Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D698C002A for ; Tue, 2 May 2023 08:21:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 297B040273 for ; Tue, 2 May 2023 08:21:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 297B040273 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20221208 header.b=UBx+0Hcs X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Pvi755E0VWiY for ; Tue, 2 May 2023 08:21:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 7C74940124 Received: from mail-oo1-xc29.google.com (mail-oo1-xc29.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::c29]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C74940124 for ; Tue, 2 May 2023 08:21:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oo1-xc29.google.com with SMTP id 006d021491bc7-549d9c295dfso2130965eaf.2 for ; Tue, 02 May 2023 01:21:14 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1683015673; x=1685607673; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=0dwuhCplAaxzMCY0kBTYf5oNeXmixbKwFoYsGjAIN+I=; b=UBx+0HcsWaDQzoXEmlCqhG3jq+y1bQyLvV2cxGiZ5pTVmjrnIp68BCjjQgOZ8n0rsa nnO85tyvsmZ60z+IjGgkI18IhooQf/G0bHrVI0GUyRgNKSyqzXzR+vtCr9U1C8jo0N7S D75wjo+s2o+ouqMnnksO8qfFAvkrpT9+V5ipZcmTZ9REkm7NTEY4cpB3LfQn9COjF1D5 6yVgLfbvi72HCR3OhcNwpBYmA8pWDNurWZhYoLP70FhOMQcob6igE3AugIkxFDFnHSfd 5sIKbJWS+vXAPF9C5mY0qYXGbMcP3QGsbjGClPOYZNviPAyPwWso3pb16EaNWWBpRreX 058A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1683015673; x=1685607673; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=0dwuhCplAaxzMCY0kBTYf5oNeXmixbKwFoYsGjAIN+I=; b=eHcIRv3/3xWnO8le2rhDKam+22OTzGHvpiXNGkACATcrhLcP9o16BouPTESURnjhnW GvyuhF1saX13L2dmE4OuriVfD4pp71sV/Bqe/bin72OXK2LyoCa0coq0oB0L8JY2lMcj 6NRm9ALTFijIoBEZJYigGoi++Yt6KAXFvK2nNkQxPiyaneLk12OudTAw25kgXWn7+Jyt P/xlpFOy/+gAXP8RGPdQC0+DungNbVX3ALkIXG/Y3nh2rYXYaUP6Cm3CrV4f3FCjx0d5 bK6Sz0nrANcUFOBtfpAFIpz6TACLM0nFJ1P2z34SlbuGKkr5oP4i0yfapxL3h9BjGdQ0 zWcA== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDx+uQ3r1xIX83zpuhg9vYQB8brpi2lN9upUftvzgMSRuA883kzc +Z8bYpIDTVgb4LkicQtxNCD5mpSb+cGvKvA3AKd3bBNFlLqq2Q== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ43iZfYF0SGor/AH/z1EjyZ54mDrR3ha2tMmpg6RFaQRmo8ozXaf2gMUwwY73OLZHfIndppIFwiAkguIMOhnq0= X-Received: by 2002:a4a:e5d8:0:b0:546:f42b:685b with SMTP id r24-20020a4ae5d8000000b00546f42b685bmr8238339oov.5.1683015673231; Tue, 02 May 2023 01:21:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <2ApImRS_OSlctWlRLsNykOYE9Z2nEfg8-IUooIluZG2MAVrY9F5oHYi5LBXN7q5QxB2_sLPIVgV-MOUBMEc451HTpPyPdrvog9jPjBpTZ5E=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: <2ApImRS_OSlctWlRLsNykOYE9Z2nEfg8-IUooIluZG2MAVrY9F5oHYi5LBXN7q5QxB2_sLPIVgV-MOUBMEc451HTpPyPdrvog9jPjBpTZ5E=@protonmail.com> From: Salvatore Ingala Date: Tue, 2 May 2023 10:21:01 +0200 Message-ID: To: Michael Folkson Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000005abd3905fab19f16" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 02 May 2023 08:22:32 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Vaults in the MATT framework X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 02 May 2023 08:21:17 -0000 --0000000000005abd3905fab19f16 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Michael, I can't make any claim of expertise on the field (especially on the other proposals that you mentioned), so this post necessarily includes my opinions =E2=88=92 and possibly my biases. The core functionality of MATT is quite simple, and could be adapted to any version of the scripting system: basically, COCV allows to "embed" some data in the next output, and decide its script; CICV allows "reading" this data. The design I proposed on taproot is surely not the only possible way, but it's the most simple/elegant I could come up with. Moreover, it doesn't seem very useful to spend time trying to get it to work on pre-taproot Script, due to the obvious advantages of those ideas when deployed on taproot (like having taptrees, and all the nice properties of Schnorr signatures). CICV/COCV can certainly be considered an additional form of introspection: you're checking that the script of an input/output equals a certain value, which is not possible in today's Script. I think that's generally true for all covenant proposals. Unlike some other proposals, MATT is not yet fully formalized, so I generally call "MATT" the combination of CICV+COCV, plus some other small set of opcodes that is yet to be defined exactly. I would say it fits in the same family as APO/OP_CTV/OP_VAULT, per your bucketization. The previous posts about MATT, fraud proofs, etc. are an exploration of the deeper things that are enabled by the MATT opcodes. The claim is that a set of changes that is (arguably) quite small and easy to analyze is enough to express general smart contracts =E2=88=92 thanks to fraud proo= fs. However, fraud proofs themselves are a quite advanced application of the new opcodes, and are not needed for most/all of the things that people are trying to build today with the other covenant proposals. Since you mention Simplicity: my current understanding is that its endeavour of replacing Script with a better language is orthogonal to the discussion about what features (e.g.: introspection, covenants) should be in the language. All the covenant proposals listed above are technically a lot smaller and easier to audit than both the SegWit and the Taproot soft forks, both in terms of code and conceptual complexity. Therefore, if we _do_ want