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From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= <jtimon@jtimon.cc>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 10:47:06 +0200
Message-ID: <CABm2gDrCOVN5FQ4DCGwG=1XjZisTVQdOKCwuPnNxd6yHQhy6rA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Cc: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork upgrades
Precedence: list

If different users want different incompatible things (enough on each
side), there's no way to avoid the split. We shouldn't try to avoid
such a split.
Users decide the rules, not miners nor developers.

On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 12:05 AM Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Ultimately there is only one answer to this question. Get majority hash p=
ower support.
>
> Soft fork enforcement is the same act as any other censorship enforcement=
, the difference is only a question of what people want. Given that there i=
s no collective =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D, those wants differ. Bitcoin resolves =
this question of conflicting wants, but it is not a democracy, it=E2=80=99s=
 a market. One votes by trading.
>
> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is accompl=
ished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so everyone g=
ets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough people w=
ant to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners =
stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99=
s your vote.
>
> Otherwise, as mentioned below, anyone can start a new coin. But it=E2=80=
=99s dishonest to imply that one can do this and all others will surely fol=
low. This cannot be known, it=E2=80=99s merely a gamble. And it=E2=80=99s o=
ne that has been shown to not always pay off.
>
> e
>
> > On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:43, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
> >
> > =EF=BB=BFFor some definitions of =E2=80=9Cblock=E2=80=9D.
> >
> > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are of=
f on a chain split. Anyone can of course split off from a chain by changing=
 a rule (soft or otherwise) at any time, so this is a bit of an empty claim=
.
> >
> > Nobody can stop a person from splitting. The relevant question is how t=
o *prevent* a split. And activation without majority hash power certainly d=
oes not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.
> >
> > e
> >
> >> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:13, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@li=
sts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> =EF=BB=BFBIP8 LOT=3DTrue just ensures miners cannot block an upgrade e=
ntirely. They can
> >> still slow it down.
> >>
> >> It also already has the trinary state you seem to be describing (altho=
ugh
> >> perhaps this could be better documented in the BIP): users who oppose =
the
> >> softfork can and should treat the successful signal (whether MASF or U=
ASF) as
> >> invalid, thereby ensuring they do not follow a chain with the rules in=
 force.
> >>
> >> No additional bit is needed, as softforks are coordinated between user=
s, NOT
> >> miners (who have no particular say in them, aside from their role as a=
lso
> >> being users). The miner involvement is only out of necessity (to set t=
he bit
> >> in the header, which users coordinate with) and potentially to acceler=
ate
> >> activation by protecting upgrade-lagging users.
> >>
> >> Luke
> >>
> >>
> >>>> On Saturday 26 June 2021 20:21:52 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev wrote=
:
> >>> Given the recent controversy over upgrade mechanisms for the
> >>> non-controversial taproot upgrade, I have been thinking about ways to=
 solve
> >>> the problems that both sides brought up. In short, BIP8 LOT=3Dtrue pr=
oponents
> >>> make the point that lazy miners failing to upgrade in a timely manner=
 slow
> >>> down releases of bitcoin upgrades, and BIP9 / BIP8 LOT=3Dfalse
> >>> proponents make the point that LOT=3Dtrue can lead to undesirable for=
ks that
> >>> might cause a lot of chaos. I believe both points are essentially cor=
rect
> >>> and have created a proposal
> >>> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-trinary-version-signaling/blob/ma=
ster/b
> >>> ip-trinary-version-bits.md> for soft fork upgrades that solve both pr=
oblems.
> >>>
> >>> The proposal uses trinary version signaling rather than binary signal=
ing.
> >>> For any particular prospective soft fork upgrade, this allows for thr=
ee
> >>> signaling states:
> >>>
> >>> * Actively support the change.
> >>> * Actively oppose the change.
> >>> * Not signaling (neither support or oppose). This is the default stat=
e.
> >>>
> >>> Using this additional information, we can release non-contentious upg=
rades
> >>> much quicker (with a much lower percent of miners signaling support).=
 For
> >>> contentious upgrades, miners who oppose the change are incentivized t=
o
> >>> update their software to a version that can actively signal oppositio=
n to
> >>> the change. The more opposition there is, the higher the threshold
> >>> necessary to lock in the upgrade. With the parameters I currently
> >>> recommended in the proposal, this chart shows how much support signal=
ing
> >>> would be necessary given a particular amount of active opposition
> >>> signaling:
> >>>
> >>> [image: thresholdChart.png]
> >>> If literally no one signals opposition, a 60% threshold should be
> >>> relatively safe because it is a supermajority amount that is unlikely=
 to
> >>> change significantly very quickly (ie if 60% of miners support the ch=
ange
> >>> today, its unlikely that less than a majority of miners would support=
 the
> >>> change a year or two from now), and if no one is signaling opposition=
,
> >>> chances are that the vast majority of the other 40% would also eventu=
ally
> >>> signal support.
> >>>
> >>> This both gives an incentive for "lazy" miners to upgrade if they act=
ually
> >>> oppose the change while at the same time allowing these lazy miners t=
o
> >>> remain lazy without slowing down the soft fork activation much.
> >>>
> >>> I think now is the right time to discuss new soft fork upgrade mechan=
isms,
> >>> when there are no pressing soft fork upgrades ready to deploy. Waitin=
g
> >>> until we need to deploy a soft fork to discuss this will only delay t=
hings
> >>> and cause contention again like it did with taproot.
> >>>
> >>> I'm very curious to know what people think of this mechanism. I would
> >>> appreciate any comments here, or written as github issues on the prop=
osal
> >>> repo itself.
> >>>
> >>> Thanks,
> >>> BT
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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