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Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 12:14:45 -0500
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: Ittay <ittay.eyal@cornell.edu>
Message-ID: <20131105171445.GA13710@petertodd.org>
References: <CABT1wWkOukEzxK5fLbnA4ZgJGN1hb_DMteCJOfA13FE_QZCi=Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<20131105170541.GA13660@petertodd.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Gavin Andresen <gavin@bitcoinfoundation.org>,
	Emin =?iso-8859-1?B?R/xu?= Sirer <egs@systems.cs.cornell.edu>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP proposal - patch to raise selfish
 mining threshold.
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On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:05:41PM -0500, Peter Todd wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:
> > Hello,
> >=20
> > Please see below our BIP for raising the selfish mining threshold.
> > Looking forward to your comments.
>=20
> <snip>
>=20
> > 2. No new vulnerabilities introduced:
> > Currently the choice among equal-length chains is done arbitrarily,
> > depending on network topology. This arbitrariness is a source of
> > vulnerability. We replace it with explicit randomness, which is at the
> > control of the protocol. The change does not introduce executions that =
were
> > not possible with the old protocol.
>=20
> Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for pointing this out, but the random
> choice solution does in fact introduce a vulnerability in that it
> creates incentives for pools over a certain size to withhold blocks
> rather than immediately broadcasting all blocks found.
>=20
> The problem is that when the pool eventually choses to reveal the block
> they mined, 50% of the hashing power switches, thus splitting the
> network. Like the original attack this can be to their benefit. For
> pools over a certain size this strategy is profitable even without
> investing in a low-latency network; Maxwell or someone else can chime in
> with the details for deriving that threshold.
>=20
> I won't get a chance to for a few hours, but someone should do the
> analysis on a deterministic switching scheme.

Oh, and I don't want to give the wrong impression: there's no need to
rush to get this problem fixed. Even if someone wanted to launch an
attack right now, with a fair amount of resources, there's a lot of
counter-measures based on human intervention that can definitely stop
the attack in the short-term; what's needed is at worst moderate-term,
and much more likely a long-term approach. In addition, keep in mind
that this attack is very easy to detect, so if one is actually launched
we will know immediately and can start taking direct counter-measures at
that time.

That Gregory Maxwell so quickly identified a flaw in this proposed
solution suggests we should proceed carefully.

It'd be good to do a test of this attack, as well as possible solutions,
on testnet to better explore it and possible counter-measures.

--=20
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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