Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z4jNx-00053B-SB for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 16 Jun 2015 05:26:09 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-pd0-f177.google.com ([209.85.192.177]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z4jNu-0007bY-U0 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 16 Jun 2015 05:26:09 +0000 Received: by pdjm12 with SMTP id m12so6103146pdj.3 for ; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 22:26:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to :subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type; bh=uY4pcVGugpj3Q/gPsTiE/gAUYJomYadcZq/6Wi2dQ3w=; b=OmZ/wCVls+bGcSUEWmlS6+4bVjYZ95G4mp+M22Q6WhKcqIEzy5LjoYYRrAPmzs3WwQ LP8V9rkbeGG2FunForlTZW1T0LxjOkEE1NtBiay6TfbMLJeH2tCGwcl6R0paTiJxW5x4 SdHYlIUCIdg/YgO5zeOn6MYls0oqemGVwyAAGeqbxa5GqUNj4a6AUzym2raauhQZBnDI scIw7RvCCohpa6NGYoY+Y8Ih+GZC+7i2cXzT1pHTZ5UzS/MN954WrCbvttYQcxiiIfpm 7e8Lc6tZo2qm4dikepwFCQFX2bgF4P2xvS5ezMCupSuZB+bv19GXfkTOa8t5NCc9r8o5 oHfw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlApd1ULzmhv9W7aGQEshPez8BjyKRlh6YQCcrUWBUfGn6rDtEMVXt/ohnvxQAQ9GhiyGlN X-Received: by 10.70.90.103 with SMTP id bv7mr55840746pdb.160.1434432361174; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 22:26:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.89] (99-8-65-117.lightspeed.davlca.sbcglobal.net. [99.8.65.117]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id ld1sm13949460pbc.26.2015.06.15.22.25.58 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 15 Jun 2015 22:25:59 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <557FB36B.1030902@thinlink.com> Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 22:26:03 -0700 From: Tom Harding User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net, Pieter Wuille References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------030802010103000105080504" X-Spam-Score: 1.0 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.0 T_FILL_THIS_FORM_SHORT Fill in a short form with personal information X-Headers-End: 1Z4jNu-0007bY-U0 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 05:26:09 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------030802010103000105080504 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Shared wallets were discussed earlier as a feature. If you pay a for dry cleaning with a shared wallet, a different 1-of-N signer can pick up the clothes with no physical transfer of a claim check, by proving the money that paid for the cleaning was his. Many kinds of vouchers can be eliminated, because the money itself can be vouched for, wirelessly, with ECDSA security. A PoP would be much more difficult to forge as a valet claim check, to steal a car. Something like your coffee gift example was also mentioned. The buyer could export the private keys to your (the beneficiary's) wallet after the purchase, by using an 'export gift claim check' function on the spent transaction. Then you pick up the coffee (car, concert seats...) just as if you had paid. Kalle goes to some trouble to describe how merchants need to ensure that they only accept a PoP provided as a response to their challenge. Coinjoin or simulfunding transactions wouldn't be PoP-able (nor should they be) since no one signer has all the private keys. On 6/15/2015 3:00 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > > I did misunderstand that. That changes things significantly. > > However, having paid is not the same as having had access to the input > coins. What about shared wallets or coinjoin? > > Also, if I understand correctly, there is no commitment to anything > you're trying to say about the sender? So once I obtain a > proof-of-payment from you about something you paid, I can go claim > that it's mine? > > Why does anyone care who paid? This is like walking into a coffeshop, > noticing I don't have money with me, let me friend pay for me, and > then have the shop insist that I can't drink it because I'm not the buy= er. > > Track payments, don't try to assign identities to payers. > > On Jun 15, 2015 11:35 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" > wrote: > > Hi Pieter! > > It is intended to be a proof that you *have paid* for something. No= t > that you have the intent to pay for something. You cannot use PoP > without a transaction to prove. > > So, yes, it's just a proof of access to certain coins that you no > longer have. > > Maybe I don't understand you correctly? > > /Kalle > > 2015-06-15 11:27 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille >: > > Now that you have removed the outputs, I don't think it's even a > intent of > > payment, but just a proof of access to certain coins. > > > > On Jun 15, 2015 11:24 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" > wrote: > >> > >> Hi all! > >> > >> I have made the discussed changes and updated my implementation > >> (https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These > are the > >> changes: > >> > >> * There is now only one output, the "pop output", of value 0. > >> * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must be set to 0.= I > >> chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity. > >> * The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 (max block > height lock > >> time). > >> > >> The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral. Are > there any > >> major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I > will ask > >> Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers. > >> > >> The two BIP proposals can be found at > >> > https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP = and > >> > https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/btcpop-scheme-BIP. > The source > >> for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is also in-lined below. > >> > >> A number of alternative names have been proposed: > >> > >> * Proof of Potential > >> * Proof of Control > >> * Proof of Signature > >> * Signatory Proof > >> * Popo: Proof of payment origin > >> * Pots: Proof of transaction signer > >> * proof of transaction intent > >> * Declaration of intent > >> * Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5 > >> * VeriBit > >> * CertiBTC > >> * VBit > >> * PayID > >> > >> Given this list, I still think "Proof of Payment" is the most > descriptive > >> to non-technical people. > >> > >> Regards, > >> Kalle > >> > >> > >> ################################################# > >> 
