Message-ID: <54EA5AAE.3040306@voskuil.org>
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2015 14:39:42 -0800
From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
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To: Jan Vornberger <jan@uos.de>, 
 bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
References: <20150222190839.GA18527@odo.localdomain>
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin at POS using BIP70,
 NFC and offline payments - implementer feedback
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Hi Jan,

This is really nice work.

WRT the Schroder and Schildbach proposal, the generalization of the "r"
and "payment_url" parameters makes sense, with only the potential
backward compat issue on payment_url.

> TBIP75 furthermore proposes to include an additional 'h' parameter
> which would be a hash of the BIP70 payment request, preventing a MITM
> attack on the Bluetooth channel even if the BIP70 payment request
> isn't signed. This would have also been my suggestion, although I
> know that Mike Hearn has raised concerns about this approach. One
> being, that one needs to finalize the BIP70 payment request at the
> time the QR code and NFC URI is generated.
> ...
> 3) Are there other comments regarding 'h' parameter as per TBIP75?

Yes, this design is problematic from a privacy standpoint. Anyone within
the rather significant range of the Bluetooth terminal is able to
capture payment requests and correlate them to people. In other words it
can be used to automate tainting.

The problem is easily resolved by recognizing that, in the envisioned
face-to-face trade, proximity is the source of trust. Even in the above
proposal the "h" parameter is trusted because it was obtained by
proximity to the NFC terminal. The presumption is that this proximity
produces a private channel.

As such the "tap" should transfer a session key used for symmetric block
cipher over the Bluetooth channel. This also resolves the issue of
needing to formulate the payment request before the NFC.

As an aside, in other scenarios, such as an automated dispenser, this
presumption does not hold. The merchant is not present to guard against
device tampering. Those scenarios can be secured using BIP70, but cannot
guarantee privacy.

The other differences I have with the proposal pertain to efficiency,
not privacy or integrity of the transaction:

The proposed resource name is redundant with any unique identifier for
the session. For example, the "h" parameter is sufficient. But with the
establishment of a session key both as I propose above, the parties can
derive a sufficiently unique public resource name from a hash of the
key. An additional advantage is that the resource name can be
fixed-length, simplifying the encoding/decoding.

The MAC address (and resource name) should be encoded using base58. This
is shorter than base16, is often shorter than base64, better
standardized and does not require URI encoding, and is generally
available to implementers.

There is no need for the establishment of two Bluetooth services.

I would change the payment_url recommendation so that the list order
represents a recommended ordering provided by the terminal for the wallet=
=2E

I wrote up my thoughts on these considerations last year and recently
revised it by adding a section at the end to incorporate the "r" and
"payment_url" generalizations from Andreas and Andy.

https://github.com/evoskuil/bips/tree/master/docs

e


On 02/22/2015 11:08 AM, Jan Vornberger wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>=20
> I am working on a Bitcoin point of sale terminal based on a Raspberry P=
i, which
> displays QR codes, but also provides payment requests via NFC. It can o=
ptionally
> receive the sender's transaction via Bluetooth, so if the sender wallet=