the features that they enable, the required engineering for a soft-fork is relatively straightforward, and there is not much of a reason to wait for Simplicity. It will be trivial to "port" any constructions we might create today with covenants to Simplicity scripts. If we _do not_ want those features, then the decision would rather be guided by other considerations, like potential risks to bitcoin caused by the effect of those features on miners' incentives. These concerns are not answered by Simplicity, as far as I understand: you would then want to implement Simplicity _without_ those features. Best, Salvatore On Mon, 1 May 2023 at 16:18, Michael Folkson wrote: > Hi Salvatore > > Can you clarify for me which bucket this proposal sits? We have APO, CTV, > OP_VAULT etc that are proposals to add additional functionality to SegWit > version 1, Tapleaf version 0 scripts. We have Simplicity that would need = a > new Tapleaf version (e.g. Tapleaf version 1). And then there are CISA lik= e > proposals that would need a new SegWit version (e.g. SegWit version 2). I= t > looks to me like your proposal is in the first bucket (same as APO, CTV > etc) as it is just introducing new opcode functionality to existing scrip= t > with no deeper introspection needed but previous and current discussion o= f > fraud proofs, MATT frameworks etc made me initially think it was going to > require more than that. > > Thanks > Michael > > -- > Michael Folkson > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin > > ------- Original Message ------- > On Monday, April 24th, 2023 at 20:37, Salvatore Ingala via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > Hello list, > > TL;DR: the core opcodes of MATT can build vaults with a very similar desi= gn > to OP_VAULT. Code example here: > > > https://github.com/bitcoin-inquisition/bitcoin/compare/24.0...bigspider:b= itcoin-inquisition:matt-vault > > > In my previous emails about the MATT proposal for smart contracts in > bitcoin [1], I mostly focused on proving its generality; that is, it > allows arbitrary smart contracts thanks to fraud proofs. > > While I still find this "completeness" result compelling, I spent more ti= me > thinking about the framework itself; the construction is not very > interesting > if it turns simple things into complicated ones. Luckily, this is not the > case. > In particular, in this email we will not merkleize anything (other than > taptrees). > > This post describes some progress into formalizing the semantics of the > core > opcodes, and demonstrates how they could be used to create vaults that se= em > comparable to the ones built with OP_VAULT [2], despite using general > purpose > opcodes. > > An implementation and some minimal tests matching the content of this > e-mail can be found in the link above, using the bitcoin-inquisition as t= he > base branch. > > Note that the linked code is not well tested and is only intended for > exploratory and demonstrative purposes; therefore, bugs are likely at thi= s > stage. > > > ########################## > # PART 1: MATT's core > ########################## > > In this section, I will discuss plausible semantics for the core opcodes > for MATT. > > The two core opcodes are defined below as OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY and > OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY. > > (the initial posts named them OP_CHECK{INPUT,OUTPUT}COVENANTVERIFY) > > They enhance Script with the following capabilities: > - decide the taptree of the output > - embed some (dynamically computed) data in the output > - access the embedded data in the current UTXO (if any) > > The opcodes below are incomplete, as they only control the output's Scrip= t > and > not the amounts; more on that below. > > Other than that, the semantics should be quite close to the "right" one f= or > the MATT framework. > > > ### The opcodes > > case OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: > { > // OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY is only available in Tapscript > if (sigversion =3D=3D SigVersion::BASE || sigversion =3D=3D > SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_BAD_OPCODE); > // (x d -- ) > if (stack.size() < 2) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); > valtype& x =3D stacktop(-2); > valtype& d =3D stacktop(-1); > if (x.size() !=3D 32 || d.size() !=3D 32) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); > const XOnlyPubKey nakedXOnlyKey{Span{x.data(), > x.data() + 32}}; > const uint256 data(d); > if (!execdata.m_internal_key.has_value()) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); // TODO > // Verify that tweak(lift_x(x), d) equals the internal pubkey > if (!execdata.m_internal_key.value().CheckDoubleTweak(nakedXOnlyKey, > &data, nullptr)) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA); > popstack(stack); > popstack(stack); > } > break; > case OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: > { > // OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY is only available in Tapscript > if (sigversion =3D=3D SigVersion::BASE || sigversion =3D=3D > SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_BAD_OPCODE); > // (out_i x taptree d -- ) > if (stack.size() < 4) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); > int out_i =3D CScriptNum(stacktop(-4), fRequireMinimal).getint(); > valtype& x =3D stacktop(-3); > valtype& taptree =3D stacktop(-2); > valtype& d =3D stacktop(-1); > auto outps =3D checker.GetTxvOut(); > // Return error if the evaluation context is unavailable > if (!outps) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); // TODO > if (x.size() !=3D 32 || taptree.size() !=3D 32 || (d.size() !=3D 0 && d.s= ize() > !=3D 32)) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); > if (out_i < 0 || out_i >=3D (int)outps->size()) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); > const XOnlyPubKey nakedXOnlyKey{Span{x.data(), > x.data() + 32}}; > const uint256 data(d); > const uint256 *data_ptr =3D (d.size() =3D=3D 0 ? nullptr : &data); > const uint256 merkle_tree(taptree); > CScript scriptPubKey =3D outps->at(out_i).scriptPubKey; > if (scriptPubKey.size() !=3D 1 + 1 + 32 || scriptPubKey[0] !=3D OP_1 || > scriptPubKey[1] !=3D 32) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA); > const XOnlyPubKey outputXOnlyKey{Span char>{scriptPubKey.data() + 2, scriptPubKey.data() + 34}}; > // Verify that taptweak(tweak(lift_x(x), d), taptree) equals the internal > pubkey > if (!outputXOnlyKey.CheckDoubleTweak(nakedXOnlyKey, data_ptr, > &merkle_tree)) > return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA); > popstack(stack); > popstack(stack); > popstack(stack); > popstack(stack); > } > break; > > ### Commentary > > CheckDoubleTweak function (implemented in the branch) gets an x-only > pubkey, > optionally some data, and optionally taptree's merkle root. > It verifies that the x-only pubkey being tested equals the given naked > pubkey, > optionally tweaked with the embedded data, optionally tweaked with the > tagged > hash of the merkle tree per BIP-0341 [3]. > Making both the tweaks optional allows to simplify the code, and also to > obtain > more compact scripts in some spending paths. > > In words: > > - OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: verify that the current input's internal k= ey > contains some embedded data (which would typically be passed through the > witness stack) > - OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: verify that a given output is a certain > P2TR > output script containing the desired embedded data. > > TBD if the tweaking used for the embedded data tweak should use a tagged > hash; > omitted for simplicity in this demo implementation. > > ### Amount preservation > > In the code above and in the linked demo implementation, the opcodes only > operate on the scriptPubkey; a complete implementation would want to make > sure > that amounts are correctly preserved. > > The most direct and general way to address this would be to allow direct > introspection on the output amounts. This has the complication that outpu= t > amounts require 64-bits arithmetics, as discussed in the context of other > proposals, for example: [4]. > > One more limited approach that works well for many interesting contracts > is that of the deferred checks, implemented in OP_VAULT [2]. > The idea is that all the amounts of the inputs that commit to the same > output > script with OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY are added together, and the scri= pt > interpreter requires that the amount of that output is not smaller than t= he > total amount of those inputs. This check is therefore transaction-wide > rather > than being tested during the input's script evaluation. > > This behaviour is adequate for vaults and likely suitable for many other > applications; however, it's not the most general approach. I didn't try t= o > implement it yet, and defer the decision on the best approach to a later > time. > > ### Extensions > > The opcodes above are not enough for the full generality of MATT: one wou= ld > need to add an opcode like OP_SHA256CAT to allow the data embedding to > commit > to multiple pieces of data. > This is not used in today's post, therefore I left it out of these code > examples. > > It would be easy to extend OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY to also apply for > an arbitrary input (typically, different from the currently executed one)= ; > there > are likely use cases for that, allowing to define contracts with more > complex > cross-input semantics, but I preferred to keep things simple. > > Of course, one could also entirely replace CICV/COCV with generic full > introspection on inputs/output's program, plus opcodes for elliptic curve > math > and tagged hashes. > > > ########################## > # PART 2: Vaults with MATT > ########################## > > In the rest of this post, I will document the first attempt at creating a > vault > using the opcodes described. > > While not an attempt at cloning exactly the functionality of OP_VAULT [2]= , > it borrows heavily from the excellent work that was done there. > > In particular, it also inherits the choice of using OP_CTV as a primitive= , > building on top of the bitcoin-inquisition's current branch that has > already > merged OP_CTV. Reasonable vaults would be possible without CTV, but they > would be less efficient, particularly in the case of sending to many > addresses > in a single unvaulting flow. > > ### Distilling OP_VAULT > > Abstracting from the implementation details, I mentally model a vault as = a > simple state machine with 2 states: [V] and [U]: > > [V]: the initial vault UTXO(s); > [U]: the utxo produced by the "trigger transaction" during unvaulting. > > On the typical path: one or more [V] UTXOs are sent to the [U] state, and > after > a timelock set on [U] expires, [U] is spent to one or several destination= s. > Crucially, the destination outputs and amounts are already decided when > [V] is > spent into [U]. > > At any time before the funds are spent from [U], they can always be spent > by > sending them to some specified recovery path. > > There are two key elements that are part of OP_VAULT's semantics, and > could be > generalized: > > =E2=88=92 Forcing the script/amount of the next stepon > =E2=88=92 Storing some data for future Script's access (in the vault's ca= se, a hash > that commits to the final withdrawal transaction). > > CICV/COCV generalize both to arbitrary scripts (taptrees) and state > machines, > and to dynamical and witness-dependent data embedded in the pubkey of a > P2TR > output. > > ### Vault parameters > > A contract that represents a vault has the following parameters (hardcode= d > in > the script when the vault is created): > > - alternate_pk: a key that can be used any time. > - spend_delay: the relative timelock before the withdrawal can be > finalized; > - recover_pk: a pubkey for a P2TR output where funds can be sent at any > time. > > The alternate_pk is a pubkey that can optionally be used as the key-path > spending condition for both states [V] and [U]. If such a spending > condition is not > desired, it can be replaced with a NUMS point, making the key-path > unspendable. > > The spend_delay is the number of blocks that must be mined before the fin= al > withdrawal transaction > > In this example we also use an unvault_pk needed to authorize the > unvaulting > process (that is, spend [V] into [U]); this could be replaced with any > miniscript > or other conditions expressible in Script. > > ### P2TR structure for [V] (vault) > > internal key: alternate_pk > > Script 1: "trigger" > # witness: > { > , > , > 2, OP_ROLL, > OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY, > > > OP_CHECKSIG > } > > Script 2: "recover" > # witness: > { > recover_pk, > OP_0, # no data tweak > OP_0, # no taptweak > OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY, > OP_TRUE > } > > The "trigger" script requires in the witness an output index and the > ctv-hash > that describes the withdrawal transaction. > COCV forces the output to contain the ctv-hash as embedded data. > That's followed by the unvaulting condition =E2=88=92 in this example, a = simple > signature check. > > The "recover" script doesn't require any signature, and it simply forces > the output specified in the witness to be a P2TR output with recover_pk a= s > its > pubkey. > > (Omitting the "recover" script in [V] would reduce the size of the witnes= s > by > 32 bytes in the expected case, and might be preferred for some users) > > ### P2TR structure for [U] (unvaulting state) > > internal key: alternate_pk (tweaked with ctv_hash) > > Script 1: "withdrawal" > # witness: > { > OP_DUP, > > # check that the top of the stack is the > # embedded data in the current input > , OP_SWAP, > OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY, > > # Check timelock > , > OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, > OP_DROP, > > # Check that the transaction output is as expected > OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY > } > > Script 2: "recover" > # witness: > { > , > OP_0, > OP_0, > OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY, > OP_TRUE > } > > The "withdrawal" finalizes the transaction, by checking that the timelock > expired and > the outputs satisfy the CTV hash that was committed to in the previous > transaction. > > The "recover" script is identical as before. > > > ### Differences with OP_VAULT vaults > > Here I refer to the latest version of OP_VAULT at the time of writing. [5= ] > It is not a thorough analysis. > > Unlike the implementation based on OP_VAULT, the [V] utxos don't have an > option > to add an additional output that is sent back to the same exact vault. > Supporting this use case seems to require a more general way of handling > the > distribution of amounts than what I discussed in the section above: that > would > in fact need to be generalized to the case of multiple > OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY opcodes executed for the same input. > > By separating the ctv-hash (which is considered "data") from the scripts > in the > taptree, one entirely avoids the need to dynamically create taptrees and > replace leaves in the covenant-encumbered UTXOs; in fact, the taptrees of > [V] > and [U] are already set in stone when [V] utxos are created, and only the > "data" portion of [U]'s scriptPubKey is dynamically computed. In my > opinion, > this makes it substantially easier to program "state machines" that > control the > behavior of coins, of which vaults are a special case. > > I hope you'll find this interesting, and look forward to your comments. > > Salvatore Ingala > > > [1] - > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-November/021= 223.html > [2] - https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1421 > [3] - https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki > [4] - > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-September/01= 9420.html > [5] - > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/7112f308b356cdf0c51d917dbdc1b98e3062= 1f80/bip-0345.mediawiki > > > --0000000000005abd3905fab19f16 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Michael,

