Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wwyd3-00077j-Io for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 19:01:09 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of i-rme.es designates 209.85.215.52 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.215.52; envelope-from=rme@i-rme.es; helo=mail-la0-f52.google.com; Received: from mail-la0-f52.google.com ([209.85.215.52]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wwyd1-0005o5-Hj for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 19:01:09 +0000 Received: by mail-la0-f52.google.com with SMTP id ty20so1851846lab.11 for ; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:01:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=U2Z9uy6PJdMDa4RsZaxvs48XudUqmWcGtboyGuUO/8w=; b=i+/Ey0X/9Y9c9/dsTZQFErFbH+0QIsf4B3rB0jk1cWgZyihP3pYQjCZNNjzu30KrWG 0nm6bwaESAcKGT9om9yLiaZTn5SPVC+6Oado8MH+X+E8XwIb1cgAOxumHAuxPQ8cL96f ZeRgWAsJr0JLgfFAqLbU3A6aRoVm5DF79BVtKq0+RTmRHyzdUTG5T/1VaoxM3wr1okC8 dfXiOGHa+egxj7TMMTyA07REEpPr/uhurxbss6Z3LiHW28xBRnLNaw8G6UHt+M/8b5x8 p5Xt0f/o/YlAivINpidtxmSoQIvzcjvkMSZPhfuyPORH+OTg1xf/IWCO0d1+rDa5kn3F XBaQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQneUTWWqVUi40B2L6lYRV06aNoqCuLcHHyUrga4tbbTArelNhllw/mhhVC4/zmUF8CYJJbR MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.50.2 with SMTP id y2mr2636980lbn.66.1403031660235; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:01:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.152.199.8 with HTTP; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:01:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [31.4.239.206] Received: by 10.152.199.8 with HTTP; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:01:00 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:01:00 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?UmHDumwgTWFydMOtbmV6?= To: =?UTF-8?B?S2FyZWwgQsOtbGVr?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113367acb7a1c604fc0cc33c X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Wwyd1-0005o5-Hj Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposals for improving Bitcoin mining decentralization X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 19:01:10 -0000 --001a113367acb7a1c604fc0cc33c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable But miners dont want to run full nodes, its better to develop some SPV like that connects to some nodes. Also I believe that stratum mining protocol improves some performance things that GBT lacks. If a new protocol that requires blocks created by miners is developed and named in a cool way, miners could ask for protocol support to his favourite pool. El 17/06/2014 20:26, "Karel B=C3=ADlek" escribi=C3=B3: > On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Christophe Biocca > wrote: > > https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Getblocktemplate is supposed to solve most > > of the pooling-centralization problems. > > This. There is no need to create anything new when GBT already exists. > In my opinion. > > > Unfortunately, it is opt-in, > > and GHash.io doesn't support it. > > Yep. As pools in general are not a part of the bitcoin protocol itself > (nobody cares how the work happened), I am not sure how this can be > forced. > > > Also most miners don't care and don't do the work to set it up. To do > > transaction inclusion themselves, they'd need to run a full node, > > which is a bit more work and resources than just pointing hashpower at > > a stratum server. > > Also, yep. If the miners cared about 51% attack, they wouldn't join > ghash in the first place. All the miners willingly accept the risk in > joining the big pool. > > K. B. > > > If you figure out a way to make GBT widely used (>50% hashpower), kudos > to you. > > > > On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 4:57 AM, Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3=ADnez = wrote: > >> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writing > below, I > >> am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it. > >> > >> ---- > >> > >> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrat= e. > >> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful. > >> > >> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening > again. > >> > >> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool like > >> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a new > mining > >> protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of > transactions to > >> include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect transactions > by his > >> own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a full node or by > running > >> a SPV like node that ask other nodes for transactions. > >> > >> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community coul= d > >> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more > >> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it. > >> > >> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to the > miner > >> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want smal= l > >> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the > minimum fee > >> per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase field > in the > >> block. > >> > >> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks: > >> > >> A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients have > a SPV > >> or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers about the length > of > >> the chain) > >> A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactions (pool > >> clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they know if > they > >> are already included on a block) > >> A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but they c= an > >> configure the minimum fee). > >> A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from > mining > >> blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently tha= t > is > >> from his pool or other). > >> > >> > >> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool a= nd > >> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners. > >> > >> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is not > >> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is not > valid. > >> > >> > >> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there is > already > >> a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read other > people's > >> ways to address this threat, thanks for reading. > >> > >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > >> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk > Solutions > >> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems > >> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data. > >> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration > >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Bitcoin-development mailing list > >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > >> > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > > HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutio= ns > > Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems > > Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data. > > Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration > > http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems > > _______________________________________________ > > Bitcoin-development mailing list > > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --001a113367acb7a1c604fc0cc33c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

But miners dont want to run full nodes, its better to develo= p some SPV like that connects to some nodes.

Also I believe that stratum mining protocol improves some pe= rformance things that GBT lacks.

If a new protocol that requires blocks created by miners is = developed and named in a cool way, miners could ask for protocol support to= his favourite pool.

El 17/06/2014 20:26, "Karel B=C3=ADlek"= ; <kb@karelbilek.com> escrib= i=C3=B3:
On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Christophe Biocca
<christophe.biocca@gmail.= com> wrote:
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Getblocktemplate is supposed to solve mo= st
> of the pooling-centralization problems.

This. There is no need to create anything new when GBT already exists.
In my opinion.

> Unfortunately, it is opt-in,
> and GHash.io doesn't support it.

Yep. As pools in general are not a part of the bitcoin protocol itself
(nobody cares how the work happened), I am not sure how this can be
forced.

> Also most miners don't care and don't do the work to set it up= . To do
> transaction inclusion themselves, they'd need to run a full node,<= br> > which is a bit more work and resources than just pointing hashpower at=
> a stratum server.

Also, yep. If the miners cared about 51% attack, they wouldn't join
ghash in the first place. All the miners willingly accept the risk in
joining the big pool.

K. B.

> If you figure out a way to make GBT widely used (>50% hashpower), k= udos to you.
>
> On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 4:57 AM, Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3=ADnez <rme@i-rme.es> wrote:
>> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writin= g below, I
>> am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it.
>>
>> ----
>>
>> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the has= hrate.
>> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful.<= br> >>
>> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happen= ing again.
>>
>> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool lik= e
>> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a = new mining
>> protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of transa= ctions to
>> include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect transacti= ons by his
>> own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a full node or = by running
>> a SPV like node that ask other nodes for transactions.
>>
>> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community = could
>> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more >> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.
>>
>> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to th= e miner
>> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want = small
>> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the m= inimum fee
>> per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase fi= eld in the
>> block.
>>
>> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks= :
>>
>> A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients = have a SPV
>> or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers about the le= ngth of
>> the chain)
>> A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactio= ns (pool
>> clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they kno= w if they
>> are already included on a block)
>> A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but th= ey can
>> configure the minimum fee).
>> A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from= mining
>> blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently= that is
>> from his pool or other).
>>
>>
>> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his po= ol and
>> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners. >>
>> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is= not
>> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is n= ot valid.
>>
>>
>> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there = is already
>> a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read other= people's
>> ways to address this threat, thanks for reading.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------= ------------
>> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk So= lutions
>> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems
>> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.
>> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Explo= ration
>> http= ://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitco= in-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/b= itcoin-development
>>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------= --------
> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Soluti= ons
> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems
> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.
> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Explorati= on
> http://p= .sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-d= evelopment@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitco= in-development
--001a113367acb7a1c604fc0cc33c--