> supports it, the sender can be completely offline. Only the terminal ne=
eds an
> internet connection.
>=20
> Typical scenario envisioned: Customer taps their smartphone (or maybe s=
martwatch
> in the future) on the NFC pad, confirms the transaction on their phone
> (or smartwatch) and the transaction completes via Bluetooth and/or the =
phone's
> internet connection.
>=20
> You can see a prototype in action here:
>=20
>   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DP7vKHMoapr8
>=20
> The above demo uses a release version of Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet, s=
o it
> works as shown today. However, some parts - especially the Bluetooth st=
uff - are
> custom extensions of Schildbach's wallet which are not yet standard.
>=20
> I'm writing this post to document my experience implementing NFC and of=
fline
> payments and hope to move the discussion forward around standardizing s=
ome of
> this stuff. Andy Schroder's work around his Bitcoin Fluid Dispenser [1,=
2]
> follows along the same lines, so his proposed TBIP74 [3] and TBIP75 [4]=
 are
> relevant here as well.
>=20
>=20
> ## NFC vs Bluetooth vs NFC+Bluetooth ##
>=20
> Before I get into the implementation details, a few words for why I dec=
ided to
> go with the combination of NFC and Bluetooth:
>=20
> Doing everything via NFC is an interesting option to keep things simple=
, but the
> issue is, that one usually can't maintain the connection while the user=
 confirms
> the transaction (as they take the device back to press a button or mayb=
e enter a
> PIN). So there are three options:
>=20
> 1. Do a "double tap": User taps, takes the device back, confirms, then =
taps
> again to transmit the transaction. (I think Google Wallet does somethin=
g like
> this.)
>=20
> 2. Confirm beforehand: User confirms, then taps and everything can happ=
en in one
> go. The disadvantage is, that you confirm the transaction before you ha=
ve seen
> the details. (I believe Google Wallet can also work this way.)
>=20
> 3. Tap the phone, then establish a Bluetooth connection which allows yo=
u to do
> all necessary communication even if the user takes the device back.
>=20
> I feel that option 3 is the nicest UX, so that is what I am focusing on=
 right
> now, but there are pros and cons to all options. One disadvantage of op=
tion 3 in
> practice is, that many users - in my experience - have Bluetooth turned=
 off, so
> it can result in additional UI dialogs popping up, asking the user to t=
urn on
> Bluetooth.
>=20
> Regarding doing everything via Bluetooth or maybe BLE: I have been foll=
owing the
> work that Airbitz has done around that, but personally I prefer the NFC=

> interaction of "I touch what I want to pay" rather than "a payment requ=
est comes
> to me through the air and I figure out whether it is meant for me/is le=
gitimate".
>=20
>=20
> ## NFC data formats ##
>=20
> A bit of background for those who are not that familiar with NFC: Most =
Bitcoin
> wallets with NFC support make use of NDEF (NFC Data Exchange Format) as=
 far as I
> am aware (with CoinBlesk being an exception, which uses host-based card=

> emulation, if I understand it correctly). NDEF defines a number of reco=
rd types,
> among them 'URI' and 'Mime Type'.
>=20
> A common way of using NFC with Bitcoin is to create a URI record that c=
ontains a
> Bitcoin URI. Beyond that Schildbach's wallet (and maybe others?) also s=
upport
> the mime type record, which is then set to 'application/bitcoin-payment=
request'
> and the rest of the NFC data is a complete BIP70 payment request.
>=20
>=20
> ## Implementation ##
>=20
> To structure the discussion a little bit, I have listed a number of sce=
narios to
> consider below. Not every possible combination is listed, but it should=
 cover a
> bit of everything.
>=20
> Scenarios:
>=20
> 1) Scan QR code, transmit transaction via Bitcoin network
>    Example QR code: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42
>=20
> 2) Touch NFC pad, transmit transaction via Bitcoin network
>    Example NFC URI: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42
>=20
> 3) Scan QR code, fetch BIP70 details via HTTP, post transaction via HTT=
P
>    Example QR code: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42&r=3Dhttps://example.or=
g/bip70paymentrequest
>=20
> 4) Touch NFC pad, fetch BIP70 details via HTTP, post transaction via HT=
TP
>    Example NFC URI: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42&r=3Dhttps://example.or=
g/bip70paymentrequest
>=20
> 5) Touch NFC pad, receive BIP70 details directly, post transaction via =
HTTP
>    Example NFC MIME record: application/bitcoin-paymentrequest + BIP70 =
payment request
>=20
> 6) Scan QR code, fetch BIP70 details via Bluetooth, post transaction vi=
a Bluetooth
>    Example QR code: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42&bt=3D1234567890AB
>    Payment request has 'payment_url' set to 'bt:1234567890AB'
>=20
> 7) Touch NFC pad, fetch BIP70 details via Bluetooth, post transaction v=
ia Bluetooth
>    Example NFC URI: bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42&bt=3D1234567890AB
>    Payment request has 'payment_url' set to 'bt:1234567890AB'
>=20
> Scenarios 1 and 2 are basically the 'legacy'/pre-BIP70 approach and I a=
m just
> listing them here for comparison. Scenario 3 is what is often in use no=
w, for
> example when using a checkout screen by BitPay or Coinbase.
>=20
> I played around with both scenarios 4 and 5, trying to decide whether I=
 should
> use an NFC URI record or already provide the complete BIP70 payment req=
uest via
> NFC.
>=20
> My experience here has been, that the latter was fairly fragile in my s=
etup
> (Raspberry Pi, NFC dongle from a company called Sensor ID, using nfcpy)=
=2E I tried
> with signed payment requests that were around 4k to 5k and the transfer=
 would
> often not complete if I didn't hold the phone perfectly in place. So I =
quickly
> switched to using the NFC URI record instead and have the phone fetch t=
he BIP70
> payment request via Bluetooth afterwards. Using this approach the amoun=
t of data
> is small enough that it's usually 'all or nothing' and that seems more =
robust to
> me.
>=20
> That said, I continue to have problems with the NFC stack that I'm usin=
g, so it
> might just be my NFC setup that is causing these problems. I will proba=
bly give
> the NXP NFC library a try next (which I believe is also the stack that =
is used
> by Android). Maybe I have more luck with that approach and could then s=
witch to
> scenario 5.
>=20
> Scenarios 6 and 7 is what the terminal is doing right now. The 'bt' par=
ameter is
> the non-standard extension of Andreas' wallet that I was mentioning. TB=
IP75
> proposes to change 'bt' into 'r1' as part of a more generic approach of=

