Ephemeral Anchors (my real policy-only proposal)


Ephemeral Anchors is a term which means an output= is watermarked as an output that MUST be spent in a V3 package. We mark th= is anchor by being the bare script `OP_TRUE` and of course make these outpu= ts standard to relay and spend with empty witness data.


<= span style=3D"font-size:11pt">Also as a simplifying assumption, we require = the parent transaction with such an output to be 0-fee. This makes mempool = reasoning simpler in case the child-spend is somehow evicted, guaranteeing = the parent will be as well.


Implications:


= a) If the = ephemeral anchor MUST be spent, we can allow *any* value, even dust, even 0= , without worrying about bloating the utxo set. We relax this policy for ma= ximum smart contract flexibility and specification simplicity..


b) Since this anchor MUST be spent, a= ny spending of other outputs in the same parent transaction MUST directly d= ouble-spend prior spends of the ephemeral anchor. This causes the 1 block C= SV timelock on outputs to be removed in these situations. This greatly magn= ifies composability of smart contracts, as now we can do things like safely= splice directly into new channels, into statechains, your custodial wallet= account, your cold wallet, wherever, without requiring other wallets to su= pport arbitrary scripts. Also it hurts that 1 CSV time locked scripts may n= ot be miniscript compatible to begin with...


c) *Anyone* can bump the transaction, without any trans= action key material. This is essentially achieving Jeremy's Transaction= Sponsors (https://lists.linuxfound= ation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/018168.html) proposal without consensus changes. As long as someone gets= a fully signed parent, they can execute a bump with minimal wallet tooling= . If a transaction author doesn=E2=80=99t want a =E2=80=9Csponsor=E2=80=9D,= do not include the output.


d) Lightning Carve-out(= https://li= sts.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-October/002240.html)=C2=A0 is superseded by this logic, as we are = not restricted to two immediately spendable output scenarios. In its place,= robust multi-party fee bumping is possible.


e) This also benefits more traditional wallet scenarios= , as change outputs can no longer be pinned, and RBF/CPFP becomes robust. P= ayees in simple spends cannot pin you. Batched payouts become a lot less pa= inful. This was one of the motivating use cases that created the term =E2= =80=9Cpinning=E2=80=9D in the first place(https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February= /015717.html), even if LN/L2 discussion has = largely overtaken it due to HTLC theft risks.

<= div>

Open Question(s):


=

  1. If we allow non-zero value in epheme= ral outputs, does this open up a MEV we are worried about? Wallets should t= oss all the value directly to fees, and add their own additional fees on to= p, otherwise miners have incentive to make the smallest utxo burn transacti= on to claim those funds. They just confirmed your parent transaction anyway= s, so do we care?

  2. <= span style=3D"background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font= -variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">SIGHASH_GROUP like constructs would allow unco= mmitted ephemeral anchors to be added at spend time, depending on spending = requirements. SIGHASH_SINGLE already allows this.




Hopefully this giv= es people something to consider as we move forward in thinking about mempoo= l design within the constraints we have today.

=


Greg

<= br>

0: With V3 transactions where you have "veto power"= ; over all the inputs in that transaction. Therefore something like ANYONEC= ANPAY is still broken. We need a more complex solution, which I=E2=80=99m p= unting for the sake of progress.

<= div>_______________________________________________
bitcoin-d= ev mailing list


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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