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From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAA5BidvSesGyofaApZY43tEziHsUcOnu6108p-UYj0Lu1+PFAA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 19:30:51 -0500
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References: <CAK51vgDO2Tg38XbW0pqAnO3ETJ_qf8owRsUYsTXmrf7H2yGZtw@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAA5BidvSesGyofaApZY43tEziHsUcOnu6108p-UYj0Lu1+PFAA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Wilmer Paulino <wilmer.paulino@gmail.com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Removal of reject network messages from Bitcoin
	Core (BIP61)
Precedence: list


>> On Mar 7, 2019, at 19:09, Wilmer Paulino via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lis=
ts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> ...
>> Nodes on the network can not generally be trusted to send valid ("reject"=
) messages, so this should only ever be used when connected to a trusted nod=
e.
>=20
> Nodes in the network generally rely on the assumption that they are connec=
ted to at least one honest peer, so we can actually converge on the set of h=
onest peers and ban/disconnect any who send an invalid reject message for a v=
alid transaction.

This implies the reject message is valid only when it is expected (i.e. the s=
ender is knowingly sending invalid transactions), which is presumably useful=
 only in a local development environment.

e=