Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C4ABE4A4 for ; Thu, 13 Jul 2017 01:15:49 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (homie.mail.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.208]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFC0214D for ; Thu, 13 Jul 2017 01:15:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DAF6284081; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 18:15:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=taoeffect.com; h= content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :message-id:references:to; s=taoeffect.com; bh=NK6Yp5zgjhlKjLg54 A5rgM4w3bE=; b=urFoyMqYvzEUdQE3MmIwN0FKLEXFBu9YCBeywV55DXqi1ztoH geYwUOTFSLeNcEYe6NldW750uCf7mteoFFgkzCBYhnIkW68WpCZBegMHxfKIsYwH QLuFf7biNjg16/HujCpv2MMmgdVJE5+BAnLrN85TOlz+Sg0YYkdsXtBcog= Received: from [192.168.42.67] (184-23-252-118.fiber.dynamic.sonic.net [184.23.252.118]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: contact@taoeffect.com) by homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AE5BA284078; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 18:15:47 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_36DE61B7-A570-4604-9157-1C78B46ACDE8"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 10.3 \(3273\)) From: Tao Effect In-Reply-To: <117f6a96-6d90-778a-d87a-be72592e31c5@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 18:15:46 -0700 X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 521601346.509938-7ab5bc3e8fae65b0f16e077393011e1a Message-Id: <42C03DFC-C358-4F8C-A088-735910CCC60E@taoeffect.com> References: <24f2b447-a237-45eb-ef9f-1a62533fad5c@gmail.com> <83671224-f6ff-16a9-81c0-20ab578aec9d@gmail.com> <6764b8af-bb4c-615d-5af5-462127bbbe36@gmail.com> <117f6a96-6d90-778a-d87a-be72592e31c5@gmail.com> To: Paul Sztorc X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3273) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 01:31:22 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 01:15:49 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_36DE61B7-A570-4604-9157-1C78B46ACDE8 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_A7BFFC63-791A-42CE-9404-C6B817AD1D90" --Apple-Mail=_A7BFFC63-791A-42CE-9404-C6B817AD1D90 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Paul, > The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different = ideas. I'm right here, are you having a conversation with me or are you on a = stage talking to an audience? > FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still = overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push = the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up = to several months. What does that have to do with my question? The counting period, if I = understood correctly, is something miners do, not full nodes. Also, if the document is old and/or outdated, do you happen to have a = link to a more update-to-date version of the spec? It would be helpful = for review. > Because if a node doesn't have the sidechain's information, it will = just assume every withdrawal is valid. This is comparable to someone who = still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, in cases [DC#0] and [#1]. Right, for [DC#0] and [DC#1], but for [DC#2] an [DC#3] you marked it as = "Yes" without substantiating why you did so. > Again, from the perspective of a mainchain user, every withdrawal is = valid. And that is not how P2SH works. > [DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in understanding = what is going on, but that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with = Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this mailing list. How is that an answer to my question? What does "[DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in = understanding what is going on" mean? In P2SH, all upgraded nodes will reject invalid P2SH transactions, = period. What exactly would [DC#2] and [DC#3] nodes do when faced with an invalid = WT^ transaction =E2=80=94 invalid in the sense that it contains funds = which miners are stealing? Again, in P2SH miners cannot steal funds, because all full nodes have a = fully automatic enforcement policy. Kind regards, Greg Slepak -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also = sharing with the NSA. > On Jul 12, 2017, at 5:26 PM, Paul Sztorc > wrote: >=20 > The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different = ideas. >=20 > I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types = of user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer): >=20 > [DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is = running, say, 0.13). However, they experience the effects of the new = rules which miners add (as per the soft fork[s] to add drivechain = functionality and individual drivechains). > [DC#1] -- Someone who always upgrades to the latest version of the = Bitcoin software, but otherwise has no interest in running/using = sidechains. > [DC#2] -- Someone who upgrades to the latest Bitcoin version, and = decides to also become a full node of one or more sidechains, but who = ever actually uses the sidechains. > [DC#3] -- Someone who upgrades their software, runs sidechain full = nodes, and actively moves money to and from these. >=20 >=20 > On 7/12/2017 6:43 PM, Tao Effect wrote: >>=20 >> I am now looking closer again at step number 4 in the Drivechain = specification [2]: >>=20 >> 4. Everyone waits for a period of, say, 3 days. This gives everyone = an opportunity to make sure the same WT^ is in both the Bitcoin coinbase = and the Sidechain header. If they=E2=80=99re different, everyone has = plenty of time to contact each other, figure out what is going on, and = restart the process until its right. >> It seems to me that where our disagreement lies is in this point. >> The Drivechain spec seems to claim that its use of anyone-can-pay is = the same as P2SH (and in later emails you reference SegWit as well). Is = this really true? > FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still = overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push = the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up = to several months. >=20 > [DC#0] Yes > [DC#1] Yes > [DC#2] Yes > [DC#3] Yes >=20 > Because if a node doesn't have the sidechain's information, it will = just assume every withdrawal is valid. This is comparable to someone who = still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, in cases [DC#0] and [#1]. >=20 > (And this is the main advantage of DC over extension blocks). >=20 >=20 >> 2. Per the question in [1], it's my understanding that P2SH = transactions contain all of the information within themselves for full = nodes to act as a check on miners mishandling the anyone-can-spend = nature of P2SH transactions. However, that does not seem to be the case = with WT^ transactions. > [DC#0] They do. > [DC#1] They do. > [DC#2] They do. > [DC#3] They do. >=20 > Again, from the perspective of a mainchain user, every withdrawal is = valid. >=20 >=20 >> In P2SH txns, there is no need for anyone to, as the Drivechain spec = says, "to contact each other, figure out what is going on". Everything = just automatically works. > There is no *need* to this in Drivechain, either, for [DC#0] or = [DC#1]. >=20 > [DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in understanding = what is going on, but that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with = Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this mailing list. >=20 >=20 >> If the security of WT^ transactions could be brought up to actually = be in line with the security of P2SH and SegWit transactions, then I = would have far less to object to. > Somehow I doubt it. >=20 >=20 > Paul --Apple-Mail=_A7BFFC63-791A-42CE-9404-C6B817AD1D90 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Paul,