I can't make any claim of expertise= on the field (especially on the
other proposals that you mentioned), so= this post necessarily includes
my opinions =E2=88=92 and possibly my bi= ases.

The core functionality of MATT is quite simple, and could be a= dapted
to any version of the scripting system: basically, COCV allows to=
"embed" some data in the next output, and decide its script; = CICV
allows "reading" this data.
The design I proposed on t= aproot is surely not the only possible way,
but it's the most simple= /elegant I could come up with. Moreover, it
doesn't seem very useful= to spend time trying to get it to work on
pre-taproot Script, due to th= e obvious advantages of those ideas when
deployed on taproot (like havin= g taptrees, and all the nice properties
of Schnorr signatures).

C= ICV/COCV can certainly be considered an additional form of
introspection= : you're checking that the script of an input/output
equals a certai= n value, which is not possible in today's Script.
I think that's= generally true for all covenant proposals.

Unlike some other propos= als, MATT is not yet fully formalized, so I
generally call "MATT&qu= ot; the combination of CICV+COCV, plus some other
small set of opcodes t= hat is yet to be defined exactly. I would say it
fits in the same family= as APO/OP_CTV/OP_VAULT, per your bucketization.

The previous posts = about MATT, fraud proofs, etc. are an exploration of
the deeper things t= hat are enabled by the MATT opcodes. The claim is
that a set of changes = that is (arguably) quite small and easy to analyze
is enough to express = general smart contracts =E2=88=92 thanks to fraud proofs.
However, fraud= proofs themselves are a quite advanced application of
the new opcodes,= and are not needed for most/all of the things that
people are tr= ying to build today with the other covenant proposals.


Since you= mention Simplicity: my current understanding is that its
endeavour of r= eplacing Script with a better language is orthogonal to
the discussion a= bout what features (e.g.: introspection, covenants)
should be in = the language.

All the covenant proposals listed above are technicall= y a lot smaller
and easier to audit than both the SegWit and the Taproot= soft forks,
both in terms of code and conceptual complexity.

The= refore, if we _do_ want the features that they enable, the required
engi= neering for a soft-fork is relatively straightforward, and there is
not = much of a reason to wait for Simplicity. It will be trivial to "port&q= uot; any
constructions we might create today with covenants to Si= mplicity scripts.

If we _do not_ want those features, then th= e decision would rather be
guided by other considerations, like potentia= l risks to bitcoin caused
by the effect of those features on miners'= incentives. These
concerns are not answered by Simplicity, as far as I = understand:
you would then want to implement Simplicity _without_= those features.

Best,
Salvatore

On Mon, 1 May 2023 at 1= 6:18, Michael Folkson <= michaelfolkson@protonmail.com> wrote:
Hi Salvatore

Can you clarify for me which bucket this proposal sits? We have AP= O, CTV, OP_VAULT etc that are proposals to add additional functionality to = SegWit version 1, Tapleaf version 0 scripts. We have Simplicity that would = need a new Tapleaf version (e.g. Tapleaf version 1). And then there are CIS= A like proposals that would need a new SegWit version (e.g. SegWit version = 2). It looks to me like your proposal is in the first bucket (same as APO, = CTV etc) as it is just introducing new opcode functionality to existing scr= ipt with no deeper introspection needed but previous and current discussion= of fraud proofs, MATT frameworks etc made me initially think it was going = to require more than that.

