Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 193FB2C for ; Fri, 3 Feb 2017 01:32:37 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f172.google.com (mail-qt0-f172.google.com [209.85.216.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A787C187 for ; Fri, 3 Feb 2017 01:32:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f172.google.com with SMTP id v23so11092144qtb.0 for ; Thu, 02 Feb 2017 17:32:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=hDbcCNkKpia766+H6IoCeRc6DMlHOywzxbG9DuxP7PE=; b=Wt4teqMRd63oAXHogVPdKoJChIXLBUwlcqnU/9QKUP6y2/oHcDdse6/V7af2yj0+Fr RQzxjE3nNMfw2oinPEJReCTyvaiZwDU0QkmB9Aj6Wjkjyw2+3ttcEaGHOt4DIxaI0DaX hAznQy8s5C7hu4TIsULdKhdKEwjuwU7Vk61rTEuQ+alluh1DwfpIkpIep/z3jEoYPQTU ynRTSJ1NcbHYnILkeOmIjnea3EdSBK90JrL9fjhlR40I9mpgFHVuyKLzoQHOKI4RRPk6 YMyhSrOMidjp5xVFNxqbF9ePyFht/Tt3fIJrEtCOyPoTn183Fp/4risvX6hO5SZKmK9m jwhg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=hDbcCNkKpia766+H6IoCeRc6DMlHOywzxbG9DuxP7PE=; b=AxpYiEeph/LKeaq6OIX+3b9H9Sbf8PR/4DIBBwEuCGjTMg+OBKuQqZ4S/5ly6WHVni Qu8XiuhALgsOd9xg0noty+a2bHfD2kXIErwHWj4NmuYDfXkDloyrGmra1tlwyJADiR5/ HOoB3CUQ0yLhknsMBTozs41WGHY7QWIXz+z6cjBWvIrwLAJJX4RAe9N9rqD1PEFKTWw6 1r/Kwv345NglTRpjR8ay8+SsHcuMVD1DhVdBv8Mzi5bM26Lbsn38zGKL24zcNeVbgD0U G5vZchx0pzlkScjwsU/PwRN2C1IJMRvbjTvKXb/uheQ3pI1Ht1UItzF9vvGFWXjjT2mc g4nA== X-Gm-Message-State: AIkVDXKjNNh5/jXVL/ulto2x7hMRPlyQX/aHjIHJFjozEAUJAQ+nJ/3HbQy9IvvqS0OrzdiTRwYbeMbmEcxaHw== X-Received: by 10.200.38.196 with SMTP id 4mr10663852qtp.96.1486085554783; Thu, 02 Feb 2017 17:32:34 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: dscotese@gmail.com Received: by 10.140.43.5 with HTTP; Thu, 2 Feb 2017 17:32:34 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <201702030024.10232.luke@dashjr.org> References: <201702030024.10232.luke@dashjr.org> From: Dave Scotese Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2017 17:32:34 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: bQOZdOKByb5QQW6gyNKQbT62ICI Message-ID: To: Luke Dashjr , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f4790994d3205479641a2 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Pre-BIP] Community Consensus Voting System X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2017 01:32:37 -0000 --001a113f4790994d3205479641a2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable There are two ideas here for "on-chain" voting, both of which require changes to the software. I agree with David that on-chain solutions complicate things. Both proposals can be effected without any software changes: Those who wish to use proof of stake can provide a service for making vanity addresses containing some indicator of the proposal to be supported - 1bigblock or 12mbblk or whatever - based on a supporter-provided secret key, and then supporters can move their bitcoin into their own vanity address and then whoever wants to can create a website to display the matching addresses and explain that this is the financial power in the hands of supporters and how to add your "financial power vote." Those who simply want to "buy votes" can use their funds in marketing efforts to promote the proposal they support. This second method, of course, can be abused. The first actually requires people to control bitcoin in order to represent support. Counting actual, real people is still a technology in its infancy, and I don't think I want to see it progress much. People are not units, but individuals, and their value only becomes correlated to their net worth after they've been alive for many years, and even then, some of the best people have died paupers. If bitcoin-discuss got more traffic, I think this discussion would be better had on that list. notplato On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 4:24 PM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Strongly disagree with buying "votes", or portraying open standards as a > voting process. Also, this depends on address reuse, so it's fundamentall= y > flawed in design. > > Some way for people to express their support weighed by coins (without > losing/spending them), and possibly weighed by running a full node, might > still be desirable. The most straightforward way to do this is to support > message signatures somehow (ideally without using the same pubkey as > spending), and some [inherently unreliable, but perhaps useful if the > community "colludes" to not-cheat] way to sign with ones' full node. > > Note also that the BIP process already has BIP Comments for leaving textu= al > opinions on the BIP unrelated to stake. See BIP 2 for details on that. > > Luke > > > On Thursday, February 02, 2017 7:39:51 PM t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Please comment on this work-in-progress BIP. > > > > Thanks, > > > > - t.k. > > > > ---------------------- > > BIP: ? > > Layer: Process > > Title: Community Consensus Voting System > > Author: t.khan > > Comments-Summary: No comments yet. > > Comments-URI: TBD > > Status: Draft > > Type: Standards Track > > Created: 2017-02-02 > > License: BSD-2 > > Voting Address: 3CoFA3JiK5wxe9ze2HoDGDTmZvkE5Uuwh8 (just an example, > don=E2=80=99t > > send to this!) > > > > Abstract > > Community Consensus Voting System (CCVS) will allow developers to measu= re > > support for BIPs prior to implementation. > > > > Motivation > > We currently have no way of measuring consensus for potential changes t= o > > the Bitcoin protocol. This is especially problematic for controversial > > changes such as the max block size limit. As a result, we have many > > proposed solutions but no clear direction. > > > > Also, due to our lack of ability to measure consensus, there is a gener= al > > feeling among many in the community that developers aren=E2=80=99t list= ening to > > their concerns. This is a valid complaint, as it=E2=80=99s not possible= to listen > > to thousands of voices all shouting different things in a crowded > > room=E2=80=94basically the situation in the Bitcoin community today. > > > > The CCVS will allow the general public, miners, companies using Bitcoin= , > > and developers to vote for their preferred BIP in a way that=E2=80=99s = public and > > relatively difficult (expensive) to manipulate. > > > > Specification > > Each competing BIP will be assigned a unique bitcoin address which is > added > > to each header. Anyone who wanted to vote would cast their ballot by > > sending a small amount (0.0001 btc) to their preferred BIP's address. > Each > > transaction counts as 1 vote. > > > > Confirmed Vote Multiplier: > > Mining Pools, companies using Bitcoin, and Core maintainers/contributor= s > > are allowed one confirmed vote each. A confirmed vote is worth 10,000x = a > > regular vote. > > > > For example: > > > > Slush Pool casts a vote for their preferred BIP and then states publicl= y > > (on their blog) their vote and the transaction ID and emails the URL to > the > > admin of this system. In the final tally, this vote will count as 10,00= 0 > > votes. > > > > Coinbase, Antpool, BitPay, BitFury, etc., all do the same. > > > > Confirmed votes would be added to a new section in each respective BIP > as a > > public record. > > > > Voting would run for a pre-defined period, ending when a particular blo= ck > > number is mined. > > > > > > Rationale > > Confirmed Vote Multiplier - The purpose of this is twofold; it gives a > > larger voice to organizations and the people who will have to do the wo= rk > > to implement whatever BIP the community prefers, and it will negate the > > effect of anyone trying to skew the results by voting repeatedly. > > > > Definitions > > Miner: any individual or organization that has mined at least one valid > > block in the last 2016 blocks. > > > > Company using Bitcoin: any organization using Bitcoin for financial, > asset > > or other purposes, with either under development and released solutions= . > > > > Developer: any individual who has or had commit access, and any > individual > > who has authored a BIP > > > > Unresolved Issues > > Node voting: It would be desirable for any full node running an > up-to-date > > blockchain to also be able to vote with a multiplier (e.g. 100x). But a= s > > this would require code changes, it is outside the scope of this BIP. > > > > Copyright > > This BIP is licensed under the BSD 2-clause license. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --=20 I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie? I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha). I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin. I also code for The Dollar Vigilante . "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto --001a113f4790994d3205479641a2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
There are two ideas here for "on-chain= " voting, both of which require changes to the software.=C2=A0 I agree= with David that on-chain solutions complicate things.=C2=A0 Both proposals= can be effected without any software changes:

