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charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I should not take it that the lack of critical feedback to this revised pro= posal is a glowing endorsement. I understand that there would be technical = issues to resolve in implementation, but, are there no fundamental errors? I suppose that it if is difficult to determine how long a transaction has b= een waiting in the pool then, each node could simply keep track of when a t= ransaction was first seen. This may have implications for a verify routine,= however, for example, if a node was offline, how should it differentiate h= ow long each transaction was waiting in that case? If a node was restarted = daily would it always think that all transactions had been waiting in the p= ool less than one day If each node keeps the current transaction pool in a = file and updates it, as transactions are included in blocks and, as new tra= nsactions appear in the pool, then that would go some way to alleviate the = issue, apart from entirely new nodes. There should be no reason the content= s of a transaction pool files cannot be shared without agreement as to the = transaction pool between nodes, just as nodes transmit new transactions fre= ely. It has been questioned why miners could not cheat. For the question of how = many transactions to include in a block, I say it is a standoff and miners = will conform to the proposal, not wanting to leave transactions with valid = fees standing, and, not wanting to shrink the transaction pool. In any case= , if miners shrink the transaction pool then I am not immediately concerned= since it provides a more efficient service. For the question of including = transactions according to the proposal, I say if it is possible to keep tra= ck of how long transactions are waiting in the pool so that they can be inc= luded on a probability curve then it is possible to verify that blocks conf= orm to the proposal, since the input is a probability, the output should co= nform to a probability curve. If someone has the necessary skill, would anyone be willing to develop the = math necessary for the proposal? Regards, Damian Williamson ________________________________ From: bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org on behalf of Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev Sent: Friday, 8 December 2017 8:01 AM To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Pr= iority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks Good afternoon, The need for this proposal: We all must learn to admit that transaction bandwidth is still lurking as a= serious issue for the operation, reliability, safety, consumer acceptance,= uptake and, for the value of Bitcoin. I recently sent a payment which was not urgent so; I chose three-day target= confirmation from the fee recommendation. That transaction has still not c= onfirmed after now more than six days - even waiting twice as long seems qu= ite reasonable to me. That transaction is a valid transaction; it is not ru= bbish, junk or, spam. Under the current model with transaction bandwidth li= mitation, the longer a transaction waits, the less likely it is ever to con= firm due to rising transaction numbers and being pushed back by transaction= s with rising fees. I argue that no transactions are rubbish or junk, only some zero fee transa= ctions might be spam. Having an ever-increasing number of valid transaction= s that do not confirm as more new transactions with higher fees are created= is the opposite of operating a robust, reliable transaction system. Business cannot operate with a model where transactions may or may not conf= irm. Even a business choosing a modest fee has no guarantee that their vali= d transaction will not be shuffled down by new transactions to the realm of= never confirming after it is created. Consumers also will not accept this = model as Bitcoin expands. If Bitcoin cannot be a reliable payment system fo= r confirmed transactions then consumers, by and large, will simply not acce= pt the model once they understand. Bitcoin will be a dirty payment system, = and this will kill the value of Bitcoin. Under the current system, a minority of transactions will eventually be the= lucky few who have fees high enough to escape being pushed down the list. Once there are more than x transactions (transaction bandwidth limit) every= ten minutes, only those choosing twenty-minute confirmation (2 blocks) wil= l have initially at most a fifty percent chance of ever having their paymen= t confirm. Presently, not even using fee recommendations can ensure a suffi= ciently high fee is paid to ensure transaction confirmation. I also argue that the current auction model for limited transaction bandwid= th is wrong, is not suitable for a reliable transaction system and, is wron= g for Bitcoin. All transactions must confirm in due time. Currently, Bitcoi= n is not a safe way to send payments. I do not believe that consumers and business are against paying fees, even = high fees. What is required is operational reliability. This great issue needs to be resolved for the safety and reliability of Bit= coin. The time to resolve issues in commerce is before they become great bi= g issues. The time to resolve this issue is now. We must have the foresight= to identify and resolve problems before they trip us over. Simply doublin= g block sizes every so often is reactionary and is not a reliable permanent= solution. I have written a BIP proposal for a technical solution but, need= your help to write it up to an acceptable standard to be a full BIP. I have formatted the following with markdown which is human readable so, I = hope nobody minds. I have done as much with this proposal as I feel that I = am able so far but continue to take your feedback. # BIP Proposal: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactio= ns In Blocks ## The problem: Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees (and we pr= esume, to minimize block size). Consumers need transaction reliability and,= (we presume) want low fees. The current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both. As t= he operational safety of transactions is limited, so is consumer confidence= as they realize the issue and, accordingly, uptake is limited. Fees are ar= tificially inflated due to bandwidth limitations while failing to provide a= full confirmation service for all transactions. Current fee recommendations provide no satisfaction for transaction reliabi= lity and, as Bitcoin scales, this will worsen. Bitcoin must be a fully scalable and reliable service, providing full trans= action confirmation for every valid transaction. The possibility to send a transaction with a fee lower than one that is acc= eptable to allow eventual transaction confirmation should be removed from t= he protocol and also from the user interface. ## Solution summary: Provide each transaction with an individual transaction priority each time = before choosing transactions to include in the current block, the priority = being a function of the fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the = transaction pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=3D60 ?). The transactio= n priority to serve as the likelihood of a transaction being included in th= e current block, and for determining the order in which transactions are tr= ied to see if they will be included. Use a target block size. Determine the target block size using; current tra= nsaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D number of transactions to = be included in the current block. Broadcast the next target block size with= the current block when it is solved so that nodes know the next target blo= ck size for the block that they are building on. The curves used for the priority of transactions would have to be appropria= te. Perhaps a mathematician with experience in probability can develop the = right formulae. My thinking is a steep curve. I suppose that the probabilit= y of all transactions should probably account for a sufficient number of in= clusions that the target block size is met although, it may not always be. = As a suggestion, consider including some zero fee transactions to pad, high= est BTC value first? **Explanation of the operation of priority:** > If transaction priority is, for example, a number between one (low) and o= ne-hundred (high) it can be directly understood as the percentage chance in= one-hundred of a transaction being included in the block. Using probabilit= y or likelihood infers that there is some function of random. If random (10= 0) < transaction priority then the transaction is included. >To break it down further, if both the fee on a curve value and the time wa= iting on a curve value are each a number between one and one-hundred, a rud= imentary method may be to simply multiply those two numbers, to find the pr= iority number. For example, a middle fee transaction waiting thirty days (i= f n =3D 60 days) may have a value of five for each part (yes, just five, t= he values are on a curve). When multiplied that will give a priority value = of twenty-five, or, a twenty-five percent chance at that moment of being i= ncluded in the block; it will likely be included in one of the next four bl= ocks, getting more likely each chance. If it is still not included then the= value of time waiting will be higher, making for more probability. A very = low fee transaction would have a value for the fee of one. It would not be = until near sixty-days that the particular low fee transaction has a high li= kelihood of being included in the block. I am not concerned with low (or high) transaction fees, the primary reason = for addressing the issue is to ensure transactional reliability and scalabi= lity while having each transaction confirm in due time. ## Pros: * Maximizes transaction reliability. * Fully scalable. * Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake. * Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; because= of reliability, in time confidence and overall uptake are greater; therefo= re, more transactions. * Market determines fee paid for transaction priority. * Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater. * Provides additional block entropy; greater security since there is less p= robability of predicting the next block. ## Cons: * Could initially lower total transaction fees per block. * Must be first be programmed. ## Solution operation: This is a simplistic view of the operation. The actual operation will need = to be determined in a spec for the programmer. 1. Determine the target block size for the current block. 2. Assign a transaction priority to each transaction in the pool. 3. Select transactions to include in the current block using probability in= transaction priority order until the target block size is met. 5. Solve block. 6. Broadcast the next target block size with the current block when it is s= olved. 7. Block is received. 8. Block verification process. 9. Accept/reject block based on verification result. 10. Repeat. ## Closing comments: It may be possible to verify blocks conform to the proposal by showing that= the probability for all transactions included in the block statistically c= onforms to a probability distribution curve, *if* the individual transactio= n priority can be recreated. I am not that deep into the mathematics; howev= er, it may also be possible to use a similar method to do this just based o= n the fee, that statistically, the blocks conform to a fee distribution. An= y zero fee transactions would have to be ignored. This solution needs a cle= ver mathematician. I implore, at the very least, that we use some method that validates full t= ransaction reliability and enables scalability of block sizes. If not this = proposal, an alternative. Regards, Damian Williamson --_000_PS2P216MB01795BFC05612E021CCEDD7C9D0B0PS2P216MB0179KORP_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I should not take it that the lack of critical feedback to this revise= d proposal is a glowing endorsement. I understand that there would be techn= ical issues to resolve in implementation, but, are there no fundamental err= ors?

I suppose that it if is difficult to determine how long a transaction has b= een waiting in the pool then, each node could simply keep track of when a t= ransaction was first seen. This may have implications for a verify routine,= however, for example, if a node was offline, how should it differentiate how long each transaction was wai= ting in that case? If a node was restarted daily would it always think that= all transactions had been waiting in the pool less than one day If each no= de keeps the current transaction pool in a file and updates it, as transactions are included in blocks and,= as new transactions appear in the pool, then that would go some way to all= eviate the issue, apart from entirely new nodes. There should be no reason = the contents of a transaction pool files cannot be shared without agreement as to the transaction pool = between nodes, just as nodes transmit new transactions freely.

It has been questioned why miners could not cheat. For the question of how = many transactions to include in a block, I say it is a standoff and miners = will conform to the proposal, not wanting to leave transactions with valid = fees standing, and, not wanting to shrink the transaction pool. In any case, if miners shrink the transact= ion pool then I am not immediately concerned since it provides a more effic= ient service. For the question of including transactions according to the p= roposal, I say if it is possible to keep track of how long transactions are waiting in the pool so that the= y can be included on a probability curve then it is possible to verify that= blocks conform to the proposal, since the input is a probability, the outp= ut should conform to a probability curve.

If someone has the necessary skill, would anyone be willing to develop= the math necessary for the proposal?

Regards,
Damian Williamson

From: bitcoin-dev-bounces= @lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.or= g> on behalf of Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Sent: Friday, 8 December 2017 8:01 AM
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transac= tion Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
 

Good afternoon,

The need for this proposal:

We all must learn to admit that transaction bandwidth is still lurking as a= serious issue for the operation, reliability, safety, consumer acceptance,= uptake and, for the value of Bitcoin.

I recently sent a payment which was not urgent so; I chose three-day target= confirmation from the fee recommendation. That transaction has still not c= onfirmed after now more than six days - even waiting twice as long seems qu= ite reasonable to me. That transaction is a valid transaction; it is not rubbish, junk or, spam. Under the curren= t model with transaction bandwidth limitation, the longer a transaction wai= ts, the less likely it is ever to confirm due to rising transaction numbers= and being pushed back by transactions with rising fees.

I argue that no transactions are rubbish or junk, only some zero fee transa= ctions might be spam. Having an ever-increasing number of valid transaction= s that do not confirm as more new transactions with higher fees are created= is the opposite of operating a robust, reliable transaction system.

Business cannot operate with a model where transactions may or may not conf= irm. Even a business choosing a modest fee has no guarantee that their vali= d transaction will not be shuffled down by new transactions to the realm of= never confirming after it is created. Consumers also will not accept this model as Bitcoin expands. If Bitcoin c= annot be a reliable payment system for confirmed transactions then consumer= s, by and large, will simply not accept the model once they understand. Bit= coin will be a dirty payment system, and this will kill the value of Bitcoin.

Under the current system, a minority of transactions will eventually be the= lucky few who have fees high enough to escape being pushed down the list.<= br>
Once there are more than x transactions (transaction bandwidth limit) every= ten minutes, only those choosing twenty-minute confirmation (2 blocks) wil= l have initially at most a fifty percent chance of ever having their paymen= t confirm. Presently, not even using fee recommendations can ensure a sufficiently high fee is paid to ensure t= ransaction confirmation.

I also argue that the current auction model for limited transaction bandwid= th is wrong, is not suitable for a reliable transaction system and, is wron= g for Bitcoin. All transactions must confirm in due time. Currently, Bitcoi= n is not a safe way to send payments.

I do not believe that consumers and business are against paying fees, even = high fees. What is required is operational reliability.

This great issue needs to be resolved for the safety and reliability of Bit= coin. The time to resolve issues in commerce is before they become great bi= g issues. The time to resolve this issue is now. We must have the foresight= to identify and resolve problems before they trip us over.  Simply doubling block sizes every so often= is reactionary and is not a reliable permanent solution. I have written a = BIP proposal for a technical solution but, need your help to write it up to= an acceptable standard to be a full BIP.

I have formatted the following with markdown which is human readable so, I = hope nobody minds. I have done as much with this proposal as I feel that I = am able so far but continue to take your feedback.