>     >>   BIP: 
>     >>   Title: Proof of Payment
>     >>   Author: Kalle Rosenbaum      >
>     >>   Status: Draft
>     >>   Type: Standards Track
>     >>   Created: 
>     >>
> >> > >> =3D=3D Abstract =3D=3D > >> > >> This BIP describes how a wallet can prove to a server that it > has the > >> ability to sign a certain transaction. > >> > >> =3D=3D Motivation =3D=3D > >> > >> There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to > prove that you > >> have paid for something. For example: > >> > >> * A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to > the door. > >> * An online video rental service where you pay for a video and > watch it on > >> any device. > >> * An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g. 2 weeks > exclusivity. During > >> this period you can upload new content to the sign whenever you > like using > >> PoP. > >> * Log in to a pay site using a PoP. > >> * A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates > itself using > >> PoP. > >> * A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and > the winner > >> is selected among the transactions to that address. You > exchange the prize > >> for a PoP for the winning transaction. > >> > >> With Proof of Payment, these use cases can be achieved without a= ny > >> personal information (user name, password, e-mail address, etc) > being > >> involved. > >> > >> =3D=3D Rationale =3D=3D > >> > >> Desirable properties: > >> > >> # A PoP should be generated on demand. > >> # It should only be usable once to avoid issues due to theft. > >> # It should be able to create a PoP for any payment, regardless > of script > >> type (P2SH, P2PKH, etc.). > >> # It should prove that you have enough credentials to unlock > all the > >> inputs of the proven transaction. > >> # It should be easy to implement by wallets and servers to ease > adoption. > >> > >> Current methods of proving a payment: > >> > >> * In BIP0070, the PaymentRequest together with the transactions > fulfilling > >> the request makes some sort of proof. However, it does not meet > 1, 2 or 4 > >> and it obviously only meets 3 if the payment is made through > BIP0070. Also, > >> there's no standard way to request/provide the proof. If > standardized it > >> would probably meet 5. > >> * Signing messages, chosen by the server, with the private keys > used to > >> sign the transaction. This could meet 1 and 2 but probably not > 3. This is > >> not standardized either. 4 Could be met if designed so. > >> > >> If an input script type is P2SH, any satisfying script should > do, just as > >> if it was a payment. For M-of-N multisig scripts, that would > mean that any > >> set of M keys should be sufficient, not neccesarily the same > set of M keys > >> that signed the transaction. This is important because strictly > demanding > >> the same set of M keys would defeat the purpose of a multisig > address. > >> > >> =3D=3D Specification =3D=3D > >> > >> =3D=3D=3D Data structure =3D=3D=3D > >> > >> A proof of payment for a transaction T, here called PoP(T), is > used to > >> prove that one has ownership of the credentials needed to > unlock all the > >> inputs of T. It has the exact same structure as a bitcoin > transaction with > >> the same inputs as T and in the same order as in T, but with > each sequence > >> number set to 0. There is exactly one output, here called the > pop output, > >> with value 0. The pop output must have the following format: > >> > >> OP_RETURN > >> > >> {| > >> ! Field !! Size [B] !! Description > >> |- > >> | <version> || 2 || Version, little endian, currently > 0x01 0x00 > >> |- > >> | <txid> || 32 || The transaction to prove > >> |- > >> | <nonce> || 6 || Random data > >> |} > >> > >> The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 to prevent > the PoP from > >> being included in a block, should it appear on the bitcoin p2p > network. This > >> is also the reason for setting the sequence numbers to 0, since > sequence > >> number of ffffffff would make lock_time ineffective. This > specification > >> demands that all input sequence numbers are 0, not just one of > them, which > >> would be sufficient to make lock_time effective. This is for > simplicity > >> reasons. > >> > >> An illustration of the PoP data structure and its original > payment is > >> shown below. > >> > >> 
>     >>   T
>     >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>     >>  |inputs                | outputs                 |
>     >>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script            |
>     >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>     >>  |input0 1,ffffffff     | 0,pay to A              |
>     >>  |input1 3,ffffffff     | 2,OP_RETURN  |
>     >>  |input2 4,ffffffff     | 1,pay to B              |
>     >>  |                      | 4,pay to C              |
>     >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>     >>
>     >>   PoP(T)
>     >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+=

