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From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= <jtimon@jtimon.cc>
Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2017 05:53:00 +0200
Message-ID: <CABm2gDqXXvNCZ7EyKuwudB5J0YDX7hNnXHPZNxTO0_JsM+yNHg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
	Mark <mark@friedenbach.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="f403045f6d64ec220c055a60136d"
Cc: Daniele Pinna <daniele.pinna@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets
Precedence: list

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I really don't see how this "outlier behaviour" can be prevented. I think
it would be the norm even with your proposed "fix". Perhaps I'm missing
something too.

On 29 Sep 2017 5:24 pm, "Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> This is correct. Under assumptions of a continuous mempool model however
> this should be considered the outlier behavior, other than a little bit of
> empty space at the end, now and then. A maximum fee rate calculated as a
> filter over past block rates could constrain this outlier behavior from
> ever happening too.
>
> > On Sep 29, 2017, at 3:43 AM, Daniele Pinna <daniele.pinna@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Maybe I'm getting this wrong but wouldn't this scheme imply that a miner
> is incentivized to limit the amount of transactions in a block to capture
> the maximum fee of the ones included?
> >
> > As an example, mined blocks currently carry ~0.8 btc in fees right now.
> If I were to submit a transaction paying 1 btc in maximal money fees, then
> the miner would be incentivized to include my transaction alone to avoid
> that lower fee paying transactions reduce the amount of fees he can earn
> from my transaction alone. This would mean that I could literally clog the
> network by paying 1btc every ten minutes.
> >
> > Am I missing something?
> >
> > Daniele
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"auto">I really don&#39;t see how this &quot;outlier behaviour&q=
uot; can be prevented. I think it would be the norm even with your proposed=
 &quot;fix&quot;. Perhaps I&#39;m missing something too.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 29 Sep 2017 5:24 pm, &quot;=
Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@li=
sts.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This is correct. =
Under assumptions of a continuous mempool model however this should be cons=
idered the outlier behavior, other than a little bit of empty space at the =
end, now and then. A maximum fee rate calculated as a filter over past bloc=
k rates could constrain this outlier behavior from ever happening too.<br>
<br>
&gt; On Sep 29, 2017, at 3:43 AM, Daniele Pinna &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:danie=
le.pinna@gmail.com">daniele.pinna@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Maybe I&#39;m getting this wrong but wouldn&#39;t this scheme imply th=
at a miner is incentivized to limit the amount of transactions in a block t=
o capture the maximum fee of the ones included?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As an example, mined blocks currently carry ~0.8 btc in fees right now=
. If I were to submit a transaction paying 1 btc in maximal money fees, the=
n the miner would be incentivized to include my transaction alone to avoid =
that lower fee paying transactions reduce the amount of fees he can earn fr=
om my transaction alone. This would mean that I could literally clog the ne=
twork by paying 1btc every ten minutes.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Am I missing something?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Daniele<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org=
/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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