Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77A7CC002D for ; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 02:09:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7049A417E1 for ; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 02:09:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kgujbyid8SEY for ; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 02:09:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-ej1-x630.google.com (mail-ej1-x630.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::630]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 156B1417DF for ; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 02:09:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ej1-x630.google.com with SMTP id kq17so602648ejb.4 for ; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:09:20 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=LxI4XJTsQd2GadHF7i3HmXm75NP2vBF0tt+UA9mEXDE=; b=dGDYTzg0lDNI/DnrhgT1cAVCwh4WU/kw+31nwpj55cG4PfMZFx2V9ajZ+HujqOORG3 BlKwJmTGRCw6RrHnfzS5Cf6yrWhCjwGae0bnf8s95QsXCVWwtlfEdqpb7r6IstdrPi1x kIMRxWsZwSKz54eOACN9A+MEpvQChSZ56F1yycqYE2wiPaFkewMM+yIr9vkQm2ECA6y+ 7RDxVWSX6RQysXpf6DSaPVz/0iWwkBllRVpxoLs7Rwk4bU8Oxe9iliVEDkhWTeVf7LYW 37TiWtZyiWgg6yLw9TKTvfW3xqrq4MwPUGHjXMDzm0AB3xkpHzZ9Uo5RBv2xGn5xel17 1YhA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=LxI4XJTsQd2GadHF7i3HmXm75NP2vBF0tt+UA9mEXDE=; b=YVxwONQX7ukN9HCqftyj0ifmh35fjKQMWy6glsj5QgQcrPfGaqYPafXhgZOZrDRzO5 whOEJHITxcJIdw8NkVR9YyyUz2kBWjsEaL/Ks5910bnPZPEvhaI0FgnzJxECR3uPralT gOnbC7oMwVxbUSg8QSUukoi+7AeBg5hoiHQsuGR5MBPbr0PiFLjfXshfPi01AUGyHYKN 8UdvkArSWoLseyGhc4134cneEdTu8st8KNeHICH2IRBALxhC6fJLlZ0i0wlBuvNZepeF pg+dSailQIcDPCKI6akuFrFIr0S6vwGy5AkQAyVyRYg6djwayuJt9Fi4JIQ+iwL0VH3z 62qQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532eCHv9bpbjmtInvmgUk3C5IWeZG67MoQTWjhI69N2Oj0X3YA0l 1C5wSpQdHh2XaiZ8dk0PH8qLfG7Rsu1mpI85La7RxDm1qjM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyUJQ+RGJV0PC6VJOhb6HS6poe8KKJK6+SwQN6ljoi9SNFH2bbw0VKg1QBLrwlfkDh1TkAFHXkTB4mK8OZycOk= X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:3daa:b0:6e8:969d:564d with SMTP id he42-20020a1709073daa00b006e8969d564dmr23601147ejc.735.1651025358856; Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:09:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Billy Tetrud Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 21:09:03 -0500 Message-ID: To: Buck O Perley , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000007a69405dd994c71" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 08:09:15 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Vaulting (Was: Automatically reverting ("transitory") > soft forks) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 02:09:23 -0000 --00000000000007a69405dd994c71 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > the hot wallet can only spend a certain amount from the hot wallet spend and the rest would .. be sent back That would definitely be the way to do it. The ability to steal from the hot wallet in my opinion shouldn't really be a "concern" about CTV, but rather an understood tradeoff of a CTV wallet vault. In fact, its hardly even a trade off - a CTV vault can be created that is usable exactly as a normal multisig wallet if the user wants to use it that way. The unvaulting would simply add an additional (and optional) usability improvement over normal multisig. The security considerations around choosing the appropriate maximum amount to unvault at a time (with one key) is just something that someone would need to decide based on basically their comfort level. It sounds like you said something very similar in your point 2. Would I like to have a wallet vault that doesn't have this security consideration? Sure. But that isn't to say a wallet vault with that hitch isn't a very useful advance to self-custody setups. > You also get the nice benefit of learning about compromised keys without having to risk all funds associated with that key. This is an interesting tack-on attribute. A built in honey pot. If you only allow 1% of your savings to be taken out at a time (with one key), is 1% of your savings worth knowing that your wallet has been partially compromised? Maybe it would be. On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:51 AM Buck O Perley via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Just a couple of comments re-CTV vault security concerns. > > > 1. One way to assuage the concern of the hot wallet vulnerability > is pre-program the spends such that the hot wallet can only > spend a certain amount from the hot wallet spend and the rest would > kind of be "recursive" in that it would be sent back to a > new instantiation of the CTV vault. I believe kanzure's vaults > does this w/ the non-covenant version using pre-signed transactions > (https://github.com/kanzure/python-vaults). While this doesn't > prevent the theft it caps off the total risk. I would argue that > this is strictly better than a multisig because you can also use > multisig