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From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
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Message-Id: <F2362784-F181-4A3D-8A8F-C906CC65AB53@voskuil.org>
Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 10:42:59 -0700
To: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
Precedence: list

=EF=BB=BF
> On Jul 10, 2022, at 07:17, alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com> wrote:
> =EF=BB=BFHi ZmnSCPxj,
>=20
>=20
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must=
 be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a maj=
ority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions with=
out community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier t=
o deploy.
>=20
> `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] ca=
n be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to=
 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure i=
f this will be a soft fork.

Soft fork, though a bit aggressive, as it would invalidate all existing bloc=
ks above the first new halving height block which claimed more than the redu=
ced reward.

Increasing the value would be a hard fork, as it would validate blocks that w=
ould previously have been invalid, as opposed to a soft fork, which invalida=
tes blocks that would previously have been valid.

e

> I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and pr=
edictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. M=
aybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being '=
compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.
>=20
> [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L6=
6
> [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply
>=20
>=20
> /dev/fd0
>=20
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
>=20
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-=
dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> Good morning e, and list,
>>=20
>>> Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to wh=
ich I was responding.
>>> Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even if i=
t was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced=
, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointed out=
. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it d=
oes not with any other good.
>>> The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship r=
esistance, not on price.
>>=20
>>=20
>> To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emis=
sion"):
>>=20
>> * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and o=
ne which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or z=
ero.
>> * Now consider a censoring miner.
>> * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner=
 loses out on the fees of those transactions.
>> * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from th=
e censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
>> * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s small relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s large relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains fro=
m the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situatio=
n.
>>=20
>> Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy er=
odes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.
>> But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved ar=
e censored or not censored.
>> Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not c=
ensor coin movements.
>> Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.=

>>=20
>>=20
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must=
 be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a maj=
ority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions with=
out community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier t=
o deploy.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev