Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1X8Is9-0003Wh-Sv for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 19 Jul 2014 00:51:33 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.219.46 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.219.46; envelope-from=el33th4x0r@gmail.com; helo=mail-oa0-f46.google.com; Received: from mail-oa0-f46.google.com ([209.85.219.46]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1X8Is8-00076r-ES for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 19 Jul 2014 00:51:33 +0000 Received: by mail-oa0-f46.google.com with SMTP id m1so4478322oag.33 for ; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 17:51:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.60.176.10 with SMTP id ce10mr12265454oec.8.1405731086956; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 17:51:26 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.76.23.193 with HTTP; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 17:51:06 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: =?UTF-8?Q?Emin_G=C3=BCn_Sirer?= Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 17:51:06 -0700 Message-ID: To: Jeff Garzik Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0118313a16899e04fe81461f X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (el33th4x0r[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1X8Is8-00076r-ES Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Decentralizing ming X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2014 00:51:34 -0000 --089e0118313a16899e04fe81461f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I thought I'd chime in and point out some research results that might help. Even if they don't, there is a cool underlying technique that some of you might find interesting. The problem being tackled here is very similar to "set reconciliation," where peer A thinks that the set of transactions that should be in the block is S_A, and peer B has actually included set S_B, and S_A and S_B are expected to not differ much. Ideally, one would like the communication complexity between A and B to be O(delta), not O(S_B) as it is right now. And ideally, one would like B to send a single message to A, and for A to figure out the difference between the two sets, without any lengthy back and forth communication. In essence, I would like to give you some magical packet that is pretty small and communicates just the delta between what you and I know. This paper from Cornell describes a scheme for achieving this: Yaron Minsky, Ari Trachtenberg, Richard Zippel: Set reconciliation with nearly optimal communication complexity. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 49(9): 2213-2218 (2003) http://ipsit.bu.edu/documents/ieee-it3-web.pdf Those of you looking for a TL;DR should read the intro and then skip to page 8 for the example. The underlying trick is very cool, comes from the peer-to-peer/gossip literature, and it is underused. It'd be really cool if it could be applied to this problem to reduce the size of the packets. This approach has three benefits over the Bloom filter approach (if I understand the Bloom filter idea correctly): (1) Bloom filters require packets that are still O(S_A), (2) Bloom filters are probabilistic, so require extra complications when there is a hash collision. In the worst case, A might get confused about which transaction B actually included, which would lead to a fork. (I am not sure if I followed the Bloom filter idea fully -- this may not happen with the proposal, but it's a possibility with a naive Bloom filter implementation) (3) Bloom filters are interactive, so when A detects that B has included some transactions that A does not know about, it has to send a message to figure out what those transactions are. Set reconciliation is O(delta), non-probabilistic, and non-interactive. The naive version requires that one have some idea of the size of the delta, but I think the paper has some discussion of how to handle the delta estimate. I have not gone through the full exercise of actually applying this trick to the Bitcoin p2p protocol yet, but wanted to draw your attention to it. If someone is interested in applying this stuff to Bitcoin, I'd be happy to communicate further off list. - egs On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 6:44 AM, Jeff Garzik wrote: > Yes. That, and several other things. If you can figure out how to > propagate a block without re-propagating all the transactions everyone > already has, you address the large-blocks-slower-to-relay problem, and > additionally create an incentive for miners to mine blocks consisting > of publicly broadcast transactions (versus a bunch of secret ones > mined with secret agreements). > > Democratizing transaction selection takes a bit of power away from the > miners and gives it back to the network at large. GBT is another > piece of that puzzle. > > > On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 6:43 AM, Mike Hearn wrote: > > Oops, sorry, I see the subject line changed. This is what I get for > working > > down the thread list top to bottom :) > > > > I think the best path forward now is to finish off getblocktemplate > support > > in the various tools so it's possible to pool for payout purposes without > > giving up control of block creation modulo the coinbase. Combined with > the > > recent sipa performance enhancing goodness, it would hopefully persuade > some > > non-trivial chunk of hashpower to go back to running their own node and > > start the process of turning pools merely into payout trackers rather > than > > block selectors. > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> > >> Jeff, I think the message you're replying to got clipped. > >> > >> Satoshi's only comment AFAIK on the topic of GPU mining was to wish for > a > >> gentlemen's agreement to postpone it as long as possible, to help make > sure > >> the distribution of coins was as even as possible. Indeed this predated > >> pooled mining. > >> > > > > > > -- > Jeff Garzik > Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist > BitPay, Inc. https://bitpay.com/ > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --089e0118313a16899e04fe81461f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I thought I'd chime in and point out some research res= ults that might help.
Even if they don't, there is a cool underlyin= g technique that some of you
might find interesting.

The problem being tackled here is very similar to "set reconcilia= tion," where
peer A thinks that the set of transactions that= should be in the block is S_A,
and peer B has actually included = set S_B, and S_A and S_B are expected
to not differ much. Ideally, one would like the communication complexi= ty
between A and B to be O(delta), not O(S_B) as it is righ= t now. And ideally,
one would like B to send a single message to = A, and for A to figure out the
difference between the two sets, without any lengthy back and forth=C2= =A0
communication. In essence, I would like to give you some magi= cal packet
that is pretty small and communicates just the delta b= etween what you and
I know.

This paper from Cornell describes a s= cheme for achieving this:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Yaron Minsky, Ari Trachten= berg, Richard Zippel: Set reconciliation with nearly optimal communication = complexity. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 49(9): 2213-2218 (2003)=

Those of you looking for a TL;DR should read the intro and then skip= to
page 8 for the example. The underlying trick is very cool, comes from = the
peer-to-peer/gossip literature, and it is underused. It'd= be really cool if it
could be applied to this problem to reduce = the size of the packets.

This approach has three benefits over the Bloom filter = approach (if I=C2=A0
understand the Bloom filter idea correctly):= =C2=A0

(1) Bloom filters require packets that are = still O(S_A),=C2=A0

(2) Bloom filters are probabilistic, so require extra c= omplications
when there is a hash collision. In the worst case, A= might get confused
about which transaction B actually included, = which would lead to a=C2=A0
fork. (I am not sure if I followed the Bloom filter idea fully -- this= may=C2=A0
not happen with the proposal, but it's a possibili= ty with a naive Bloom
filter implementation)

(3) Bloom filters are interactive, so when A detects that B has included
some transactions that A does not know about, it has to send a mess= age
to figure out what those transactions are.=C2=A0
Set reconciliation is O(delta), non-probabilistic, and non-inter= active. The
naive version requires that one have some idea of the= size of the delta,
but I think the paper has some discussion of = how to handle the delta=C2=A0
estimate.

I have not gone through the full ex= ercise of actually applying this trick to
the Bitcoin p2p protoco= l yet, but wanted to draw your attention to it.=C2=A0
If someone = is interested in applying this stuff to Bitcoin, I'd be happy=C2=A0
to communicate further off list.

- egs
<= div>


On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 6:44 AM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@bitpay= .com> wrote:
Yes. =C2=A0That, and several other things. = =C2=A0If you can figure out how to
propagate a block without re-propagating all the transactions everyone
already has, you address the large-blocks-slower-to-relay problem, and
additionally create an incentive for miners to mine blocks consisting
of publicly broadcast transactions (versus a bunch of secret ones
mined with secret agreements).

Democratizing transaction selection takes a bit of power away from the
miners and gives it back to the network at large. =C2=A0GBT is another
piece of that puzzle.


On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 6:43 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> Oops, sorry, I see the subject line changed. This is what I get for wo= rking
> down the thread list top to bottom :)
>
> I think the best path forward now is to finish off getblocktemplate su= pport
> in the various tools so it's possible to pool for payout purposes = without
> giving up control of block creation modulo the coinbase. Combined with= the
> recent sipa performance enhancing goodness, it would hopefully persuad= e some
> non-trivial chunk of hashpower to go back to running their own node an= d
> start the process of turning pools merely into payout trackers rather = than
> block selectors.
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>>
>> Jeff, I think the message you're replying to got clipped.
>>
>> Satoshi's only comment AFAIK on the topic of GPU mining was to= wish for a
>> gentlemen's agreement to postpone it as long as possible, to h= elp make sure
>> the distribution of coins was as even as possible. Indeed this pre= dated
>> pooled mining.
>>
>



--
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0https://bitpay.com/

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
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search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/b= ds
_______________________________________________
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https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

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