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 <874kgkkpji.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
In-Reply-To: <874kgkkpji.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
From: Ryan Grant <bitcoin-dev@rgrant.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2021 01:20:15 +0000
Message-ID: <CAMnpzfopMNO=73wqvXpOn9u8X4MwJArqGxODJAS4-9iFiZOd6A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, 
 Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] March 23rd 2021 Taproot Activation Meeting Notes
Precedence: list

On Tue, Apr 6, 2021 at 11:58 PM Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> The core question always was: what do we do if miners fail to activate?
>
> [...]  Speedy Trial takes the approach that "let's pretend we didn't
> *actually* ask [miners]".

What ST is saying is that a strategy of avoiding unnecessary risk is
stronger than a strategy of brinkmanship when brinkmanship wasn't
our only option.  Having deescalation in the strategy toolkit makes
Bitcoin stronger.

> It's totally a political approach, to avoid facing the awkward question.
> Since I believe that such prevaricating makes a future crisis less
> predictable, I am forced to conclude that it makes bitcoin less robust.

LOT=true does face the awkward question, but there are downsides:

  - in the requirement to drop blocks from apathetic miners (although
    as Luke-Jr pointed out in a previous reply on this list they have
    no contract under which to raise a complaint); and

  - in the risk of a chain split, should gauging economic majority
    support - which there is zero intrinsic tooling for - go poorly.

> Personally, I think the compromise position is using LOT=false and
> having those such as Luke and myself continue working on a LOT=true
> branch for future consideration.  It's less than optimal, but I
> appreciate that people want Taproot activated more than they want
> the groundwork future upgrades.

Another way of viewing the current situation is that should
brinkmanship be necessary, then better tooling to resolve a situation
that requires brinkmanship will be invaluable.  But:

  - we do not need to normalize brinkmanship;

  - designing brinkmanship tooling well before the next crisis does
    not require selecting conveniently completed host features to
    strap the tooling onto for testing; and

  - it's already the case that a UASF branch can be prepared along
    with ST (ie. without requiring LOT=false), although the code is a
    bit more complex and the appropriate stopheight a few blocks later.

Although your NACK is well explained, for the reasons above I am
prepared to run code that overrides it.