Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F21FC0001 for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 14:33:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 113AF83FE0 for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 14:33:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vmptcxLBROaj for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 14:33:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-lj1-x230.google.com (mail-lj1-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::230]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD1CC840FE for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 14:33:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lj1-x230.google.com with SMTP id o16so15253614ljp.3 for ; Sat, 08 May 2021 07:33:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=3zrBv4z+JK1C+3oQZo4roiuisDUMXLKPL16MovUWmyA=; b=RiuTLgg+jljz/4LfmCgVpxnimIypfpp/GHyCewhwz2mOhLjeCWwqQfS9I/+AMwNl0K ss4Ca7eh1tWNGm2X8P/gPjxpAAaQPKUGgi+Opm8R+PhLuol787C731urMTp9jvARPoOG RV3xl0auffb6wZ9h6yZ8W5279R4kDYTl5wrG6lViJMGVkQmf/J6234274JJ1jufDLHAS 2yGX+rH9JUcTrIViAvQlP6NZxWF7v639aGRGm5kCNwfjS8wzGuYqFvCDfjywkklEu4vu uPKjPKEoE766wHwY52T3OVs6RlB8TOX0+idfrKmUUSA5RId3M3t0SeKn6inKNEKiNFFU NrkQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=3zrBv4z+JK1C+3oQZo4roiuisDUMXLKPL16MovUWmyA=; b=HsytF5djw1CnGFPgyQRA5iJET9Y/O6Cz2nbLNOfe/9pWAKPzmD41vUUmNWJtlq0FoF GUINlexjAxXW4rB8Y/ZXgiV6NptkLgaPpoEUPYIJh9fIiG7Njn4yFiCN7e1KS82hEmnd 2KhgEqTn0KvZ9/jFzGkypiVXxR64VvS2pqoLZdHa3pDSILFfShryBuoMhBis03ktqhQO t61Hse7ufTtc706wt0nlCormJHWLl6qYmT1b/4QvrMLbLHzhMYqTRfMNLD2M7SytYnoP wxhT2vuC8bRhsj0Ldvd613C2CTXhVrdkBBgiNpEL3mvOxlz5K9Qs/sCsZCRZQ4HAorrZ 5sxg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533Mqvdn67ALw17cZiHTb7JiV8YfPrsWe8k99iCm8FhFvtJOq4MK lL/EstqBt0a1cg7xcpcIdbkiy7wTSLvuCt9JF9g= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxkjGzgOWdNE1Q/YQP/+Lqr2X9WuJ/jmvXcCffN6iUxh7ADKy1ZgqW1uPW3Fq49u8AzXG5gi/c19rzQr30S6vI= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:a543:: with SMTP id e3mr12112063ljn.433.1620484424643; Sat, 08 May 2021 07:33:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <6do5xN2g5LPnFeM55iJ-4C4MyXOu_KeXxy68Xt4dJQMhi3LJ8ZrLICmEUlh8JGfDmsDG12m1JDAh0e0huwK_MlyKpdfn22ru3zsm7lYLfBo=@protonmail.com> <6C68BF06-522B-41D3-BF3A-17D900C51BD1@voskuil.org> In-Reply-To: <6C68BF06-522B-41D3-BF3A-17D900C51BD1@voskuil.org> From: Karl Date: Sat, 8 May 2021 10:33:31 -0400 Message-ID: To: Eric Voskuil , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000007eb61805c1d26e80" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 08 May 2021 14:36:13 +0000 Cc: SatoshiSingh Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Opinion on proof of stake in future X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 08 May 2021 14:33:48 -0000 --0000000000007eb61805c1d26e80 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Bitcoin would get better mainstream public reputation if the block reward were reduced to reduce mining. This would quickly and easily reduce energy expenditure. A system would be needed to do that with consensus, to make it political. For example, making a norm of extending the block reward termination farther into the future, spreading the remaining coins out more thinly, but never doing the opposite. PoS can be made to work but it's hard to do so amid such disagreement. It is so hard to express one's relevant information concisely and effectively. I recommended earlier finding or hiring an experienced facilitator who could make sure all concerns around the chain are included by engaging all the dialog more productively. Somebody would need to be available to do the work of finding such a person and any compensation they might need. On Fri, May 7, 2021, 7:05 PM Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-Fallacy > This wiki states things as impossible but does not at all demonstrate them to be so. The assumption that something is impossible always relies on many other assumptions, and the reader may have different ones from the author. Quote from Proof-of-Stake-Fallacy > In Other Means Principle it is shown that censorship resistance depends on people paying miners to overpower the censor. > Overcoming censorship is not possible in a PoS system, as the censor has acquired majority stake and cannot be unseated. If the link in that text is followed you get, Quote from Other Means Principle: > Given that mining is necessarily anonymous, there is no way for the economy to prevent state participation in mining. The article then goes on to assume this, but "no way" is a circular link back to Proof-of-Stake-Fallacy! Never is it demonstrated that a censor will always be able to have majority stake. In a PoS system, they would have to be able to form false chain histories to do that. In a PoW system, they would have to outcompete the work. These are not inherent limitations. The whole world is open. Consider a proof of work algorithm that requires the freeing of prisoners: a state a very different state if it does this. Or a communication protocol that already cannot be intercepted. These things are exotically hard, but not impossible, and show that the logic of the articles is not valid. Another random idea: incentivising out-of-band channels, for example. Mining blocks based on finding and uniting illegitimate forks. Now a chain functions by defeating its own censorship. --0000000000007eb61805c1d26e80 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bitcoin would get better mainstream public reputatio= n if the block reward were reduced to reduce mining.=C2=A0 This would quick= ly and easily reduce energy expenditure.

<= div dir=3D"auto">A system would be needed to do that with consensus, to mak= e it political.=C2=A0 For example, making a norm of extending the block rew= ard termination farther into the future, spreading the remaining coins out = more thinly, but never doing the opposite.

PoS can be made to work but it's hard to do so amid = such disagreement.=C2=A0 It is so hard to express one's relevant inform= ation concisely and effectively.

I recommended earlier finding or hiring an experienced facilitato= r who could make sure all concerns around the chain are included by engagin= g all the dialog more productively.=C2=A0 Somebody would need to be availab= le to do the work of finding such a person and any compensation they might = need.

=
This wiki states things as impossible but does not at all= demonstrate them to be so.

The assumption that something is impossible always relies on many other= assumptions, and the reader may have different ones from the author.
=

Quote from Proof-of-Stake-Fal= lacy
> In Other Means Principle it is shown that = censorship resistance depends on people paying miners to overpower the cens= or.=C2=A0
> Overcoming censorship is not possible= in a PoS system, as the censor has acquired majority stake and cannot be u= nseated.

If the link in = that text is followed you get,

Quote from Other Means Principle:
> Given = that mining is necessarily anonymous, there is no way for the economy to pr= event state participation in mining.

The article then goes on to assume this, but "no way"= ; is a circular link back to Proof-of-Stake-Fallacy!

Never is it demonstrated that a censor will al= ways be able to have majority stake.=C2=A0 In a PoS system, they would have= to be able to form false chain histories to do that.=C2=A0 In a PoW system= , they would have to outcompete the work.

=
These are not inherent limitations.=C2=A0 The whole world= is open.=C2=A0 Consider a proof of work algorithm that requires the freein= g of prisoners: a state a very different state if it does this.=C2=A0 Or a = communication protocol that already cannot be intercepted.=C2=A0 These thin= gs are exotically hard, but not impossible, and show that the logic of the = articles is not valid.

A= nother random idea: incentivising out-of-band channels, for example.=C2=A0 = Mining blocks based on finding and uniting illegitimate forks.=C2=A0 Now a = chain functions by defeating its own censorship.

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