Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2020 11:44:53 +0000
To: Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Cc: Gleb Naumenko <naumenko.gs@gmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network
Precedence: list

Good morning Aymeric,

> The issue each time there are discussions/research linking to Tor is that=
 it is biased since the beginning because based on a wrong postulate: using=
 the Tor network
>

Well, in the interest of using the wrong tool for a highly important job, l=
et me present this thought:

* The Tor network is weakened due to its dependence on a limited set of exi=
t nodes.
* "Direct", within-Tor rendezvous points are good, i.e. Tor hidden services=
.
* Thus, there is no issue with Tor-to-Tor or clearnet-to-clearnet connectio=
ns, the issue is with Tor-to-clearnet connections.
* Of course, no miner is going to run over Tor because latency, so all the =
miners will be on clearnet.
* So make your own bridge between Tor and clearnet.
* Run two fullnodes on your computer (with sufficient ingenuity, you can pr=
obably share their block storages, or make one pruning).
* One fullnode is on the public network but runs in `blocksonly` so it does=
 not propagate any transactions (which might be attached to your public IP)=
.
* The other fullnode is on the Tor network and has an `-addnode` to the pub=
lic-network node via `localhost`, which I assume is very hard for an eclips=
e attacker to get at.
* Use the Tor-fullnode to propagate your transactions.

Of course, the eclipse attacker can still attack all Tor exit nodes and blo=
ck outgoing transaction traffic to perform eclipse attacks.
And if you decide to propagate transactions to the public-network node then=
 you pretty much lose your privacy there.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj