From: Tom Zander <tomz@freedommail.ch>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Gareth Williams <gjw@posteo.net>
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2017 10:17:18 +0100
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Moving towards user activated soft fork activation
Precedence: list

On Tuesday, 7 March 2017 00:23:47 CET Gareth Williams via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> What you're describing is a hashpower activated soft fork to censor
> transactions, in response to a user activated soft fork that the majority
> of hashpower disagrees with.

It is incorrect to say that censoring of transactions is what Edmund=20
suggested. It's purely about the form they take, you can re-send the=20
transaction in a different form with the same content and they go through.=
=20
Hence, not transaction censoring.

I do believe the point that Edmund brought up is a very good one, the idea=
=20
that a set of users can force the miners to do something is rather silly an=
d=20
the setup that a minority miner fraction can force the majority to do=20
something is equally silly. This is because the majority mining hashpower=20
can fight back against this attack upon them.

Don=E2=80=99t be mistaken; a hash-minority attacking the hash-majority is i=
n actual=20
fact an attack upon Bitcoin as a whole.
If this were possible then next year we=E2=80=99d see governments try to pu=
sh=20
through changes in the same UASF way. I=E2=80=99m very happy that UASFs can=
=E2=80=99t work=20
because that would be the end of Bitcoin's freedom and decentralized nature.

> It is always possible for a majority of hashpower to censor transactions
> they disagree with. Users may view that as an attack, and can always
> respond with a POW hard fork.

I definitely welcome that approach.

The result would be that you have two chains, but also you ensure that the=
=20
chain that the miners didn=E2=80=99t like will no longer be something they =
can mine.=20
Not even the minority set of miners that like the softfork can mine on it.=
=20
This is a win-win and then the market will decide which one will "win".
=20
> Bitcoin only works if the majority of hashpower is not hostile to the
> users.

This goes both ways, miners both generate value (in the form of security)=20
and they take value (in the form of inflation).
If the majority of the users are hostile and reject blocks that the miners=
=20
create, or change the POW, then what the miners bring to the table is also=
=20
removed.
Bitcoin would lose the security and in the short term even the ability to=20
mine blocks every 10 minutes.

So, lets correct your statement a little;
=C2=ABBitcoin only works when the majority of the hashpower and the (econom=
ic)
  majority of the users are balanced in power and have their goals aligned.=
=C2=BB

=2D-=20
Tom Zander
Blog: https://zander.github.io
Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel