Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <gmaxwell@gmail.com>) id 1X7Qdu-0005hY-RG for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:57:14 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.217.171 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.217.171; envelope-from=gmaxwell@gmail.com; helo=mail-lb0-f171.google.com; Received: from mail-lb0-f171.google.com ([209.85.217.171]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1X7Qdt-0000mc-Mu for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:57:14 +0000 Received: by mail-lb0-f171.google.com with SMTP id l4so743143lbv.16 for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:57:07 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.207.11 with SMTP id ls11mr9494023lac.62.1405522627002; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:57:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.112.35.138 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:57:06 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <CAJHLa0NcFcRhczf9WWGj+4fYBdYCUBb7Zm__Y5+qhprXL21wUA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CANEZrP1t3Pz3FOgxkxsj+sSgyQhPxfUTdCGXTC7=yxeZkGt-DQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAJHLa0NhZ=RuUMts19EUhY6C1+dy1yaje3Hb5Lfm+AqjRRL5uw@mail.gmail.com> <CANEZrP20E5R3D+Em4hordpSpe-e88iyHwyq=WdffsTCpTm+RVA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJHLa0NcFcRhczf9WWGj+4fYBdYCUBb7Zm__Y5+qhprXL21wUA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 07:57:06 -0700 Message-ID: <CAAS2fgTA9dmMeSmkMCa0AKpn8VMU8HDOCJQB3zfyb-E4Tmo8rQ@mail.gmail.com> From: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com> To: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@bitpay.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (gmaxwell[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1X7Qdt-0000mc-Mu Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Draft BIP for geutxos message X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:57:15 -0000 On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 7:25 AM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@bitpay.com> wrote: > On the specific issue I raised, the BIP only says "Querying multiple > nodes and combining their answers can be a partial solution to this" > which is not very helpful advice. That's a partial answer to my > question #2 with zero response for question #3. > > This sort of thing really needs a warning label like "use only if you > don't have a trusted solution" and discussion of that choice is > completely absent (question #1). In IETF documents there is a required security considerations section, see http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp72 In many of our documents the whole thing is a security consideration but for ones like these we should probably always document the weaknesses as set out from the rest of the document. See how BIP32 enumerates the one-private-key-breaks the chain. On this point the getutxos document is doing well. Perhaps breaking some things out of the auth section into a security / security-limitations section. In particular, can this document specifically call out that a local network attacker can MITM all the peers. (If Mike would prefer, I can send a diff with proposed changes)