Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Qwr9d-0008VZ-Li for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 26 Aug 2011 07:48:41 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from smtp-vbr6.xs4all.nl ([194.109.24.26]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1Qwr9Y-0006Zu-KN for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 26 Aug 2011 07:48:41 +0000 Received: from webmail.xs4all.nl (dovemail12.xs4all.nl [194.109.26.14]) by smtp-vbr6.xs4all.nl (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id p7Q7mNUE093051 for ; Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:48:28 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from capibara@xs4all.nl) Received: from 83.163.132.66 (SquirrelMail authenticated user rmeijer) by webmail.xs4all.nl with HTTP; Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:48:28 +0200 Message-ID: <4aa4401704cc1e7a1665971b79684a83.squirrel@webmail.xs4all.nl> Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:48:28 +0200 From: "Rob Meijer" To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.18 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanned: by XS4ALL Virus Scanner X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [194.109.24.26 listed in list.dnswl.org] -0.5 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain X-Headers-End: 1Qwr9Y-0006Zu-KN Subject: [Bitcoin-development] BitCoin and MinorFs/AppArmor X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: rmeijer@xs4all.nl List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 07:48:41 -0000 A few years ago I wrote a least authority based set of filesystems named MinorFs that worked closely together with AppArmor (suse/ubuntu) to give ' pseudo persistent processes' their own private but decomposable and delegatable piece of filesystem storage: http://www.linuxjournal.com/magazine/minorfs http://www.capibara.com/blog/2011/05/25/taming-mutable-state-for-file-systems/ Currently there is only one perfect fit for MinorFs and that's the stack AppArmor/MinorFs/E-language-persistent-application. There are some close fits like running ssh without a passphrase ( http://minorfs.polacanthus.net/wiki/Ssh_private_keys_without_passphrase ) but these require lots of manual fiddling by the user to get working. The ssh trick would probably work with bitcoin, but as you can see from the link above, it would be rather cumbersome. I am trying to get specs together for rewriting MinorFs (in Python) in a way that would make it easy and natural for application developers that want their application to be able to protect user data (like bitcoin wallets) from mallware running under the same uid as that user. Currently minorfs granularity is hard fixed to that of the 'pseudo persistent process', and that granularity is determined as described in the following link: http://minorfs.polacanthus.net/wiki/Pseudo_persistent_process When using pseudo persistent processes, you basically end up with file-system storage that follows almost all of the modeling principles of the object capability model. This is great when designing a least authority program from scratch and writing it in the (object capability) e-language using its persistence facilities. Given however that I don't expect bitcoin, openssh, chrome, firefox, or any other application that would benefit from what MinorFs provides to be rewritten in E, it seems like the next version of MinorFs should give up on the purity of its least authority model, and take an approach that better suits common development languages and practices. With bitcoin being a project that could benefit most from what MinorFs has to offer, I would like to ask bitcoin developers to think about what attributes from the current granularity level (pseudo persistent process) should be kept, what attributes should be dropped, and what properties should be added to arrive at an 'id' that is the best fit for granularity of persistent private storage for bitcoin. I really want to accommodate bitcoin developer needs in this, so all input that helps me help you guys to get the next MinorFs version to accommodate your needs to a level that code to use MinorFs where available can be added to bitcoin, would be extremely welcome. Let me know what you think, Rob