>     >>  | inputs               | outputs                              |=

>     >>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script                         |=

>     >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+=

>     >>  |input0 1,00000000     | 0,OP_RETURN    |=

>     >>  |input1 3,00000000     |                                      |=

>     >>  |input2 4,00000000     |                                      |=

>     >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+=

>     >>  | lock_time=3D499999999                                        =
 |
>     >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+=

>     >>
> >> > >> The PoP is signed using the same signing process that is used > for bitcoin > >> transactions. > >> > >> The purpose of the nonce is to make it harder to use a stolen > PoP; Once > >> the PoP has reached the server, that PoP is useless since the > server will > >> generate a new nonce for every PoP request. > >> > >> =3D=3D=3D Process =3D=3D=3D > >> > >> # A proof of payment request is sent from the server to the > wallet. The > >> PoP request contains: > >> ## a random nonce > >> ## a destination where to send the PoP, for example a https URL > >> ## data hinting the wallet which transaction to create a proof > for. For > >> example: > >> ##* txid, if known by the server > >> ##* PaymentRequest.PaymentDetails.merchant_data (in case of a > BIP0070 > >> payment) > >> ##* amount, label, message or other information from a BIP0021 U= RI > >> # The wallet identifies a transaction T, if possible. Otherwise > it asks > >> the user to select among the ones that match the hints in 1.iii.= > >> # The wallet creates an unsigned PoP (UPoP) for T, and asks the > user to > >> sign it. > >> # The user confirms > >> # The UPoP(T) is signed by the wallet, creating PoP(T). > >> # The PoP is sent to the destination in 1.ii. > >> # The server receiving the PoP validates it and responds with > =93valid=94 or > >> =93invalid=94. > >> # The wallet displays the response in some way to the user. > >> > >> '''Remarks:''' > >> > >> * The method of transferring the PoP request at step 1 is not > specified > >> here. Instead that is specified in separate specifications. See > [btcpop > >> scheme BIP](btcpop scheme BIP). > >> * The nonce must be randomly generated by the server for every > new PoP > >> request. > >> > >> =3D=3D=3D Validating a PoP =3D=3D=3D > >> > >> The server needs to validate the PoP and reply with "valid" or > "invalid". > >> That process is outlined below. If any step fails, the > validation is aborted > >> and "invalid" is returned: > >> > >> # Check the format of the PoP. It must pass normal transaction > checks, > >> except that the inputs may already be spent. > >> # Check that lock_time is 499999999. > >> # Check that there is exactly one output. This output must have > value 0 > >> and conform to the OP_RETURN output format outlined above. > >> # Check that the nonce is the same as the one requested. > >> # Check that the inputs of the PoP are exactly the same as in > transaction > >> T, except that the sequence numbers must all be 0. The ordering > of the > >> inputs must also be the same as in T. > >> # Run the scripts of all the inputs. All scipts must return true= =2E > >> # Check that the txid in the PoP output is the transaction you > actually > >> want proof for. If you don=92t know exactly what transaction you= > want proof > >> for, check that the transaction actually pays for the > product/service you > >> deliver. > >> # Return "valid". > >> > >> =3D=3D Security considerations =3D=3D > >> > >> * Someone can intercept the PoP-request and change any > parameter in it. > >> These can be mitigated by using secure connections. For example:= > >> ** Pop destination - Stealing your PoP. > >> ** label - Trick you to sign an unintended pop or set a label > that your > >> wallet doesn't have any record for, resulting in a broken > service. Always > >> check the PoP before signing. > >> ** nonce - Your pop will not validate on server. > >> * Someone can steal a PoP, for example by tampering with the > PoP request, > >> and try to use the service hoping to get a matching nonce. > Probability per > >> try: 1/(2^48). The server should have a mechanism for detecting > a brute > >> force attack of this kind, or at least slow down the process by > delaying the > >> PoP request by some 100 ms or so. > >> * Even if a wallet has no funds it might still be valuable as a > generator > >> for PoPs. This makes it important to keep the security of the > wallet after > >> it has been emptied. > >> * Transaction malleability may cause the server to have another > >> transaction id for a payment than the client's wallet. In that > case the > >> wallet will not be able to prove the transaction to the server. > Wallets > >> should not rely on the transaction id of the outgoing > transaction. Instead > >> it should listen for the transaction on the network and put > that in its list > >> of transactions. > >> > >> =3D=3D Reference implementation =3D=3D > >> > >> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc poppoc on GitHub] > >> > >> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/wallet Mycelium fork on GitHu= b] > >> > >> =3D=3D References =3D=3D > >> > >> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki > BIP0021]: > >> URI Scheme > >> > >> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki > BIP0070]: > >> Payment Protocol > >> > >> [[btcpop scheme BIP]] > >> > >> ######################################################### > >> > >> 2015-06-06 23:25 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum >: > >> > Thank you all for the feedback. > >> > > >> > I will change the data structure as follows: > >> > > >> > * There will be only one output, the "pop output", and no > outputs from > >> > T will be copied to the PoP. > >> > * The pop output will have value 0. > >> > * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP will be set to > 0. I > >> > chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity. > >> > * The lock_time of the PoP is always set to 499999999. > >> > > >> > Any comments on this? > >> > > >> > /Kalle > >> > > >> > 2015-06-06 19:00 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum > >: > >> >> 2015-06-06 18:10 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding >: > >> >>> On Jun 6, 2015 8:05 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" > > wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> I'm open to changes here. > >> >>> > >> >>> I suggest: > >> >>> > >> >>> - Don't include any real outputs. They are redundant > because the > >> >>> txid is > >> >>> already referenced. > >> >> > >> >> with the nLocktime solution, the copied outputs are not neede= d. > >> >> > >> >>> > >> >>> - Start the proof script, which should be invalid, with a ma= gic > >> >>> constant and > >> >>> include space for future expansion. This makes PoP's easy > to identify > >> >>> and > >> >>> extend. > >> >> > >> >> I did remore the constant (a "PoP" literal ascii encoded stri= ng) > >> >> because it didn't add much. The recipient will expect a pop, > so it > >> >> will simply treat it as one. I did add a 2 byte version > field to make > >> >> it extendable. > >> >> > >> >>> > >> >>> - "Proof of Potential" > >> >> > >> >> Noted :-) > >> >> > >> >> Thank you > >> >> /Kalle > >> > >> > >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------= ----------- > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Bitcoin-development mailing list > >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > > >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development= > >> > > > > > > -----------------------------------------------------------------------= ------- > > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development --------------030802010103000105080504 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Shared wallets were discussed earlier as a feature.  If you pay a for dry cleaning with a shared wallet, a different 1-of-N signer can pick up the clothes with no physical transfer of a claim check, by proving the money that paid for the cleaning was his.

Many kinds of vouchers can be eliminated, because the money itself can be vouched for, wirelessly, with ECDSA security.  A PoP would be much more difficult to forge as a valet claim check, to steal a car.

Something like your coffee gift example was also mentioned.  The buyer could export the private keys to your (the beneficiary's) wallet after the purchase, by using an 'export gift claim check' function on the spent transaction.  Then you pick up the coffee (car, concert seats...) just as if you had paid.

Kalle goes to some trouble to describe how merchants need to ensure that they only accept a PoP provided as a response to their challenge.

Coinjoin or simulfunding transactions wouldn't be PoP-able (nor should they be) since no one signer has all the private keys.



On 6/15/2015 3:00 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote:

I did misunderstand that. That changes things significantly.

However, having paid is not the same as having had access to the input coins. What about shared wallets or coinjoin?

Also, if I understand correctly, there is no commitment to anything you're trying to say about the sender? So once I obtain a proof-of-payment from you about something you paid, I can go claim that it's mine?

Why does anyone care who paid? This is like walking into a coffeshop, noticing I don't have money with me, let me friend pay for me, and then have the shop insist that I can't drink it because I'm not the buyer.

Track payments, don't try to assign identities to payers.

On Jun 15, 2015 11:35 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se> wrote:
Hi Pieter!

It is intended to be a proof that you *have paid* for something. Not
that you have the intent to pay for something. You cannot use PoP
without a transaction to prove.

So, yes, it's just a proof of access to certain coins that you no longer have.

Maybe I don't understand you correctly?

/Kalle

2015-06-15 11:27 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>:
> Now that you have removed the outputs, I don't think it's even a intent of
> payment, but just a proof of access to certain coins.
>
> On Jun 15, 2015 11:24 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all!
>>
>> I have made the discussed changes and updated my implementation
>> (https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These are the
>> changes:
>>
>> * There is now only one output, the "pop output", of value 0.
>> * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must be set to 0. I
>> chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
>> * The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 (max block height lock
>> time).
>>
>> The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral. Are there any
>> major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I will ask
>> Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers.
>>
>> The two BIP proposals can be found at
>> https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP and
>> https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/btcpop-scheme-BIP. The source
>> for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is also in-lined below.
>>
>> A number of alternative names have been proposed:
>>
>> * Proof of Potential
>> * Proof of Control
>> * Proof of Signature
>> * Signatory Proof
>> * Popo: Proof of payment origin
>> * Pots: Proof of transaction signer
>> * proof of transaction intent
>> * Declaration of intent
>> * Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5
>> * VeriBit
>> * CertiBTC
>> * VBit
>> * PayID
>>
>> Given this list, I still think "Proof of Payment" is the most descriptive
>> to non-technical people.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Kalle
>>
>>
>> #################################################
>> <pre>
>>   BIP: <BIP number>
>>   Title: Proof of Payment
>>   Author: Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>
>>   Status: Draft
>>   Type: Standards Track
>>   Created: <date created on, in ISO 8601 (yyyy-mm-dd) format>
>> </pre>
>>
>> == Abstract ==
>>
>> This BIP describes how a wallet can prove to a server that it has the
>> ability to sign a certain transaction.
>>
>> == Motivation ==
>>
>> There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to prove that you
>> have paid for something. For example:
>>
>> * A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to the door.
>> * An online video rental service where you pay for a video and watch it on
>> any device.
>> * An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g. 2 weeks exclusivity. During
>> this period you can upload new content to the sign whenever you like using
>> PoP.
>> * Log in to a pay site using a PoP.
>> * A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates itself using
>> PoP.
>> * A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and the winner
>> is selected among the transactions to that address. You exchange the prize
>> for a PoP for the winning transaction.
>>
>> With Proof of Payment, these use cases can be achieved without any
>> personal information (user name, password, e-mail address, etc) being
>> involved.
>>
>> == Rationale ==
>>
>> Desirable properties:
>>
>> # A PoP should be generated on demand.
>> # It should only be usable once to avoid issues due to theft.
>> # It should be able to create a PoP for any payment, regardless of script
>> type (P2SH, P2PKH, etc.).
>> # It should prove that you have enough credentials to unlock all the
>> inputs of the proven transaction.
>> # It should be easy to implement by wallets and servers to ease adoption.
>>
>> Current methods of proving a payment:
>>
>> * In BIP0070, the PaymentRequest together with the transactions fulfilling
>> the request makes some sort of proof. However, it does not meet 1, 2 or 4
>> and it obviously only meets 3 if the payment is made through BIP0070. Also,
>> there's no standard way to request/provide the proof. If standardized it
>> would probably meet 5.
>> * Signing messages, chosen by the server, with the private keys used to
>> sign the transaction. This could meet 1 and 2 but probably not 3. This is
>> not standardized either. 4 Could be met if designed so.
>>
>> If an input script type is P2SH, any satisfying script should do, just as
>> if it was a payment. For M-of-N multisig scripts, that would mean that any
>> set of M keys should be sufficient, not neccesarily the same set of M keys
>> that signed the transaction. This is important because strictly demanding
>> the same set of M keys would defeat the purpose of a multisig address.
>>
>> == Specification ==
>>
>> === Data structure ===
>>
>> A proof of payment for a transaction T, here called PoP(T), is used to
>> prove that one has ownership of the credentials needed to unlock all the
>> inputs of T. It has the exact same structure as a bitcoin transaction with
>> the same inputs as T and in the same order as in T, but with each sequence
>> number set to 0. There is exactly one output, here called the pop output,
>> with value 0. The pop output must have the following format:
>>
>>  OP_RETURN <version> <txid> <nonce>
>>
>> {|
>> ! Field        !! Size [B] !! Description
>> |-
>> | &lt;version> || 2        || Version, little endian, currently 0x01 0x00
>> |-
>> | &lt;txid>    || 32       || The transaction to prove
>> |-
>> | &lt;nonce>   || 6        || Random data
>> |}
>>
>> The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 to prevent the PoP from
>> being included in a block, should it appear on the bitcoin p2p network. This
>> is also the reason for setting the sequence numbers to 0, since sequence
>> number of ffffffff would make lock_time ineffective. This specification
>> demands that all input sequence numbers are 0, not just one of them, which
>> would be sufficient to make lock_time effective. This is for simplicity
>> reasons.
>>
>> An illustration of the PoP data structure and its original payment is
>> shown below.
>>
>> <pre>
>>   T
>>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>  |inputs                | outputs                 |
>>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script            |
>>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>  |input0 1,ffffffff     | 0,pay to A              |
>>  |input1 3,ffffffff     | 2,OP_RETURN <some data> |
>>  |input2 4,ffffffff     | 1,pay to B              |
>>  |                      | 4,pay to C              |
>>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>
>>   PoP(T)
>>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>  | inputs               | outputs                              |
>>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script                         |
>>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>  |input0 1,00000000     | 0,OP_RETURN <version> <txid> <nonce> |
>>  |input1 3,00000000     |                                      |
>>  |input2 4,00000000     |                                      |
>>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>  | lock_time=499999999                                         |
>>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>> </pre>
>>
>> The PoP is signed using the same signing process that is used for bitcoin
>> transactions.
>>
>> The purpose of the nonce is to make it harder to use a stolen PoP; Once
>> the PoP has reached the server, that PoP is useless since the server will
>> generate a new nonce for every PoP request.
>>
>> === Process ===
>>
>> # A proof of payment request is sent from the server to the wallet. The
>> PoP request contains:
>> ## a random nonce
>> ## a destination where to send the PoP, for example a https URL
>> ## data hinting the wallet which transaction to create a proof for. For
>> example:
>> ##* txid, if known by the server
>> ##* PaymentRequest.PaymentDetails.merchant_data (in case of a BIP0070
>> payment)
>> ##* amount, label, message or other information from a BIP0021 URI
>> # The wallet identifies a transaction T, if possible. Otherwise it asks
>> the user to select among the ones that match the hints in 1.iii.
>> # The wallet creates an unsigned PoP (UPoP) for T, and asks the user to
>> sign it.
>> # The user confirms
>> # The UPoP(T) is signed by the wallet, creating PoP(T).
>> # The PoP is sent to the destination in 1.ii.
>> # The server receiving the PoP validates it and responds with “valid” or
>> “invalid”.
>> # The wallet displays the response in some way to the user.
>>
>> '''Remarks:'''
>>
>> * The method of transferring the PoP request at step 1 is not specified
>> here. Instead that is specified in separate specifications. See [btcpop
>> scheme BIP](btcpop scheme BIP).
>> * The nonce must be randomly generated by the server for every new PoP
>> request.
>>
>> === Validating a PoP ===
>>
>> The server needs to validate the PoP and reply with "valid" or "invalid".
>> That process is outlined below. If any step fails, the validation is aborted
>> and "invalid" is returned:
>>