Those who wish to use= proof of stake can provide a service for making vanity addresses containin= g some indicator of the proposal to be supported - 1bigblock or 12mbblk or = whatever - based on a supporter-provided secret key, and then supporters ca= n move their bitcoin into their own vanity address and then whoever wants t= o can create a website to display the matching addresses and explain that t= his is the financial power in the hands of supporters and how to add your &= quot;financial power vote."

Those who simply want to &quo= t;buy votes" can use their funds in marketing efforts to promote the p= roposal they support.

This second method, of course, can be ab= used.=C2=A0 The first actually requires people to control bitcoin in order = to represent support.=C2=A0 Counting actual, real people is still a technol= ogy in its infancy, and I don't think I want to see it progress much. P= eople are not units, but individuals, and their value only becomes correlat= ed to their net worth after they've been alive for many years, and even= then, some of the best people have died paupers. If bitcoin-discuss got mo= re traffic, I think this discussion would be better had on that list.
notplato

On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 4:24 PM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:=
Strongly disagree with buying "vote= s", or portraying open standards as a
voting process. Also, this depends on address reuse, so it's fundamenta= lly
flawed in design.

Some way for people to express their support weighed by coins (without
losing/spending them), and possibly weighed by running a full node, might still be desirable. The most straightforward way to do this is to support message signatures somehow (ideally without using the same pubkey as
spending), and some [inherently unreliable, but perhaps useful if the
community "colludes" to not-cheat] way to sign with ones' ful= l node.

Note also that the BIP process already has BIP Comments for leaving textual=
opinions on the BIP unrelated to stake. See BIP 2 for details on that.

Luke


On Thursday, February 02, 2017 7:39:51 PM t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Please comment on this work-in-progress BIP.
>
> Thanks,
>
> - t.k.
>
> ----------------------
> BIP: ?
> Layer: Process
> Title: Community Consensus Voting System
> Author: t.khan <teekhan42@gm= ail.com>
> Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
> Comments-URI: TBD
> Status: Draft
> Type: Standards Track
> Created: 2017-02-02
> License: BSD-2
> Voting Address: 3CoFA3JiK5wxe9ze2HoDGDTmZvkE5Uuwh8=C2=A0 (just an= example, don=E2=80=99t
> send to this!)
>
> Abstract
> Community Consensus Voting System (CCVS) will allow developers to meas= ure
> support for BIPs prior to implementation.
>
> Motivation
> We currently have no way of measuring consensus for potential changes = to
> the Bitcoin protocol. This is especially problematic for controversial=
> changes such as the max block size limit. As a result, we have many > proposed solutions but no clear direction.
>
> Also, due to our lack of ability to measure consensus, there is a gene= ral
> feeling among many in the community that developers aren=E2=80=99t lis= tening to
> their concerns. This is a valid complaint, as it=E2=80=99s not possibl= e to listen
> to thousands of voices all shouting different things in a crowded
> room=E2=80=94basically the situation in the Bitcoin community today. >
> The CCVS will allow the general public, miners, companies using Bitcoi= n,
> and developers to vote for their preferred BIP in a way that=E2=80=99s= public and
> relatively difficult (expensive) to manipulate.
>
> Specification
> Each competing BIP will be assigned a unique bitcoin address which is = added
> to each header. Anyone who wanted to vote would cast their ballot by > sending a small amount (0.0001 btc) to their preferred BIP's addre= ss. Each
> transaction counts as 1 vote.
>
> Confirmed Vote Multiplier:
> Mining Pools, companies using Bitcoin, and Core maintainers/contributo= rs
> are allowed one confirmed vote each. A confirmed vote is worth 10,000x= a
> regular vote.
>
> For example:
>
> Slush Pool casts a vote for their preferred BIP and then states public= ly
> (on their blog) their vote and the transaction ID and emails the URL t= o the
> admin of this system. In the final tally, this vote will count as 10,0= 00
> votes.
>
> Coinbase, Antpool, BitPay, BitFury, etc., all do the same.
>
> Confirmed votes would be added to a new section in each respective BIP= as a
> public record.
>
> Voting would run for a pre-defined period, ending when a particular bl= ock
> number is mined.
>
>
> Rationale
> Confirmed Vote Multiplier - The purpose of this is twofold; it gives a=
> larger voice to organizations and the people who will have to do the w= ork
> to implement whatever BIP the community prefers, and it will negate th= e
> effect of anyone trying to skew the results by voting repeatedly.
>
> Definitions
> Miner: any individual or organization that has mined at least one vali= d
> block in the last 2016 blocks.
>
> Company using Bitcoin: any organization using Bitcoin for financial, a= sset
> or other purposes, with either under development and released solution= s.
>
> Developer: any individual who has or had commit access, and any indivi= dual
> who has authored a BIP
>
> Unresolved Issues
> Node voting: It would be desirable for any full node running an up-to-= date
> blockchain to also be able to vote with a multiplier (e.g. 100x). But = as
> this would require code changes, it is outside the scope of this BIP.<= br> >
> Copyright
> This BIP is licensed under the BSD 2-clause license.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



--
I like to provi= de some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie?=C2=A0 I own Litmocracy<= /a> and Meme Racing= (in alpha).
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoi= n.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante.
"He ought to find it more profitable= to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto
--001a113f4790994d3205479641a2--