# BIP Proposal: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactio= ns In Blocks

## The problem:
Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees (and we pr= esume, to minimize block size). Consumers need transaction reliability and,= (we presume) want low fees.

The current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both. As t= he operational safety of transactions is limited, so is consumer confidence= as they realize the issue and, accordingly, uptake is limited. Fees are ar= tificially inflated due to bandwidth limitations while failing to provide a full confirmation service for all t= ransactions.

Current fee recommendations provide no satisfaction for transaction reliabi= lity and, as Bitcoin scales, this will worsen.

Bitcoin must be a fully scalable and reliable service, providing full trans= action confirmation for every valid transaction.

The possibility to send a transaction with a fee lower than one that is acc= eptable to allow eventual transaction confirmation should be removed from t= he protocol and also from the user interface.

## Solution summary:
Provide each transaction with an individual transaction priority each time = before choosing transactions to include in the current block, the priority = being a function of the fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the = transaction pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=3D60 ?). The transaction priority to serve as the likelih= ood of a transaction being included in the current block, and for determini= ng the order in which transactions are tried to see if they will be include= d.

Use a target block size. Determine the target block size using; current tra= nsaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D number of transactions to = be included in the current block. Broadcast the next target block size with= the current block when it is solved so that nodes know the next target block size for the block that they are = building on.

The curves used for the priority of transactions would have to be appropria= te. Perhaps a mathematician with experience in probability can develop the = right formulae. My thinking is a steep curve. I suppose that the probabilit= y of all transactions should probably account for a sufficient number of inclusions that the target block size i= s met although, it may not always be. As a suggestion, consider including s= ome zero fee transactions to pad, highest BTC value first?

**Explanation of the operation of priority:**
> If transaction priority is, for example, a number between one (low) an= d one-hundred (high) it can be directly understood as the percentage chance= in one-hundred of a transaction being included in the block. Using probabi= lity or likelihood infers that there is some function of random. If random (100) < transaction priority then= the transaction is included.

>To break it down further, if both the fee on a curve value and the time= waiting on a curve value are each a number between one and one-hundred, a = rudimentary method may be to simply multiply those two numbers, to find the= priority number. For example, a middle fee transaction waiting thirty days (if n =3D 60 days) may have a value of= five for each part  (yes, just five, the values are on a curve). When= multiplied that will give a priority value of twenty-five, or,  a twe= nty-five percent chance at that moment of being included in the block; it will likely be included in one of the next four = blocks, getting more likely each chance. If it is still not included then t= he value of time waiting will be higher, making for more probability. A ver= y low fee transaction would have a value for the fee of one. It would not be until near sixty-days that the= particular low fee transaction has a high likelihood of being included in = the block.

I am not concerned with low (or high) transaction fees, the primary reason = for addressing the issue is to ensure transactional reliability and scalabi= lity while having each transaction confirm in due time.

## Pros:
* Maximizes transaction reliability.
* Fully scalable.
* Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
* Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; because= of reliability, in time confidence and overall uptake are greater; therefo= re, more transactions.
* Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.
* Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater.
* Provides additional block entropy; greater security since there is less p= robability of predicting the next block.

## Cons:
* Could initially lower total transaction fees per block.
* Must be first be programmed.

## Solution operation:
This is a simplistic view of the operation. The actual operation will need = to be determined in a spec for the programmer.

1. Determine the target block size for the current block.
2. Assign a transaction priority to each transaction in the pool.
3. Select transactions to include in the current block using probability in= transaction priority order until the target block size is met.
5. Solve block.
6. Broadcast the next target block size with the current block when it is s= olved.
7. Block is received.
8. Block verification process.
9. Accept/reject block based on verification result.
10. Repeat.

## Closing comments:
It may be possible to verify blocks conform to the proposal by showing that= the probability for all transactions included in the block statistically c= onforms to a probability distribution curve, *if* the individual transactio= n priority can be recreated. I am not that deep into the mathematics; however, it may also be possible to us= e a similar method to do this just based on the fee, that statistically, th= e blocks conform to a fee distribution. Any zero fee transactions would hav= e to be ignored. This solution needs a clever mathematician.

I implore, at the very least, that we use some method that validates full t= ransaction reliability and enables scalability of block sizes. If not this = proposal, an alternative.

Regards,
Damian Williamson

--_000_PS2P216MB01795BFC05612E021CCEDD7C9D0B0PS2P216MB0179KORP_--