>> # Check the format of the PoP. It must pass normal transaction checks,
>> except that the inputs may already be spent.
>> # Check that lock_time is 499999999.
>> # Check that there is exactly one output. This output must have value 0
>> and conform to the OP_RETURN output format outlined above.
>> # Check that the nonce is the same as the one requested.
>> # Check that the inputs of the PoP are exactly the same as in transaction
>> T, except that the sequence numbers must all be 0. The ordering of the
>> inputs must also be the same as in T.
>> # Run the scripts of all the inputs. All scipts must return true.
>> # Check that the txid in the PoP output is the transaction you actually
>> want proof for. If you don’t know exactly what transaction you want proof
>> for, check that the transaction actually pays for the product/service you
>> deliver.
>> # Return "valid".
>>
>> == Security considerations ==
>>
>> * Someone can intercept the PoP-request and change any parameter in it.
>> These can be mitigated by using secure connections. For example:
>> ** Pop destination - Stealing your PoP.
>> ** label - Trick you to sign an unintended pop or set a label that your
>> wallet doesn't have any record for, resulting in a broken service. Always
>> check the PoP before signing.
>> ** nonce - Your pop will not validate on server.
>> * Someone can steal a PoP, for example by tampering with the PoP request,
>> and try to use the service hoping to get a matching nonce. Probability per
>> try: 1/(2^48). The server should have a mechanism for detecting a brute
>> force attack of this kind, or at least slow down the process by delaying the
>> PoP request by some 100 ms or so.
>> * Even if a wallet has no funds it might still be valuable as a generator
>> for PoPs. This makes it important to keep the security of the wallet after
>> it has been emptied.
>> * Transaction malleability may cause the server to have another
>> transaction id for a payment than the client's wallet. In that case the
>> wallet will not be able to prove the transaction to the server. Wallets
>> should not rely on the transaction id of the outgoing transaction. Instead
>> it should listen for the transaction on the network and put that in its list
>> of transactions.
>>
>> == Reference implementation ==
>>
>> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc poppoc on GitHub]
>>
>> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/wallet Mycelium fork on GitHub]
>>
>> == References ==
>>
>> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki BIP0021]:
>> URI Scheme
>>
>> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki BIP0070]:
>> Payment Protocol
>>
>> [[btcpop scheme BIP]]
>>
>> #########################################################
>>
>> 2015-06-06 23:25 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
>> > Thank you all for the feedback.
>> >
>> > I will change the data structure as follows:
>> >
>> > * There will be only one output, the "pop output", and no outputs from
>> > T will be copied to the PoP.
>> > * The pop output will have value 0.
>> > * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP will be set to 0. I
>> > chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
>> > * The lock_time of the PoP is always set to 499999999.
>> >
>> > Any comments on this?
>> >
>> > /Kalle
>> >
>> > 2015-06-06 19:00 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
>> >> 2015-06-06 18:10 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink.com>:
>> >>> On Jun 6, 2015 8:05 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> I'm open to changes here.
>> >>>
>> >>> I suggest:
>> >>>
>> >>> - Don't include any real outputs.   They are redundant because the
>> >>> txid is
>> >>> already referenced.
>> >>
>> >> with the nLocktime solution, the copied outputs are not needed.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>> - Start the proof script, which should be invalid, with a magic
>> >>> constant and
>> >>> include space for future expansion.  This makes PoP's easy to identify
>> >>> and
>> >>> extend.
>> >>
>> >> I did remore the constant (a "PoP" literal ascii encoded string)
>> >> because it didn't add much. The recipient will expect a pop, so it
>> >> will simply treat it as one. I did add a 2 byte version field to make
>> >> it extendable.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>> - "Proof of Potential"
>> >>
>> >> Noted :-)
>> >>
>> >> Thank you
>> >> /Kalle
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>


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