Thanks
Michael

--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson = at protonmail.com
GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
<= span style=3D"font-family:SFMono-Regular,Consolas,"Liberation Mono&quo= t;,Menlo,monospace,monospace">
=20
=20

------- Original Message -------
On Monday, April 24th, 2023 at 20:37, Salvatore Ingala via bitcoin-= dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

Hello list,

TL;DR: the core opcodes of = MATT can build vaults with a very similar design
to OP_VAULT. Code examp= le here:

https://github.com/bitcoin-inquisitio= n/bitcoin/compare/24.0...bigspider:bitcoin-inquisition:matt-vault

In my previous emails about the MATT proposal for smart contracts in<= br>bitcoin [1], I mostly focused on proving its generality; that is, it
= allows arbitrary smart contracts thanks to fraud proofs.

While I sti= ll find this "completeness" result compelling, I spent more time<= br>thinking about the framework itself; the construction is not very intere= sting
if it turns simple things into complicated ones. Luckily, this is = not the case.
In particular, in this email we will not merkleize anythin= g (other than taptrees).

This post describes some progress into form= alizing the semantics of the core
opcodes, and demonstrates how they cou= ld be used to create vaults that seem
comparable to the ones built with = OP_VAULT [2], despite using general purpose
opcodes.

An implement= ation and some minimal tests matching the content of this
e-mail can be = found in the link above, using the bitcoin-inquisition as the
base branc= h.

Note that the linked code is not well tested and is only intended= for
exploratory and demonstrative purposes; therefore, bugs are likely = at this
stage.


##########################
# PART 1: MAT= T's core
##########################

In this section, I will d= iscuss plausible semantics for the core opcodes for MATT.

The two co= re opcodes are defined below as OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY and
OP_CHECK= OUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY.

(the initial posts named them OP_CHECK{INPUT,O= UTPUT}COVENANTVERIFY)

They enhance Script with the following capabil= ities:
- decide the taptree of the output
- embed some (dynamical= ly computed) data in the output
- access the embedded data in the curr= ent UTXO (if any)

The opcodes below are incomplete, as they only con= trol the output's Script and
not the amounts; more on that below.
Other than that, the semantics should be quite close to the "righ= t" one for
the MATT framework.


### The opcodes

case OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY:
{
// OP_= CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY is only available in Tapscript
if (sigversi= on =3D=3D SigVersion::BASE || sigversion =3D=3D SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) ret= urn set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_BAD_OPCODE);
// (x d -- )
if= (stack.size() < 2)
return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVAL= ID_STACK_OPERATION);
valtype& x =3D stacktop(-2);
valtype= & d =3D stacktop(-1);
if (x.size() !=3D 32 || d.size() !=3D 32)<= br> return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION); const XOnlyPubKey nakedXOnlyKey{Span<const unsigned char>{x.data= (), x.data() + 32}};
const uint256 data(d);
if (!execdata.m_i= nternal_key.has_value())
return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_UNK= NOWN_ERROR); // TODO
// Verify that tweak(lift_x(x), d) equals the = internal pubkey
if (!execdata.m_internal_key.value().CheckDoubleTwea= k(nakedXOnlyKey, &data, nullptr))
return set_error(serror, S= CRIPT_ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA);
popstack(stack);
popstack(stack= );
}
break;
case OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY:
{
// OP_C= HECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY is only available in Tapscript
if (sigversi= on =3D=3D SigVersion::BASE || sigversion =3D=3D SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) ret= urn set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_BAD_OPCODE);
// (out_i x taptree d = -- )
if (stack.size() < 4)
return set_error(serror, SC= RIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION);
int out_i =3D CScriptNum(stacktop= (-4), fRequireMinimal).getint();
valtype& x =3D stacktop(-3); valtype& taptree =3D stacktop(-2);
valtype& d =3D stack= top(-1);
auto outps =3D checker.GetTxvOut();
// Return error = if the evaluation context is unavailable
if (!outps)
retu= rn set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); // TODO
if (x.size()= !=3D 32 || taptree.size() !=3D 32 || (d.size() !=3D 0 && d.size() = !=3D 32))
return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPER= ATION);
if (out_i < 0 || out_i >=3D (int)outps->size())
= return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION);
= const XOnlyPubKey nakedXOnlyKey{Span<const unsigned char>{x.data(),= x.data() + 32}};
const uint256 data(d);
const uint256 *data_= ptr =3D (d.size() =3D=3D 0 ? nullptr : &data);
const uint256 mer= kle_tree(taptree);
CScript scriptPubKey =3D outps->at(out_i).scri= ptPubKey;
if (scriptPubKey.size() !=3D 1 + 1 + 32 || scriptPubKey[0]= !=3D OP_1 || scriptPubKey[1] !=3D 32)
return set_error(serror, = SCRIPT_ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA);
const XOnlyPubKey outputXOnlyKey{Span= <const unsigned char>{scriptPubKey.data() + 2, scriptPubKey.data() + = 34}};
// Verify that taptweak(tweak(lift_x(x), d), taptree) equals t= he internal pubkey
if (!outputXOnlyKey.CheckDoubleTweak(nakedXOnlyKe= y, data_ptr, &merkle_tree))
return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_= ERR_WRONGCONTRACTDATA);
popstack(stack);
popstack(stack);
= popstack(stack);
popstack(stack);
}
break;

#= ## Commentary

CheckDoubleTweak function (implemented in the branch) = gets an x-only pubkey,
optionally some data, and optionally taptree'= s merkle root.
It verifies that the x-only pubkey being tested equals th= e given naked pubkey,
optionally tweaked with the embedded data, optiona= lly tweaked with the tagged
hash of the merkle tree per BIP-0341 [3].Making both the tweaks optional allows to simplify the code, and also to = obtain
more compact scripts in some spending paths.

In wor= ds:

- OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: verify that the current input'= ;s internal key
contains some embedded data (which would typically be = passed through the
witness stack)
- OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY: v= erify that a given output is a certain P2TR
output script containing t= he desired embedded data.

TBD if the tweaking used for the embedded = data tweak should use a tagged hash;
omitted for simplicity in this demo= implementation.

### Amount preservation

In the code above an= d in the linked demo implementation, the opcodes only
operate on the scr= iptPubkey; a complete implementation would want to make sure
that amount= s are correctly preserved.

The most direct and general way to addres= s this would be to allow direct
introspection on the output amounts. Thi= s has the complication that output
amounts require 64-bits arithmetics, = as discussed in the context of other
proposals, for example: [4].
One more limited approach that works well for many interesting contractsis that of the deferred checks, implemented in OP_VAULT [2].
The idea = is that all the amounts of the inputs that commit to the same output
scr= ipt with OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY are added together, and the scriptinterpreter requires that the amount of that output is not smaller than th= e
total amount of those inputs. This check is therefore transaction-wide= rather
than being tested during the input's script evaluation.
<= br>This behaviour is adequate for vaults and likely suitable for many other=
applications; however, it's not the most general approach. I didn&#= 39;t try to
implement it yet, and defer the decision on the best approac= h to a later time.

### Extensions

The opcodes above are not e= nough for the full generality of MATT: one would
need to add an opcode l= ike OP_SHA256CAT to allow the data embedding to commit
to multiple piece= s of data.
This is not used in today's post, therefore I left it out= of these code examples.

It would be easy to extend OP_CHECKOUTPUTCO= NTRACTVERIFY to also apply for
an arbitrary input (typically, different = from the currently executed one); there
are likely use cases for that, a= llowing to define contracts with more complex
cross-input semantics, but= I preferred to keep things simple.

Of course, one could also entire= ly replace CICV/COCV with generic full
introspection on inputs/output= 9;s program, plus opcodes for elliptic curve math
and tagged hashes.
=

##########################
# PART 2: Vaults with MATT
####= ######################

In the rest of this post, I will document the= first attempt at creating a vault
using the opcodes described.

W= hile not an attempt at cloning exactly the functionality of OP_VAULT [2],it borrows heavily from the excellent work that was done there.

In= particular, it also inherits the choice of using OP_CTV as a primitive,building on top of the bitcoin-inquisition's current branch that has a= lready
merged OP_CTV. Reasonable vaults would be possible without CTV, b= ut they
would be less efficient, particularly in the case of sending to = many addresses
in a single unvaulting flow.

### Distilling OP_VAU= LT

Abstracting from the implementation details, I mentally model a v= ault as a
simple state machine with 2 states: [V] and [U]:

[V]: t= he initial vault UTXO(s);
[U]: the utxo produced by the "trigger tr= ansaction" during unvaulting.

On the typical path: one or more = [V] UTXOs are sent to the [U] state, and after
a timelock set on [U] exp= ires, [U] is spent to one or several destinations.
Crucially, the destin= ation outputs and amounts are already decided when [V] is
spent into [U]= .

