Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DAA03C000E for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9D02402A6 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:41 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.099 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=tutanota.de Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id APTH75swuRVn for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from w1.tutanota.de (w1.tutanota.de [81.3.6.162]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7DAC40288 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from w3.tutanota.de (unknown [192.168.1.164]) by w1.tutanota.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF1C8FA006A; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1625055155; s=s1; d=tutanota.de; h=From:From:To:To:Subject:Subject:Content-Description:Content-ID:Content-Type:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Cc:Date:Date:In-Reply-To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:References:Sender; bh=UGIgRLUJomOBMGojXS1cglIry3UARJzUX9yUjHgZ9gI=; b=UfroJbbYM+PYCP9aBsThWIHibMhgfzV9MEFC4uvD9FeAupD+8fmz79pzEZ4A1VRP P5xcr2E3m1iOZutA/hkPHrfNP6MbTB8s1apgZLuR7zvEl3GyKUJ8HMtEq32wL8orysz pjWj0CC0X5hpJLPYEb2TTepwkakJr+wq59YmVhw7TXiUdbQGw/K0CxG7DKcItYKxier VoNc5qyOGEs4U1FHa4T+Lmhykf63gOqdgJOQAp7fIqcX8+tz5fjjX3/QzEEkvOIQhMD 25FeDI2wIPtCoRus7iq0SezcqRuO9N8XkFuFRnES6i90UdW4I0jLxBTk3knr4pj0USc X7gSlHhj7w== Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 14:12:35 +0200 (CEST) From: Prayank To: Eric Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org> References: <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_644554_2052639145.1625055155891" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:44:40 +0000 Cc: 'Bitcoin Dev' Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:12:42 -0000 ------=_Part_644554_2052639145.1625055155891 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable >=C2=A0I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game t= heory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2= =80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game= theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80= =99s a market. Agree its difficult to predict and include all the possible things that may= happen.=C2=A0Two articles I had read in past that explained few things bas= ed on game theory: https://jimmysong.medium.com/uasf-bip148-scenarios-and-game-theory-9530336d= 953e https://jimmysong.medium.com/segwit2x-game-theory-scenarios-part-1-7f863904= a72 >=C2=A0Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings. My question was related to discussions on mailing list, IRC channels, Reddi= t, Twitter, GitHub etc. Not sure if everyone does but few had no issues wit= h Taproot before signaling according to=C2=A0https://web.archive.org/web/20= 210316221837/https://taprootactivation.com/ >=C2=A0Every time two people trade both party validates what they receive (= not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevan= t and their power is a function of how much they are doing so. Agree. Running and 'using' the node for economic activity can be considered= enforcing consensus rules. >=C2=A0Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any= non-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is. I am not sure about this.=C2=A0 >=C2=A0I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. Ther= e are many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any o= f them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block= miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all. Signaling can be done for many things. In this case I think miners are sign= aling 'readiness'.=C2=A0 Pieter Wuille had answered a related question on S= E:=C2=A0https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/97043/is-there-an-activ= e-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/ Since this is misunderstood or misinterpreted by many, I had even requested= Hampus Sj=C3=B6berg=C2=A0to mention this in=C2=A0https://taproot.watch/ := =C2=A0https://github.com/hsjoberg/fork-explorer/issues/57 --=20 Prayank Jun 30, 2021, 14:47 by eric@voskuil.org: > > Hi Prayank, > > > =C2=A0 > > > > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in = chain split? > > > =C2=A0 > > > Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s p= resumably why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept of = =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or another. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants t= o use? > > > =C2=A0 > > > I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another,= or what people want to use, nor does economics. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory? > > > =C2=A0 > > > I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory= to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t= give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theore= tic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a ma= rket. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling = for a soft fork begins? > > > =C2=A0 > > > Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling re= adiness for soft fork?=C2=A0 > > > =C2=A0 > > > A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner t= o enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals= of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that othe= rs will enforce. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Mine= rs? > > > =C2=A0 > > > A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce con= sensus rules when they reject trading for something that they don=E2=80=99t= consider money. Every time two people trade both party validates what they= receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economical= ly relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doing so. > > > =C2=A0 > > > Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners = can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks. = This is what soft fork enforcement is. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Is soft fork signaling same as voting? > > > =C2=A0 > > > I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are= many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of the= m. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block mine= r intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforc= ed by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. > > > =C2=A0 > > > Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn = the block reward. > > > =C2=A0 > > > > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting inclu= ding some mining pools and exchanges. > > > =C2=A0 > > > What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined behavi= or. > > > =C2=A0 > > > e > > > =C2=A0 > > > > > From:> Prayank =20 > Sent:> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM > To:> eric@voskuil.org > Cc:> Bitcoin Dev > Subject:> Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork > > > > > =C2=A0 > > > Hello Eric, > > > =C2=A0 > > > I have few questions: > > > =C2=A0 > > > >=C2=A0Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you a= re off on a chain split. > > > =C2=A0 > > > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in ch= ain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody = wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game= theory?=C2=A0 > > > =C2=A0 > > > >=C2=A0And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =E2= =80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this. > > > =C2=A0 > > > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling fo= r a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation ev= en if signaling readiness for soft fork?=C2=A0 > > > =C2=A0 > > > >=C2=A0If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is = accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so eve= ryone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough p= eople want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitc= oiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that= =E2=80=99s your vote. > > > =C2=A0 > > > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners= ? > > > =C2=A0 > > > Is soft fork signaling same as voting? > > > =C2=A0 > > > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced= by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not vo= ting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools = and exchanges. > > > =C2=A0 > > > =C2=A0 > > > -- > > > Prayank > > ------=_Part_644554_2052639145.1625055155891 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance o= f game theory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I = can=E2=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a vali= d game theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it= =E2=80=99s a market.

Agree its difficult to predict and include all the possible things that ma= y happen. Two articles I had read in past that explained few things ba= sed on game theory:


<= br>
> Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited= to round table meetings.

My question was related to discussions on mailing list, IRC channels,= Reddit, Twitter, GitHub etc. Not sure if everyone does but few had no issu= es with Taproot before signaling according to https://web.archive.org/web/20210316221837= /https://taprootactivation.com/

> Every time two people trade both party validates = what they receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are e= conomically relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doi= ng so.

Agree. Runnin= g and 'using' the node for economic activity can be considered enforcing co= nsensus rules.

>&= nbsp;Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any n= on-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.

I am not sure about this. 
=

> I don=E2=80= =99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds o= f voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It=E2=80= =99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends t= o censor, that=E2=80=99s all.

Signaling can be done for many things. In this case I think miner= s are signaling 'readiness'.  Pieter Wuille had answered a related que= stion on SE: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questi= ons/97043/is-there-an-active-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/

Since this is misunder= stood or misinterpreted by many, I had even requested Hampus Sj=C3=B6berg&n= bsp;to mention this in https://tapr= oot.watch/ : https://github.com= /hsjoberg/fork-explorer/issues/57

=

--
Prayank
<= br>

Jun 30, 2021, 14:47 by eric@voskuil.org:

Hi Prayank,

 

> So major= ity hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain split?=

 

Any two people on differe= nt rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s presumably why rule changes = are called forks. There is no actual concept of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D= just one set of rules or another.

 

> Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobo= dy wants to use?

 

I don=E2= =80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another, or what p= eople want to use, nor does economics.

 

<= p class=3D"">> What are different things possible in this case based on = game theory?

 

I=E2=80=99ve = seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. Pe= ople throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t give you an an= swer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model appli= cable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a market.

 

> Do miners and mining pools par= ticipate in discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins?

 

Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invit= ed to round table meetings.

 

> Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling= readiness for soft fork? 

 

A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a min= er to enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the sig= nals of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that = others will enforce.

 

> = Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?<= br>

 

A node (software) doesn=E2= =80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus rules when they rejec= t trading for something that they don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time = two people trade both party validates what they receive (not what they trad= e away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power = is a function of how much they are doing so.

 

Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced.= Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-c= ensoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.

 

> Is soft fork signaling same as voting?

 

I don=E2=80=99t see that it= needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds of voting. It wou= ld be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It=E2=80=99s a public sign= al that the miner who mined a given block miner intends to censor, that=E2= =80=99s all.

 

> Accordin= g to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full n= odes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.

 

Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There ar= e many. They earn the block reward.

 

> Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it v= oting including some mining pools and exchanges.

 = ;

What people consider it is inconsequential. It has c= learly defined behavior.

 

e=

 


From: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>
Sent:<= /b> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM
To: eric@voskuil.org=
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation= .org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Si= gnaling for softfork


 

Hello Eric,

 =

I have few questions:

 

> Without majori= ty hash power support, activation simply means you are off on a chain split= .

 

So= majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain = split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody want= s to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game the= ory? 

 

> And activation without majority hash power certainly does = not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.

 

Do miners and mining pools participate in di= scussions before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine some= thing else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork? =

 

>= ; If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is ac= complished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so every= one gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough peo= ple want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoi= ners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2= =80=99s your vote.

 

Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full no= des or Miners?

 

Is soft fork signaling same as voting?

 

According to my understanding= , miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy= + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people con= sider it voting including some mining pools and exchanges.

 

 

=

--

Prayank

=

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