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Date: Thu, 7 May 2015 22:42:01 +0100
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
To: Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mechanics of a hard fork
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> On the other hand, if 99.99% of the miners updated and only 75% of
> merchants and 75% of users updated, then that would be a serioud split of
> the network.

But is that a plausible scenario?  Certainly *if* the concensus rules
required a 99% supermajority of miners for the hard fork to go ahead,
then there would be absoltely no rational reason for merchants and
users to refuse to upgrade, even if they don't support the changes
introduces by the hard fork.  Their only choice, if the fork succeeds,
is between the active chain and the one that is effectively stalled -
and, of course, they can make that choice ahead of time.

roy