Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2021 14:41:24 +0000
To: Nathan T Alexander <nta@nathanalexander.net>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Question- must every mining rig attempt every
	block?
Precedence: list

Good morning Nathan,

> For purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some
> non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would
> be accepted by that rig?
>
> Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the
> network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their
> bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute?

They are "identified" by the address that is on the coinbase output.

There is nothing preventing a *single* miner having *multiple* addresses, i=
n much the same way that a *single* HODLer is not prevented from having *mu=
ltiple* addresses.

>
> Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be
> accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful
> block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light=
.

Since a miner can have multiple addresses, the miners can game this by simp=
ly grinding on *which* of their multiple addresses gets the green light.
That grinding is no more different in quality than grinding the block hash.

Thus, you just move proof-of-work elsewhere and make it harder to see, not =
reduce it.


Worse, *identifying* miners reduces the important anonymity property of min=
ing.
With non-anonymous mining, it is much easier for states to co-opt large min=
es, since they are identifiable, and states can target larger miners.
Thus, miners ***must*** use multiple addresses as a simple protection again=
st state co-option.

>
> Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the
> miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set by
> algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block.

The power consumption of proof-of-work ***is not a problem***, it is instea=
d the solution against state co-option.

If you reduce the power consumption, it becomes easier for states to simply=
 purchase and co-opt mines and attack the system, since it is easier to mus=
ter the power consumption and outright 51% Bitcoin.
The power consumption is an important security parameter, ***even more impo=
rtant than raw hashes-per-second***, since hashes-per-second will inevitabl=
y rise anyway even with constant power consumption.

It should always remain economically infeasible to 51% Bitcoin, otherwise B=
itcoin will ***die*** and all your HODLings in it.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj