Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1WNpFk-0007RD-S0 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 12 Mar 2014 19:55:48 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.173 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.173; envelope-from=will.yager@gmail.com; helo=mail-qc0-f173.google.com; Received: from mail-qc0-f173.google.com ([209.85.216.173]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1WNpFh-0000Jm-9a for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 12 Mar 2014 19:55:48 +0000 Received: by mail-qc0-f173.google.com with SMTP id r5so12013246qcx.32 for ; Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:55:39 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.224.89.71 with SMTP id d7mr28618863qam.54.1394654139904; Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:55:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.31.135 with HTTP; Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:55:39 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <5320B7F1.8060701@gk2.sk> References: <44fcb02b-3784-45a6-816a-312c78d940cd@me.com> <5320B7F1.8060701@gk2.sk> Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 14:55:39 -0500 Message-ID: From: William Yager Cc: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c3e16697f87a04f46e3875 X-Spam-Score: 0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (will.yager[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.2 MISSING_HEADERS Missing To: header 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1WNpFh-0000Jm-9a Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key with optional encryption X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 19:55:49 -0000 --001a11c3e16697f87a04f46e3875 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Pavol Rusnak wrote: > On 03/12/2014 08:26 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman wrote: > > So upon entering a password with a typo, the user will not be notified > of an > > error, but be presented with a wallet balance of 0, after the blockchain > has > > been scanned. I'm sorry, but that's not the kind of experience I would > want to > > present to my users. > > Sure, you can have either plausible deniability or typo checking, not > both at the same time. > > The proposed BIP uses a bloom filter, so it has both plausible deniability *and *typo checking. The bloom filter is optimized for two elements and will catch something like 99.9975% of typos, despite allowing two different passwords. > Would you care to elaborate how optional outsourcing of the KDF breaks > > compatibility? > > I'm afraid one would end up with code generated in one client that is > unusable in a different client, because the client's developer thought > that using fancier algorithm instead of the proposed ones was a good idea. > > This is clearly in violation of the spec. You could argue this about anything in Bitcoin. What if a developer decided to replace SHA256 with SHA3 in their implementation of a Bitcoin client? Obviously this would cause issues. Will --001a11c3e16697f87a04f46e3875 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Pavol Rusnak <stick@gk2.sk> wrote:
On 03/12/2014 08:26 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman wrote:
> So upon entering a password with a typo, the user will not be notified= of an
> error, but be presented with a wallet balance of 0, after the blockcha= in has
> been scanned. I'm sorry, but that's not the kind of experience= I would want to
> present to my users.

Sure, you can have either plausible deniability or typo checking, not=
both at the same time.


The proposed BIP= uses a bloom filter, so it has both plausible deniability and typo = checking. The bloom filter is optimized for two elements and will catch som= ething like 99.9975% of typos, despite allowing two different passwords.

> Would you care to elaborate how optional outsourcing of the KDF breaks=
> compatibility?

I'm afraid one would end up with code generated in one client tha= t is
unusable in a different client, because the client's developer thought<= br> that using fancier algorithm instead of the proposed ones was a good idea.<= br>

<= br>
This is clearly in violation of the spec. You could argue thi= s about anything in Bitcoin. What if a developer decided to replace SHA256 = with SHA3 in their implementation of a Bitcoin client? Obviously this would= cause issues.=A0

Will
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