At any time before the funds are spent from [U], they can always b= e spent by
sending them to some specified recovery path.

There ar= e two key elements that are part of OP_VAULT's semantics, and could be<= br>generalized:

=E2=88=92 Forcing the script/amount of the next step= on
=E2=88=92 Storing some data for future Script's access (in the va= ult's case, a hash
that commits to the final withdrawal transacti= on).

CICV/COCV generalize both to arbitrary scripts (taptrees) and s= tate machines,
and to dynamical and witness-dependent data embedded in t= he pubkey of a P2TR
output.

### Vault parameters

A contrac= t that represents a vault has the following parameters (hardcoded in
the= script when the vault is created):

- alternate_pk: a key that can b= e used any time.
- spend_delay: the relative timelock before the withdra= wal can be finalized;
- recover_pk: a pubkey for a P2TR output where fun= ds can be sent at any time.

The alternate_pk is a pubkey that can op= tionally be used as the key-path
spending condition for both states [V] = and [U]. If such a spending condition is not
desired, it can be replace= d with a NUMS point, making the key-path unspendable.

The spend_dela= y is the number of blocks that must be mined before the final
withdrawal= transaction

In this example we also use an unvault_pk needed to aut= horize the unvaulting
process (that is, spend [V] into [U]); this could = be replaced with any miniscript
or other conditions expressible in Scrip= t.

### P2TR structure for [V] (vault)

internal key: alternate= _pk

Script 1: "trigger"
# witness: <out_i>= ; <ctv-hash>
{
<alternate_pk>= ;,
<merkle root of U's taptree>,
2, OP_ROLL,
= OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY,

<unvault_pk>
OP_CHEC= KSIG
}

Script 2: "recover"
# witness:= <out_i>
{
recover_pk,
OP_0= , # no data tweak
OP_0, = # no taptweak
OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY,
OP_TRUE
= }

The "trigger" script requires in the witness an o= utput index and the ctv-hash
that describes the withdrawal transaction.<= br>COCV forces the output to contain the ctv-hash as embedded data.
That= 's followed by the unvaulting condition =E2=88=92 in this example, a si= mple
signature check.

The "recover" script doesn't = require any signature, and it simply forces
the output specified in the = witness to be a P2TR output with recover_pk as its
pubkey.

(Omitt= ing the "recover" script in [V] would reduce the size of the witn= ess by
32 bytes in the expected case, and might be preferred for some us= ers)

### P2TR structure for [U] (unvaulting state)

internal k= ey: alternate_pk (tweaked with ctv_hash)

Script 1: "withdrawal&= quot;
# witness: <ctv_hash>
{<= br> OP_DUP,

# check that the top of the stack is the
#= embedded data in the current input
<alternate_pk>, OP_SWAP, OP_CHECKINPUTCONTRACTVERIFY,

# Check timelock
<s= pend_delay>,
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY,
OP_DROP,

#= Check that the transaction output is as expected
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVE= RIFY
}

Script 2: "recover"
# witness:= <out_i>
{
<recover_pk>,
= OP_0,
OP_0,
OP_CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY,
OP_TRUE<= br>}

The "withdrawal" finalizes the transaction, by= checking that the timelock expired and
the outputs satisfy the C= TV hash that was committed to in the previous transaction.

The "= ;recover" script is identical as before.


### Differences wi= th OP_VAULT vaults

Here I refer to the latest version of OP_VAULT at= the time of writing. [5]
It is not a thorough analysis.

Unlike t= he implementation based on OP_VAULT, the [V] utxos don't have an option=
to add an additional output that is sent back to the same exact vault.<= br>Supporting this use case seems to require a more general way of handling= the
distribution of amounts than what I discussed in the section above:= that would
in fact need to be generalized to the case of multiple
OP= _CHECKOUTPUTCONTRACTVERIFY opcodes executed for the same input.

By s= eparating the ctv-hash (which is considered "data") from the scri= pts in the
taptree, one entirely avoids the need to dynamically create t= aptrees and
replace leaves in the covenant-encumbered UTXOs; in fact, th= e taptrees of [V]
and [U] are already set in stone when [V] utxos are cr= eated, and only the
"data" portion of [U]'s scriptPubKey i= s dynamically computed. In my opinion,
this makes it substantially easie= r to program "state machines" that control the
behavior of coi= ns, of which vaults are a special case.

I hope you'll find this = interesting, and look forward to your comments.


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