From: Isidor Zeuner <cryptocurrencies@quidecco.de>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
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Message-Id: <20140116035443.E5C60DB1D40@quidecco.de>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 04:54:43 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Tor / SPV
Precedence: list

quote:
> > but then you remove the implication that a node has to give both public
> > and private IPs to a peer. If it's part of a batch of "addr"s, it could be
> > my own hidden service ID, but it could also be one that I learned from
> > someone else and is now propagating, for anyone to bootstrap with Tor
> > hidden service peers if they'd like.
> >
>
> Hmm. So you mean that we pick a set of peers we believe to not be sybils of
> each other, but they might give us hidden services run by other people? I
> need to think about that. If they're getting the hidden services just from
> addr announcements themselves, then you just punt the issue up a layer -
> what stops me generating 10000 hidden service keys that all map to my same
> malicious node, announcing them, and then waiting for the traffic to
> arrive? If clearnet nodes inform of their own hidden service IDs, that
> issue is avoided.
>

Considering that the clearnet sybil protection also relies on scaling
up the resource requirements for an attacker, why not require hidden
service addresses following a certain pattern, like a fixed prefix?
Essentially also a PoW scheme...

> My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of
> clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what.

What would you consider as the main merits of clearnet nodes?

Best regards,

Isidor