Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 764C9AF3 for ; Fri, 26 Jun 2015 00:42:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.help.org (mail.help.org [70.90.2.18]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4B107F4 for ; Fri, 26 Jun 2015 00:42:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.1.10.25] (B [10.1.10.25]) by mail.help.org with ESMTPA ; Thu, 25 Jun 2015 20:42:17 -0400 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: <558B4632.8080504@bitcoins.info> From: Milly Bitcoin Message-ID: <558C9FE3.6000804@bitcoins.info> Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 20:42:11 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.0.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------050404030803010903050601" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Process and Votes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 00:42:23 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------050404030803010903050601 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit That description makes sense. It also makes sense to separate out the hard fork from the soft fork process. Right now some people want to use the soft fork procedure for a hard fork simply because there is no other way to do it. I am under the impression that most users expect changes/improvements that would require a hard fork so I think some kind of process needs to be developed. Taking the responsibility off the shoulder of the core maintainer also makes sense. The hard fork issue is too much of a distraction for people trying to maintain the nuts and bolts of the underlying system. I saw a suggestion that regularly scheduled hard forks should be planned. That seems to make sense so you would have some sort of schedule where you would have cut off dates for hard-fork BIP submissions. That way you avoid the debates over whether there should be hard forks to what should be contained within the hard fork (if needed). It makes sense to follow the BIP process as close as possible. Possibly adding another step after "Dev acceptance" to include input from others such as merchants/exchanges/miners/users. It will only be an approximation of "decentralization" and the process won't be perfect but if you want to move forward then you need some way to do it. Russ On 6/25/2015 4:05 PM, Tier Nolan wrote: > On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 2:50 AM, Mark Friedenbach > > wrote: > > I'm sorry but this is absolutely not the case, Milly. The reason > that people get defensive is that we have a carefully constructed > process that does work (thank you very much!) and is well documented. > > > There is no process for handling hard forks, which aren't bug fixes. > > Soft forks have a defined process of something like > > - BIP proposal + discussion > - Proposed code > - Dev acceptance > - Release > - Miner vote/acceptance > > The devs have a weak veto. If they refuse to move forward with > changes, miners could perform a soft fork on their own. They don't > want to do that, as it would be controversial and the devs know the > software better. > > The miner veto is stronger (for soft forks) but not absolute. The > devs could checkpoint/blacklist a chain if miners implemented a fork > that wasn't acceptable (assuming the community backed them). > > When ASICs arrived, it was pointed out by some that the devs could hit > back if ASICs weren't made publicly available. If they slightly > tweaked the hashing algorithm, then current generation of ASICs would > be useless. The potential threat may have acted as a disincentive > for ASIC manufacturers to use the ASICs themselves. > > Moving forward with agreement between all involved is the recommended > and desirable approach. > > Consensus between all parties is the goal but isn't absolutely > required. This escape valve is partly what makes consensus work. If > you dig your heels in, then the other side can bypass you, but they > have an incentive to try to convince you to compromise first. The > outcome is better if a middle ground can be found. > > Hard forks are different. The "checks and balances" of weak vetoes > are not present. This means that things can devolve from consensus to > mutual veto. Consensus ceases to be a goal and becomes a requirement. > > This is partly a reflection of the nature of hard forks. Everyone > needs to upgrade. On the other hand, if most of the various groups > upgrade, then users of the legacy software would have to upgrade or > get left behind. If 5% of the users decided not to upgrade, should > they be allowed to demand that nobody else does? > > There is clearly some kind of threshold that is reasonable. > > The fundamental problem is that there isn't agreement on what the > block size is. Is it equal in status to the 21 million BTC limit? > > If Satoshi had said that 1MB was part of the definition of Bitcoin, > then I think people would accept it to the same extent as they accept > the 21 million coin limit. It might cause people to leave the coin > though. > > It was intended to be temporary, but people have realized that it > might be a good idea to keep it. In effect both sides could argue > that they should be considered the status quo. > > I wonder if a coin toss would be acceptable :). "Come to an agreement > or we decide by coin toss" > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --------------050404030803010903050601 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
That description makes sense.  It also makes sense to separate out the hard fork from the soft fork process.   Right now some people want to use the soft fork procedure for a hard fork simply because there is no other way to do it.

I am under the impression that most users expect changes/improvements that would require a hard fork so I think some kind of process needs to be developed.  Taking the responsibility off the shoulder of the core maintainer also makes sense.  The hard fork issue is too much of a distraction for people trying to maintain the nuts and bolts of the underlying system. 

I saw a suggestion that regularly scheduled hard forks should be planned.  That seems to make sense so you would have some sort of schedule where you would have cut off dates for hard-fork BIP submissions.  That way you avoid the debates over whether there should be hard forks to what should be contained within the hard fork (if needed).  It makes sense to follow the BIP process as close as possible.  Possibly adding another step after "Dev acceptance" to include input from others such as merchants/exchanges/miners/users.  It will only be an approximation of "decentralization" and the process won't be perfect but if you want to move forward then you need some way to do it.

Russ


On 6/25/2015 4:05 PM, Tier Nolan wrote:
On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 2:50 AM, Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:
I'm sorry but this is absolutely not the case, Milly. The reason that people get defensive is that we have a carefully constructed process that does work (thank you very much!) and is well documented.

There is no process for handling hard forks, which aren't bug fixes.

Soft forks have a defined process of something like

- BIP proposal + discussion
- Proposed code
- Dev acceptance
- Release
- Miner vote/acceptance

The devs have a weak veto.  If they refuse to move forward with changes, miners could perform a soft fork on their own.  They don't want to do that, as it would be controversial and the devs know the software better.

The miner veto is stronger (for soft forks) but not absolute.  The devs could checkpoint/blacklist a chain if miners implemented a fork that wasn't acceptable (assuming the community backed them).

When ASICs arrived, it was pointed out by some that the devs could hit back if ASICs weren't made publicly available.  If they slightly tweaked the hashing algorithm, then current generation of ASICs would be useless.   The potential threat may have acted as a disincentive for ASIC manufacturers to use the ASICs themselves.

Moving forward with agreement between all involved is the recommended and desirable approach.

Consensus between all parties is the goal but isn't absolutely required.  This escape valve is partly what makes consensus work.  If you dig your heels in, then the other side can bypass you, but they have an incentive to try to convince you to compromise first.  The outcome is better if a middle ground can be found.

Hard forks are different.  The "checks and balances" of weak vetoes are not present.  This means that things can devolve from consensus to mutual veto.  Consensus ceases to be a goal and becomes a requirement.

This is partly a reflection of the nature of hard forks.  Everyone needs to upgrade.  On the other hand, if most of the various groups upgrade, then users of the legacy software would have to upgrade or get left behind.  If 5% of the users decided not to upgrade, should they be allowed to demand that nobody else does?

There is clearly some kind of threshold that is reasonable.

The fundamental problem is that there isn't agreement on what the block size is.  Is it equal in status to the 21 million BTC limit?

If Satoshi had said that 1MB was part of the definition of Bitcoin, then I think people would accept it to the same extent as they accept the 21 million coin limit.  It might cause people to leave the coin though.

It was intended to be temporary, but people have realized that it might be a good idea to keep it.  In effect both sides could argue that they should be considered the status quo.

I wonder if a coin toss would be acceptable :).  "Come to an agreement or we decide by coin toss"


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