> numbering different sources for the BIP70 payment request. I think that=
 is a
> good idea and would express my vote for this proposal. So the QR code o=
r NFC URI
> would then look something like this:
>=20
>   bitcoin:1asdf...?amount=3D42&r=3Dhttps://example.org/bip70&r1=3Dbt:12=
34567890AB/resource
>=20
> In addition the payment request would need to list additional 'payment_=
url's. My
> proposal would be to do something like this:
>=20
>     message PaymentDetails {
>         ...
>         optional string payment_url =3D 6;
>         optional bytes merchant_data =3D 7;
>         repeated string additional_payment_urls =3D 8;
>           // ^-- new; to hold things like 'bt:1234567890AB'
>     }
>=20
> TBIP75 proposes to just change 'optional string payment_url' into 'repe=
ated
> string payment_url'. If this isn't causing any problems (and hopefully =
not too
> much confusion?) I guess that would be fine too.
>=20
> In my opinion a wallet should then actually attempt all or multiple of =
the
> provided mechanisms in parallel (e.g. try to fetch the BIP70 payment re=
quest via
> both HTTP and Bluetooth) and go with whatever completes first. But that=
 is of
> course up to each wallet to decide how to handle.
>=20
> TBIP75 furthermore proposes to include an additional 'h' parameter whic=
h would
> be a hash of the BIP70 payment request, preventing a MITM attack on the=

> Bluetooth channel even if the BIP70 payment request isn't signed. This =
would
> have also been my suggestion, although I know that Mike Hearn has raise=
d
> concerns about this approach. One being, that one needs to finalize the=
 BIP70
> payment request at the time the QR code and NFC URI is generated.
>=20
>=20
> ## Questions ##
>=20
> My questions to the list:
>=20
> 1) Do you prefer changing 'optional string payment_url' into 'repeated =
string
> payment_url' or would you rather introduce a new field 'additional_paym=
ent_urls'?
>=20
> 2) @Andreas: Is the r, r1, r2 mechanism already implemented in Bitcoin =
Wallet?
>=20
> 3) Are there other comments regarding 'h' parameter as per TBIP75?
>=20
> 4) General comments, advice, feedback?
>=20
> I appreciate your input! :-)
>=20
> Cheers,
> Jan
>=20
> [1] http://andyschroder.com/BitcoinFluidDispenser/
> [2] https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development%40lists.sourceforg=
e.net/msg06354.html
> [3] https://github.com/AndySchroder/bips/blob/master/tbip-0074.mediawik=
i
> [4] https://github.com/AndySchroder/bips/blob/master/tbip-0075.mediawik=
i
>=20
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>=20


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