Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6FDBDE5 for ; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 23:42:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f171.google.com (mail-io0-f171.google.com [209.85.223.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1753411E for ; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 23:42:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iods203 with SMTP id s203so109595984iod.0 for ; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 16:42:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=ITLaW9b22ps+v5x4oLKKABlsI867E2m2VxVFdIcW1uA=; b=UtVJgvX523E7m2Ee0mZlrPpzVoH0e9CKUG4bnKybfzqXBvFDAlTDkO0sel/UKxIxyd LjkmIC/VY7OkY+dqW4IvinQOfspzIb6QUWbjyMvieey+0GTqulGAye71qKBDSDEjf3qG fAN0MAkDNFcAUBKCFQMVyxKAyA7fp3+CFjdsmv4qJaYq8kN8MV0nWuZ9ZS3/46T1aCrz CatMCqCqgrkexNiVW7LHaWDE4ZzwzOLbV671b4eWysVMnXE8BiQ0ELCzT4Unhw2MNqGM k9UdrAVj/lyhWpInqHsE17bihqvHtoM9d4IjgfCtNHtvnZ7H/SySzlDk9PVzuu+pgZXg rh9A== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.137.208 with SMTP id t77mr15685860ioi.2.1440805377484; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 16:42:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.144.196 with HTTP; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 16:42:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.144.196 with HTTP; Fri, 28 Aug 2015 16:42:57 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <2081355.cHxjDEpgpW@crushinator> Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2015 19:42:57 -0400 Message-ID: From: Chris Pacia To: Mark Friedenbach Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113ed538b7301f051e67a4f9 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Consensus based block size retargeting algorithm (draft) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2015 23:42:59 -0000 --001a113ed538b7301f051e67a4f9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Aug 28, 2015 7:38 PM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: > > It is in their individual interests when the larger block that is allowed for them grants them more fees. And pay a difficulty penalty and lose full blocks because of it? Even if fees are somehow high enough to compensate for the lost reward, it still requires miners to collectively decide to raise the block size for it to make sense individually. An individual vote will not raise the limit, but it will cost the miner money. > > On Aug 28, 2015 4:35 PM, "Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >> When discussing this with Matt Whitlock earlier we basically concluded the block size will never increase under this proposal do to a collective action problem. If a miner votes for an increase and nobody else does, the blocksize will not increase yet he will still have to pay the difficulty penalty. >> >> It may be in everyone's collective interest to raise the block size but not their individual interest. >> >> On Aug 28, 2015 6:24 PM, "Gavin via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> >>> With this proposal, how much would it cost a miner to include an 'extra' 500-byte transaction if the average block size is 900K and it costs the miner 20BTC in electricity/capital/etc to mine a block? >>> >>> If my understanding of the proposal is correct, it is: >>> >>> 500/900000 * 20 =3D 0.11111 BTC >>> >>> ... Or $2.50 at today's exchange rate. >>> >>> That seems excessive. >>> >>> -- >>> Gavin Andresen >>> >>> >>> > On Aug 28, 2015, at 5:15 PM, Matt Whitlock via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> > >>> > This is the best proposal I've seen yet. Allow me to summarize: >>> > >>> > =E2=80=A2 It addresses the problem, in Jeff Garzik's BIP 100, of mine= rs selling their block-size votes. >>> > =E2=80=A2 It addresses the problem, in Gavin Andresen's BIP 101, of b= lindly trying to predict future market needs versus future technological capacities. >>> > =E2=80=A2 It avoids a large step discontinuity in the block-size limi= t by starting with a 1-MB limit. >>> > =E2=80=A2 It throttles changes to =C2=B110% every 2016 blocks. >>> > =E2=80=A2 It imposes a tangible cost (higher difficulty) on miners wh= o vote to raise the block-size limit. >>> > =E2=80=A2 It avoids incentivizing miners to vote to lower the block-s= ize limit. >>> > >>> > However, this proposal currently fails to answer a very important question: >>> > >>> > =E2=80=A2 What is the mechanism for activation of the new consensus r= ule? It is when a certain percentage of the blocks mined in a 2016-block retargeting period contain valid block-size votes? >>> > >>> > >>> > https://github.com/btcdrak/bips/blob/bip-cbbsra/bip-cbbrsa.mediawiki >>> > >>> > >>> >> On Friday, 28 August 2015, at 9:28 pm, Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>> >> Pull request: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/187 >>> > _______________________________________________ >>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> --001a113ed538b7301f051e67a4f9 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Aug 28, 2015 7:38 PM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:
>
> It is in their individual interests when the larger block that is allo= wed for them grants them more fees.

And pay a difficulty penalty and lose full blocks because of= it? Even if fees are somehow high enough to compensate for the lost reward= , it still requires miners to collectively decide to raise the block size f= or it to make sense individually. An individual vote will not raise the lim= it, but it will cost the miner money.

>
> On Aug 28, 2015 4:35 PM, "Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev" <<= a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.l= inuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> When discussing this with Matt Whitlock earlier we basically concl= uded the block size will never increase under this proposal do to a collect= ive action problem. If a miner votes for an increase and nobody else does, = the blocksize will not increase yet he will still have to pay the difficult= y penalty.
>>
>> It may be in everyone's collective interest to raise the block= size but not their individual interest.
>>
>> On Aug 28, 2015 6:24 PM, "Gavin via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.lin= uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> With this proposal, how much would it cost a miner to include = an 'extra' 500-byte transaction if the average block size is 900K a= nd it costs the miner 20BTC in electricity/capital/etc to mine a block?
>>>
>>> If my understanding of the proposal is correct, it is:
>>>
>>> 500/900000 * 20 =3D 0.11111 BTC
>>>
>>> ... Or $2.50 at today's exchange rate.
>>>
>>> That seems excessive.
>>>
>>> --
>>> Gavin Andresen
>>>
>>>
>>> > On Aug 28, 2015, at 5:15 PM, Matt Whitlock via bitcoin-de= v <bitcoin-dev@= lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > This is the best proposal I've seen yet. Allow me to = summarize:
>>> >
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It addresses the problem, in Jeff Garzik's = BIP 100, of miners selling their block-size votes.
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It addresses the problem, in Gavin Andresen'= ;s BIP 101, of blindly trying to predict future market needs versus future = technological capacities.
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It avoids a large step discontinuity in the blo= ck-size limit by starting with a 1-MB limit.
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It throttles changes to =C2=B110% every 2016 bl= ocks.
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It imposes a tangible cost (higher difficulty) = on miners who vote to raise the block-size limit.
>>> > =E2=80=A2 It avoids incentivizing miners to vote to lower= the block-size limit.
>>> >
>>> > However, this proposal currently fails to answer a very i= mportant question:
>>> >
>>> > =E2=80=A2 What is the mechanism for activation of the new= consensus rule? It is when a certain percentage of the blocks mined in a 2= 016-block retargeting period contain valid block-size votes?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > https://github.com/btcdrak/bips/blob/bip-cbbsra/bip= -cbbrsa.mediawiki
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> On Friday, 28 August 2015, at 9:28 pm, Btc Drak via b= itcoin-dev wrote:
>>> >> Pull request: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/187
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> > = bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoi= n-dev
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitco= in-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev=
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-d= ev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev=
>>

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