as you normally would if you want but you have the option > if you think your hot key is secure to use that spending path. > You also get the nice benefit of learning about compromised > keys without having to risk all funds associated with that key. > > > 2. As to how to improve UX for CTV with other proposals, I think > you get a lot of benefits when using with taproot because you can > use CTV in tapleaves to secure specific spend conditions, but can > always fall back to other off-ramps (e.g. a musig key path spend or > other script path conditions). Of course you can do this without > taproot but taproot makes this more space efficient. This idea has > been used to some effect in some recent exploration of how CTV can > help improve UX around DLCs. You could even do this to help with > the problems of not sending the right amount such that you have a > really really cold key or set of keys for example such that if you > have UTXOs that have values that can't be spent with the given CTV > commitment, then you just use that other branch. > > - Buck > > ------- Original Message ------- > > > Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 18:03:52 -0500 > > From: Billy Tetrud billy.tetrud@gmail.com > > > > > To: "Russell O'Connor" roconnor@blockstream.com, Bitcoin Protocol > > > > > Discussion bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > > > > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Vaulting (Was: Automatically reverting > > ("transitory") soft forks) > > Message-ID: > > CAGpPWDaeKYABkK+StFXoxgWEhVGzqY02KPGOFjOtt9W8UPRr1A@mail.gmail.com > > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > > > > @Matt > > > > > > both of which are somewhat frustrating limitations, but not security > > > > > limitations, only practical ones. > > > > > So I think the first limitation you mentioned (that if your hot wallet's > > key gets stolen you need) can be legitimately considered a security > > limitation. Not because you need to rotate your keys, but because you > might > > not know your hot wallet key has been stolen. If you unvault an output to > > your hot wallet, the thief could be lying in wait, ready to steal those > > funds upon them landing. At that point, you would then know your hot > wallet > > key was compromised and could rotate your vault keys in order to prevent > > further theft. However, the fact that there is a clear theft > vulnerability > > is something I would say should be considered a "security limitation". > > > > > As you mentioned, this is of course also a security limitation of a hot > > wallet, so this setup definitely has a lot of advantages over a simple > hot > > wallet. However, if you compare it against a multisig wallet (eg 2 of 3), > > you can see that while theft of a single key would never result in any > > theft in that setup, it could in a CTV vault. The other trade offs there > > are ones of practicality and convenience. > > > > > This isn't to say a CTV vault wouldn't be useful. Just that it has > > significant trade offs. > > > > > @Russel > > > > > > the original MES vault .. commits to the destination address during > > > > > unvaulting > > > > > I see. Looking at the MES16 paper, OP_COV isn't described clearly enough > > for me to understand that it does that. However, I can imagine how it > > might do that. > > > > > One possibility is that the intended destination is predetermined and > > hardcoded. This wouldn't be very useful, and also wouldn't be different > > than how CTV could do it, so I assume that isn't what you envisioned this > > doing. > > > > > I can imagine instead that the definition of the pattern could be > specified > > as a number indicating the number of stack items in the pattern, followed > > by that number of stack items. If that's how it is done, I can see the > user > > inputting an intended destination script (corresponding to the intended > > destination address) which would then be somehow rotated in to the right > > spot within the pattern, allowing the pattern to specify the coins > > eventually reaching an address with that script. However, this could be > > quite cumbersome, and would require fully specifying the scripts along > the > > covenant pathways leading to a fair amount of information duplication > > (since scripts must be specified both in the covenant and in spending the > > subsequent output). Both of these things would seem to make OP_COV in > > practice quite an expensive opcode to spend with. It also means that, > since > > the transactor must fully specify the script, its not possible to take > > advantage of taproot's script hiding capabilities (were it to send to a > > taproot address). > > > > > However, my assumptions might be incorrect. If you think OP_COV would be > a > > useful opcode, I would encourage you to write up a complete > specification. > > > > > > What ways can we build a secured vault that commits to the destination > > > > > address? > > > > > Some kind of passed-through state allows doing this. With OP_COV (if my > > assumptions above are correct), the intended destination can be passed > > through the output script pattern(s). With my own proposed > > op_pushoutputstack > > > https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-efficient-bitcoin-vaults/blob/main/pos/bip-pushoutputstack.md > , > > > > > state is passed as an attachment on the output more directly. Curious > what > > you think about that proposal. > > > > > > Are there elegant ways of building secure vaults by using CTV plus > > > > > something else. > > > > > Since CTV predefines all the transactions that can happen under its > > control, passed state like this can't help because any dynamic state > would > > change the template and render the CTV transaction invalid. I don't see > any > > way of solving this problem for CTV. > > > > > I'm curious how you think op_cat could enable this with CTV (other than > the > > cat+schnorr tricks that don't require CTV at all). > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 2:31 PM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev < > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > Okay, Matt explained to me the intended application of CTV vaults off > > > list, so I have a better understanding now. > > > > > > > The CTV vault scheme is designed as an improvement over the traditional > > > management of hot-wallets and cold-wallets. The CTV vault is logically > on > > > the "cold-side" and lets funds be sent from the "cold" side to one's > own > > > the hot wallet after the unvaulting delay. In this case, the hot wallet > > > funds are always at risk, so it isn't unexpected that those funds > could be > > > stolen. After all, that is how hot wallets are today. The advantage is > > > that funds can be moved from the "cold" side without needing to dig > out the > > > cold keys. > > > > > > > The MES vault scheme applies to a different scenario. In the MES case > it > > > is the hot funds are inside the vault, and it is the hot key that > unvaults > > > the funds and sends them to customer's addresses after a delay. If the > > > hot-key is used in any unauthorised way, then funds can be sent to the > > > address of the cold key (the MES vault actually does something fancy in > > > case of recovery, but it could be adapted to simply send funds to a > cold > > > wallet). > > > > > > > The MES vault lie somewhere between "better" and "different" when > compared > > > to the CTV vault. If one is unwilling to use the MES vault on the hot > side > > > and have every withdrawl vetted, then, while you could use the MES > design > > > on the cold side like the CTV vault, it wouldn't really offer you any > > > advantages over a CTV vault. However, if you are interested in managing > > > all your payments through a vault (as I've been imagining) then the CTV > > > vault comes across as ineffective when compared to an MES style vault. > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 2:24 PM Matt Corallo lf-lists@mattcorallo.com > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Still trying to make sure I understand this concern, let me know if > I get > > > > this all wrong. > > > > > > > > > On 4/22/22 10:25 AM, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > > > > > > > > It's not the attackers only choice to succeed. If an attacker > steals > > > > > the hot key, then they have > > > > > the option to simply wait for the user to unvault their funds of > their > > > > > own accord and then race / > > > > > outspend the users transaction with their own. Indeed, this is > what we > > > > > expect would happen in the > > > > > dark forest. > > > > > > > > > Right, a key security assumption of the CTV-based vaults would be > that > > > > you MUST NOT EVER withdraw > > > > more in one go than your hot wallet risk tolerance, but given that > your > > > > attack isn't any worse than > > > > simply stealing the hot wallet key immediately after a withdraw. > > > > > > > > > It does have the drawback that if you ever get a hot wallet key > stole you > > > > have to rotate all of your > > > > CTV outputs and your CTV outputs must never be any larger than your > hot > > > > wallet risk tolerance > > > > amount, both of which are somewhat frustrating limitations, but not > > > > security limitations, only > > > > practical ones. > > > > > > > > > > And that's not even mentioning the issues already noted by the > document > > > > > regarding fee management, > > > > > which would likely also benefit from a less constrained design for > > > > > covenants. > > > > > > > > > Of course I've always been in favor of a less constrained covenants > > > > design from day one for ten > > > > reasons, but that's a whole other rabbit hole :) > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --00000000000007a69405dd994c71 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>=C2=A0 the hot wallet can only spend a certain amount from the hot wallet spend an= d the rest would .. be sent back

