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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable >1. Introducing state checkpoints into the chain itself could make it possi= ble for full nodes to skip verification of large sections of historical dat= a when booting up. What you are suggesting, unless I am mistaken, is that new full nodes shoul= d have no way of knowing if an output is spent or even if it exists. Since = large sections of the blockchain will potentially be skipped, the full node= will not have complete knowledge of utxo's just for starters. Regards, Damian Williamson ________________________________ From: bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org on behalf of Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev Sent: Monday, 19 February 2018 12:29:50 PM To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Some thoughts on removing timestamps in PoW Copied from: https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rebooting-the-web-of-trust-s= pring2018/pull/13 # Blockchain Timestamps Unnecessary In Proof-of-Work? *Author: Greg Slepak ([@taoeffect@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@taoeffect))* ---- The Bitcoin blockchain has a 10-minute target blocktime that is achieved by= a difficulty adjustment algorithm. I assert, or rather, pose the hypothesis, that the use of timestamps in Bit= coin's blockchain may be unnecessary, and that Bitcoin can operate with the= same security guarantees without it (except as noted in [Risks and Mitigat= ions](#risks-and-mitigations)), and therefore does not need miners to maint= ain global clock synchronization. The alternative difficulty adjustment algorithm would work according to the= following principles: - The incentive for miners is and always has been to maximize profit. - The block reward algorithm is now modified to issue coins into perpetuity= (no maximum). Any given block can issue _up to_ `X` number of coins per bl= ock. - The number of coins issued per block is now tied directly to the difficul= ty of the block, and the concept of "epocs" or "block reward halving" is re= moved. - The chain selection rule remains "chain with most proof of work" - The difficulty can be modified by miners in an arbitrary direction (up or= down), but is limited in magnitude by some maximum percentage (e.g. no mor= e than 20% deviation from the previous block), we call this `Y%`. ### Observations - Miners are free to mine blocks of whatever difficulty they choose, up to = a maximum deviation - The blockchain may at times produce blocks very quickly, and at other tim= es produce blocks more slowly - Powerful miners are incentivized to raise the difficulty to remove compet= itors (as is true today) - Whether miners choose to produce blocks quickly or slowly is entirely up = to them. If they produce blocks quickly, each block has a lower reward, but= there are more of them. If they produce blocks slowly, each block has a hi= gher reward, but there are fewer of them. So an equilibrium will be natural= ly reached to produce blocks at a rate that should minimize orphans. A timestamp may still be included in blocks, but it no longer needs to be u= sed for anything, or represent anything significant other than metadata abo= ut when the miner claims to have produced the block. ### Risks and Mitigations Such a system may introduce risks that require further modification of the = protocol to mitigate. The most straightforward risk comes from the potential increase in total tr= ansaction throughput that such a change would introduce (these are the same= concerns that exist with respect to raising the blocksize). The removal of= timestamps would allow a cartel of miners to produce high-difficulty block= s at a fast rate, potentially resulting in additional centralization pressu= res not only on miners but also on full nodes who then would have greater d= ifficulty keeping up with the additional bandwidth and storage demands. Two equally straightforward mitigations exist to address this if we are giv= en the liberty of modifying the protocol as we wish: 1. Introducing state checkpoints into the chain itself could make it possib= le for full nodes to skip verification of large sections of historical data= when booting up. 2. A sharded protocol, where each shard uses a "sufficiently different" PoW= algorithm, would create an exit for users should the primary blockchain be= come captured by a cartel providing poor quality-of-service. -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing w= ith the NSA. --_000_PSXP216MB0181312DCCA46A1F9A276D799DC80PSXP216MB0181KORP_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

>1. Introducing state ch= eckpoints into the chain itself could make it possible for full nodes to sk= ip verification of large sections of historical data when booting up= .


What you are suggesting, unless I= am mistaken, is that new full nodes should have no way of knowing if an ou= tput is spent or even if it exists. Since large sections of the blockchain = will potentially be skipped, the full node will not have complete knowledge of utxo's just for starters.


Regards,

Damian Williamson

From: bitcoin-dev-bounces@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org&= gt; on behalf of Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoun= dation.org>
Sent: Monday, 19 February 2018 12:29:50 PM
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Some thoughts on removing timestamps in PoW
 
Copied from: https://githu= b.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rebooting-the-web-of-trust-spring2018/pull/13


# Blockchain Timestamps Unnecessary In Proof-of-Work?

*Author: Greg Slepak ([@taoeffect@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@taoeffect))= *

----

The Bitcoin blockchain has a 10-minute target blocktime tha= t is achieved by a difficulty adjustment algorithm.

I assert, or rather, pose the hypothesis, that the use of t= imestamps in Bitcoin's blockchain may be unnecessary, and that Bitcoin can = operate with the same security guarantees without it (except as noted in [R= isks and Mitigations](#risks-and-mitigations)), and therefore does not need miners to maintain global clock synchronizatio= n.

The alternative difficulty adjustment algorithm would work = according to the following principles:

- The incentive for miners is and always has been to maximi= ze profit.
- The block reward algorithm is now modified to issue coins= into perpetuity (no maximum). Any given block can issue _up to_ `X` number= of coins per block.
- The number of coins issued per block is now tied directly= to the difficulty of the block, and the concept of "epocs" or &q= uot;block reward halving" is removed.
- The chain selection rule remains "chain with most pr= oof of work"
- The difficulty can be modified by miners in an arbitrary = direction (up or down), but is limited in magnitude by some maximum percent= age (e.g. no more than 20% deviation from the previous block), we call this= `Y%`.

### Observations

- Miners are free to mine blocks of whatever difficulty the= y choose, up to a maximum deviation
- The blockchain may at times produce blocks very quickly, = and at other times produce blocks more slowly
- Powerful miners are incentivized to raise the difficulty = to remove competitors (as is true today)
- Whether miners choose to produce blocks quickly or slowly= is entirely up to them. If they produce blocks quickly, each block has a l= ower reward, but there are more of them. If they produce blocks slowly, eac= h block has a higher reward, but there are fewer of them. So an equilibrium will be naturally reached to produce = blocks at a rate that should minimize orphans.

A timestamp may still be included in blocks, but it no long= er needs to be used for anything, or represent anything significant other t= han metadata about when the miner claims to have produced the block.

### Risks and Mitigations

Such a system may introduce risks that require further modi= fication of the protocol to mitigate.

The most straightforward risk comes from the potential incr= ease in total transaction throughput that such a change would introduce (th= ese are the same concerns that exist with respect to raising the blocksize)= . The removal of timestamps would allow a cartel of miners to produce high-difficulty blocks at a fast rate,= potentially resulting in additional centralization pressures not only on m= iners but also on full nodes who then would have greater difficulty keeping= up with the additional bandwidth and storage demands.

Two equally straightforward mitigations exist to address th= is if we are given the liberty of modifying the protocol as we wish:

1. Introducing state checkpoints into the chain itself coul= d make it possible for full nodes to skip verification of large sections of= historical data when booting up.
2. A sharded protocol, where each shard uses a "suffic= iently different" PoW algorithm, would create an exit for users should= the primary blockchain become captured by a cartel providing poor quality-= of-service.


--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing<= span class=3D"" style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Helvetica; font-size= :14px; font-style:normal; font-weight:normal; letter-spacing:normal; text-a= lign:start; text-indent:0px; text-transform:none; white-space:normal; word-= spacing:0px; line-height:normal; orphans:2; widows:2"> with the NSA.

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