The confusion below stems from = his conflation of several different ideas.

I'm right here, are you having a = conversation with me or are you on a stage talking to an audience?

FYI that = document is nearly two years old, and although it is still = overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push = the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up = to several months.

What does that have to do with my question? The counting = period, if I understood correctly, is something miners do, not full = nodes.

Also, = if the document is old and/or outdated, do you happen to have a link to = a more update-to-date version of the spec? It would be helpful for = review.

Because if a node doesn't have the = sidechain's information, it will just assume every withdrawal is valid. = This is comparable to someone who still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, = in cases [DC#0] and [#1].

Right, for [DC#0] and [DC#1], but for = [DC#2] an [DC#3] you marked it as "Yes" without substantiating why you = did so.

Again, from the perspective of a = mainchain user, every withdrawal is valid.

And that is not how P2SH = works.

[DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an = interest in understanding what is going on, but that has absolutely = nothing whatsoever to do with Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this = mailing list.

How is that an answer to my question?

What does "[DC#2] and [DC#3] would = certainly have an interest in understanding what is going on" = mean?

In P2SH, = all upgraded nodes will reject invalid P2SH transactions, = period.

What = exactly would [DC#2] and [DC#3] nodes do when faced with an invalid WT^ = transaction =E2=80=94 invalid in the sense that it contains funds which = miners are stealing?

Again, in P2SH miners cannot steal funds, because all full = nodes have a fully automatic enforcement policy.

Kind regards,
Greg = Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not = comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

On Jul 12, 2017, at 5:26 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com>= wrote:

=20 =20
The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.

I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types of user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer):

[DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is running, say, 0.13). However, they experience the effects of the new rules which miners add (as per the soft fork[s] to add drivechain functionality and individual drivechains).
= [DC#1] -- Someone who always upgrades to the latest version of the Bitcoin software, but otherwise has no interest in running/using sidechains.
[DC#2] -- Someone who upgrades to the latest Bitcoin version, and decides to also become a full node of one or more sidechains, but who ever actually uses the sidechains.
[DC#3] -- Someone who upgrades their software, runs sidechain full nodes, and actively moves money to and from these.