That would definitely b= e the way to do it. The ability to steal from the hot wallet in my opinion = shouldn't really be a "concern" about CTV, but rather an unde= rstood tradeoff of a CTV wallet vault. In fact, its hardly even a trade off= - a CTV vault can be created that is usable exactly as a normal multisig w= allet if the user wants to use it that way. The unvaulting would simply add= an additional (and optional) usability improvement over normal multisig. T= he security considerations around choosing the appropriate maximum amount t= o unvault at a time (with one key) is just something that someone would nee= d to decide based on basically their comfort level. It sounds like you said= something very similar in your point 2.

Would I l= ike to have a wallet vault that doesn't have this security consideratio= n? Sure. But that isn't to say a wallet vault with that hitch isn't= a very useful advance to self-custody setups.

>= ; You also get the nice benefit of learning about compromised keys without = having to risk all funds associated with that key.

This is an interesting tack-on attribute. A built in honey pot. If you onl= y allow 1% of your savings to be taken out at a time (with one key), is=C2= =A01% of your savings worth knowing that your wallet has been partially com= promised? Maybe it would be.


<= br>
On Mon,= Apr 25, 2022 at 11:51 AM Buck O Perley via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation= .org> wrote:
Just a couple of comments re-CTV vault security concerns.


1. One way to assuage the concern of the hot wallet vulnerability
is pre-program the spends such that the hot wallet can only
spend a certain amount from the hot wallet spend and the rest would
kind of be "recursive" in that it would be sent back to a
new instantiation of the CTV vault. I believe kanzure's vaults
does this w/ the non-covenant version using pre-signed transactions
(https://github.com/kanzure/python-vaults). While this d= oesn't
prevent the theft it caps off the total risk. I would argue that
this is strictly better than a multisig because you can also use
multisig as you normally would if you want but you have the option
if you think your hot key is secure to use that spending path.
You also get the nice benefit of learning about compromised
keys without having to risk all funds associated with that key.


2. As to how to improve UX for CTV with other proposals, I think
you get a lot of benefits when using with taproot because you can
use CTV in tapleaves to secure specific spend conditions, but can
always fall back to other off-ramps (e.g. a musig key path spend or
other script path conditions). Of course you can do this without
taproot but taproot makes this more space efficient. This idea has
been used to some effect in some recent exploration of how CTV can
help improve UX around DLCs. You could even do this to help with
the problems of not sending the right amount such that you have a
really really cold key or set of keys for example such that if you
have UTXOs that have values that can't be spent with the given CTV
commitment, then you just use that other branch.

- Buck

------- Original Message -------

> Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 18:03:52 -0500
> From: Billy Tetrud billy.tetrud@gmail.com
>

> To: "Russell O'Connor" roconnor@blockstream.com, Bitcoin Protocol=
>

> Discussion bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>

> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Vaulting (Was: Automatically reverting
> ("transitory") soft forks)
> Message-ID:
> CAGpPWDaeKYABkK+StFXoxgWEhVGzqY02KPGOFj= Ott9W8UPRr1A@mail.gmail.com
>

> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"utf-8"
>

> @Matt
>

> > both of which are somewhat frustrating limitations, but not secur= ity
>

> limitations, only practical ones.
>

> So I think the first limitation you mentioned (that if your hot wallet= 's
> key gets stolen you need) can be legitimately considered a security > limitation. Not because you need to rotate your keys, but because you = might
> not know your hot wallet key has been stolen. If you unvault an output= to
> your hot wallet, the thief could be lying in wait, ready to steal thos= e
> funds upon them landing. At that point, you would then know your hot w= allet
> key was compromised and could rotate your vault keys in order to preve= nt
> further theft. However, the fact that there is a clear theft vulnerabi= lity
> is something I would say should be considered a "security limitat= ion".
>

> As you mentioned, this is of course also a security limitation of a ho= t
> wallet, so this setup definitely has a lot of advantages over a simple= hot
> wallet. However, if you compare it against a multisig wallet (eg 2 of = 3),
> you can see that while theft of a single key would never result in any=
> theft in that setup, it could in a CTV vault. The other trade offs the= re
> are ones of practicality and convenience.
>

> This isn't to say a CTV vault wouldn't be useful. Just that it= has
> significant trade offs.
>

> @Russel
>

> > the original MES vault .. commits to the destination address duri= ng
>

> unvaulting
>

> I see. Looking at the MES16 paper, OP_COV isn't described clearly = enough
> for me to understand that it does that. However, I can imagine how it<= br> > might do that.
>

> One possibility is that the intended destination is predetermined and<= br> > hardcoded. This wouldn't be very useful, and also wouldn't be = different
> than how CTV could do it, so I assume that isn't what you envision= ed this
> doing.
>

> I can imagine instead that the definition of the pattern could be spec= ified
> as a number indicating the number of stack items in the pattern, follo= wed
> by that number of stack items. If that's how it is done, I can see= the user
> inputting an intended destination script (corresponding to the intende= d
> destination address) which would then be somehow rotated in to the rig= ht
> spot within the pattern, allowing the pattern to specify the coins
> eventually reaching an address with that script. However, this could b= e
> quite cumbersome, and would require fully specifying the scripts along= the
> covenant pathways leading to a fair amount of information duplication<= br> > (since scripts must be specified both in the covenant and in spending = the
> subsequent output). Both of these things would seem to make OP_COV in<= br> > practice quite an expensive opcode to spend with. It also means that, = since
> the transactor must fully specify the script, its not possible to take=
> advantage of taproot's script hiding capabilities (were it to send= to a
> taproot address).
>

