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Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2015 10:18:56 -0400
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From: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@gmail.com>
To: jl2012@xbt.hk
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Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] block size - pay with difficulty
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Thanks for the link.  I readily admit only having given pay-to-future-miner
a little bit of thought.  Not convinced it sets a minimal tx fee in all
cases.


On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 12:55 AM, <jl2012@xbt.hk> wrote:

> Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev =E6=96=BC 2015-09-03 00:05 =E5=AF=AB=E5=88=B0=
:
>
>> Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block
>> size should be avoided.  The miners incentive has always been fairly
>> straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as
>> you can get it online.  Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring
>> out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners
>> to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both
>> unrealistic and potentially corrosive.  That potentially makes the
>> block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to
>> the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.
>>
>> Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth
>> researching.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
> Ref:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/01072=
3.html
>
> I explained here why pay with difficulty is bad for everyone: miners and
> users, and described the use of OP_CLTV for pay-to-future-miner
>
> However, a general problem of pay-to-increase-block-size scheme is it
> indirectly sets a minimal tx fee, which could be difficult and arbitrary,
> and is against competition
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the link.=C2=A0 I readily admit only having giv=
en pay-to-future-miner a little bit of thought.=C2=A0 Not convinced it sets=
 a minimal tx fee in all cases.<div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 12:55 AM,  <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jl2012@xbt.hk" target=3D"_blank">jl2012@x=
bt.hk</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Jeff Garzik v=
ia bitcoin-dev =E6=96=BC 2015-09-03 00:05 =E5=AF=AB=E5=88=B0:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">
Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block<br>
size should be avoided.=C2=A0 The miners incentive has always been fairly<b=
r>
straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as<br>
you can get it online.=C2=A0 Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring<br>
out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners<br>
to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both<br>
unrealistic and potentially corrosive.=C2=A0 That potentially makes the<br>
block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to<br>
the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.<br>
<br>
Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth<br>
researching.<br>
<br>
<br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Ref: <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/201=
5-August/010723.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010723.html</a><br>
<br>
I explained here why pay with difficulty is bad for everyone: miners and us=
ers, and described the use of OP_CLTV for pay-to-future-miner<br>
<br>
However, a general problem of pay-to-increase-block-size scheme is it indir=
ectly sets a minimal tx fee, which could be difficult and arbitrary, and is=
 against competition<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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