Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 17D25B8B for ; Sat, 27 Jun 2015 17:26:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ob0-f172.google.com (mail-ob0-f172.google.com [209.85.214.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75D71279 for ; Sat, 27 Jun 2015 17:26:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by obbop1 with SMTP id op1so83582620obb.2 for ; Sat, 27 Jun 2015 10:26:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=Mf/FPsZFB3OfBPbUxRBAutN6RHfKkbw+7WQn8ir8I6g=; b=wfzpLrN2hu1Gd2hvGivk1liOF6IcC9ntgm5wAU/vG5rzYBY743qAcXfbc0xCk7TzjU hNsbRPf9dobkzAk5c9ObFk64wmQoCIi3Y3qO/hTBqpOeLrfoPD/wfjtI+j9DP9gjeG78 eHoCMe2O6KvxJkzTrLpD9G4gHafXB2iBWA0gYv7PxI2peWKmXkAIHNRp3WaVl40RBjuk osV2LSpfzqJ4QoQw6JfN8ti/oTiwfNfkPcWc1V0AwQf2pLvEHMPAyNgmtAcvNVCllJxK gjLl5kqQCOrx6I30dt1zahalAoSdS651aNGf4iF5aqGI5tLOOy2A9f9sd/K46psZzVsX OG0A== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.210.165 with SMTP id mv5mr4128540obc.82.1435425960926; Sat, 27 Jun 2015 10:26:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.202.87.197 with HTTP; Sat, 27 Jun 2015 10:26:00 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150627172011.GB18729@muck> References: <1EF70EBC-8BB8-4A93-8591-52B2B0335F6C@petertodd.org> <20150627172011.GB18729@muck> Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 19:26:00 +0200 Message-ID: From: Benjamin To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2489480a4c805198326ee X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Proposed Compromise to the Block Size Limit X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 17:26:02 -0000 --001a11c2489480a4c805198326ee Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 "Thus we have a fixed capacity system where access is mediated by supply and demand transaction fees." There is no supply and demand. That would mean users would be able to adapt fees and get different quality of service depending on current capacity. For example if peak load is 10x average load, then at those times fees would be higher and users would delay transactions to smooth out demand. On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 7:20 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 12:19:04PM -0400, Michael Naber wrote: > > That test seems like a reasonable suggestion; 840GB is not prohibitive > > given today's computing costs. What other than the successful result of > > that test would you want to see before agreeing to increase the block > size > > to 8MB? > > The two main things you need to show is: > > 1) Small, anonymous, miners remain approximately as profitable as large > miners, regardless of whether they are in the world, and even when > miners are under attack. Remember I'm talking about mining here, not > just hashing - the process of selling your hashpower to someone else who > is actually doing the mining. > > As for "approximately as profitable", based on a 10% profit margin, a 5% > profitability difference between a negligable ~0% hashing power miner > and a 50% hashing power miner is a good standard here. > > The hard part here is basically keeping orphan rates low, as the %5 > profitability different on %10 profit margin implies an orphan rate of > about 0.5% - roughly what we have right now if not actually a bit lower. > That also implies blocks propagate across the network in just a few > seconds in the worst case, where blocks are being generated with > transactions in them that are not already in mempools - circumventing > propagation optimization techniques. As we're talking about small > miners, we can't assume the miners are directly conneted to each other. > (which itself is dangerous from an attack point of view - if they're > directly connected they can be DoS attacked) > > 2) Medium to long term plan to pay for hashing power. Without scarcity > of blockchain space there is no reason to think that transaction fees > won't fall to the marginal cost of including a transaction, which > doesn't leave anything to pay for proof-of-work security. A proposal > meeting this criteria will have to be clever if you don't keep the > blocksize sufficiently limited that transaction fees are non-negligable. > One possible approach - if probably politically non-viable - would be to > change the inflation schedule so that the currency is inflated > indefinitely. > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 0000000000000000007fc13ce02072d9cb2a6d51fae41fefcde7b3b283803d24 > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11c2489480a4c805198326ee Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
"Thus we= have a fixed=C2=A0capa= city system where access is mediated by supply and demand=C2=A0transaction fees."
=
There is no supply and demand. That wo= uld mean users would be able to adapt fees and get different quality of ser= vice depending on current capacity. For example if peak load is 10x average= load, then at those times fees would be higher and users would delay trans= actions to smooth out demand.
=
On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 7:20 PM, Peter Todd = <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 12:19:04PM -0400, Michael Naber= wrote:
> That test seems like a reasonable suggestion; 840GB is not prohibitive=
> given today's computing costs. What other than the successful resu= lt of
> that test would you want to see before agreeing to increase the block = size
> to 8MB?

The two main things you need to show is:

1) Small, anonymous, miners remain approximately as profitable as large
miners, regardless of whether they are in the world, and even when
miners are under attack. Remember I'm talking about mining here, not just hashing - the process of selling your hashpower to someone else who is actually doing the mining.

As for "approximately as profitable", based on a 10% profit margi= n, a 5%
profitability difference between a negligable ~0% hashing power miner
and a 50% hashing power miner is a good standard here.

The hard part here is basically keeping orphan rates low, as the %5
profitability different on %10 profit margin implies an orphan rate of
about 0.5% - roughly what we have right now if not actually a bit lower. That also implies blocks propagate across the network in just a few
seconds in the worst case, where blocks are being generated with
transactions in them that are not already in mempools - circumventing
propagation optimization techniques. As we're talking about small
miners, we can't assume the miners are directly conneted to each other.=
(which itself is dangerous from an attack point of view - if they're directly connected they can be DoS attacked)

2) Medium to long term plan to pay for hashing power. Without scarcity
of blockchain space there is no reason to think that transaction fees
won't fall to the marginal cost of including a transaction, which
doesn't leave anything to pay for proof-of-work security. A proposal meeting this criteria will have to be clever if you don't keep the
blocksize sufficiently limited that transaction fees are non-negligable. One possible approach - if probably politically non-viable - would be to change the inflation schedule so that the currency is inflated
indefinitely.

--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000007fc13ce02072d9cb2a6d51fae41fefcde7b3b283803d24

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