> However, my assumptions might be incorrect. If you think OP_COV would = be a
> useful opcode, I would encourage you to write up a complete specificat= ion.
>

> > What ways can we build a secured vault that commits to the destin= ation
>

> address?
>

> Some kind of passed-through state allows doing this. With OP_COV (if m= y
> assumptions above are correct), the intended destination can be passed=
> through the output script pattern(s). With my own proposed
> op_pushoutputstack
> https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-efficient-bitcoin-vaults/blob/main/pos/= bip-pushoutputstack.md,
>

> state is passed as an attachment on the output more directly. Curious = what
> you think about that proposal.
>

> > Are there elegant ways of building secure vaults by using CTV plu= s
>

> something else.
>

> Since CTV predefines all the transactions that can happen under its > control, passed state like this can't help because any dynamic sta= te would
> change the template and render the CTV transaction invalid. I don'= t see any
> way of solving this problem for CTV.
>

> I'm curious how you think op_cat could enable this with CTV (other= than the
> cat+schnorr tricks that don't require CTV at all).
>

>

>

> On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 2:31 PM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev &= lt;
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>

> > Okay, Matt explained to me the intended application of CTV vaults= off
> > list, so I have a better understanding now.
> >

> > The CTV vault scheme is designed as an improvement over the tradi= tional
> > management of hot-wallets and cold-wallets. The CTV vault is logi= cally on
> > the "cold-side" and lets funds be sent from the "c= old" side to one's own
> > the hot wallet after the unvaulting delay. In this case, the hot = wallet
> > funds are always at risk, so it isn't unexpected that those f= unds could be
> > stolen. After all, that is how hot wallets are today. The advanta= ge is
> > that funds can be moved from the "cold" side without ne= eding to dig out the
> > cold keys.
> >

> > The MES vault scheme applies to a different scenario. In the MES = case it
> > is the hot funds are inside the vault, and it is the hot key that= unvaults
> > the funds and sends them to customer's addresses after a dela= y. If the
> > hot-key is used in any unauthorised way, then funds can be sent t= o the
> > address of the cold key (the MES vault actually does something fa= ncy in
> > case of recovery, but it could be adapted to simply send funds to= a cold
> > wallet).
> >

> > The MES vault lie somewhere between "better" and "= different" when compared
> > to the CTV vault. If one is unwilling to use the MES vault on the= hot side
> > and have every withdrawl vetted, then, while you could use the ME= S design
> > on the cold side like the CTV vault, it wouldn't really offer= you any
> > advantages over a CTV vault. However, if you are interested in ma= naging
> > all your payments through a vault (as I've been imagining) th= en the CTV
> > vault comes across as ineffective when compared to an MES style v= ault.
> >

> > On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 2:24 PM Matt Corallo lf-lists@mattcorallo.com
> > wrote:
> >

> > > Still trying to make sure I understand this concern, let me = know if I get
> > > this all wrong.
> > >

> > > On 4/22/22 10:25 AM, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev wr= ote:
> > >

> > > > It's not the attackers only choice to succeed. If a= n attacker steals
> > > > the hot key, then they have
> > > > the option to simply wait for the user to unvault their= funds of their
> > > > own accord and then race /
> > > > outspend the users transaction with their own. Indeed, = this is what we
> > > > expect would happen in the
> > > > dark forest.
> > >

> > > Right, a key security assumption of the CTV-based vaults wou= ld be that
> > > you MUST NOT EVER withdraw
> > > more in one go than your hot wallet risk tolerance, but give= n that your
> > > attack isn't any worse than
> > > simply stealing the hot wallet key immediately after a withd= raw.
> > >

> > > It does have the drawback that if you ever get a hot wallet = key stole you
> > > have to rotate all of your
> > > CTV outputs and your CTV outputs must never be any larger th= an your hot
> > > wallet risk tolerance
> > > amount, both of which are somewhat frustrating limitations, = but not
> > > security limitations, only
> > > practical ones.
> > >

> > > > And that's not even mentioning the issues already n= oted by the document
> > > > regarding fee management,
> > > > which would likely also benefit from a less constrained= design for
> > > > covenants.
> > >

> > > Of course I've always been in favor of a less constraine= d covenants
> > > design from day one for ten
> > > reasons, but that's a whole other rabbit hole :)
> >

> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundatio= n.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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