On 7/12/2017 6:43 PM, Tao Effect wrote:

I am now looking closer again at step number 4 in the Drivechain specification [2]:

4. Everyone waits for a period of, say, 3 = days. This gives everyone an opportunity to make sure the same WT^ is in both the Bitcoin coinbase and the Sidechain header. If they=E2=80=99re different, everyone has plenty of time to = contact each other, figure out what is going on, and restart the process until its right.
It seems to me that where our disagreement lies is in this point.
The Drivechain spec seems to claim that its use of anyone-can-pay is the same as P2SH (and in later emails you reference SegWit as well). Is this really true?
FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizations allow us (I think) to push the waiting period to several weeks and the total ACK counting period up to several months.

[DC#0] Yes
[DC#1] Yes
[DC#2] Yes
[DC#3] Yes

Because if a node doesn't have the sidechain's information, it will just assume every withdrawal is valid. This is comparable to someone who still hasn't upgraded to support P2SH, in cases [DC#0] and = [#1].

(And this is the main advantage of DC over extension blocks).


2. Per the question in [1], it's my understanding that P2SH transactions contain all of the information within themselves for full nodes to act as a check on miners mishandling the anyone-can-spend nature of P2SH transactions. However, that does not seem to be the case with WT^ transactions.
[DC#0] They do.
[DC#1] They do.
[DC#2] They do.
[DC#3] They do.

Again, from the perspective of a mainchain user, every withdrawal is valid.


In P2SH txns, there is no need for anyone to, as = the Drivechain spec says, "to contact each other, figure out what is going on". Everything just automatically works.
There is no *need* to this in Drivechain, either, for [DC#0] or [DC#1].

[DC#2] and [DC#3] would certainly have an interest in understanding what is going on, but that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Bitcoin Core and so is off-topic for this mailing list.


If the security of WT^ transactions could be = brought up to actually be in line with the security of P2SH and SegWit transactions, then I would have far less to object to.
Somehow I doubt it.


Paul

= --Apple-Mail=_A7BFFC63-791A-42CE-9404-C6B817AD1D90-- --Apple-Mail=_36DE61B7-A570-4604-9157-1C78B46ACDE8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJZZsnCAAoJEOxnICvpCVJHrD0P/3tt2J2vuIw56bf7r+YE/DmX i7JYDzA7wzk8j01radmWpBapxXj4Rlt1E7N5E63Z1Ha3NEsp6rHQ2eYNbSnkKVt+ y/yKTEh9AFkWikDMZ4nxXkNYDvT6sCd1aRHu/6hzJH/hddRCnQH2ijZgxqS55FwQ C4+zaHJFZn9fK4IX/uewgRDaz/UQH8aD+ixGPM5wK4thhrqRNd9q8o8G0lR2Ywha XEN9UXrED8dt5/+RiQk1kHNDYWyFm6mGJ8+a6YOSouArTl/tJo1aFqUh5PQydrS8 LnvLj/MkiztKR1ZE+bMkhTfhHOtuJZPsnqMQ2SltSFMLnMSR9ZYu0CIbKCK785ar Bui4nS6Ho1tR6j0Kuv/GHap31VqKkBJDWWgHRqKZJh8Kt1Zdbc3Gw3qOGgJ601vj bwlGhJ9lHaUN8Q9yjgJIhSgXy1tJLJpaCN8if7UF9tE46GZboaTXVPMxHZ1F162x Zy/4/G0OlDT97Q3rc6yTkuKVdJzjAKZXK8lc9Gy3oWHIhWh7qChILvWSHOi1qDfk z5mkg2MB6ysO/ZB4axhQOj4T2eR+WemDKvV7qj+hgQ8dGltzc4G808BafiGddxR/ Dwhgrc+XLhYiNhNg/VM6NznNv4/ss+ApMbZBx2xZddYvQfi993XUejLwlvVW3Y3y 73FNo2dQ3bPN95U45Beo =LH2B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Apple-Mail=_36DE61B7-A570-4604-9157-1C78B46ACDE8--