Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XAiGm-0002YZ-Kg for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:22:56 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.177 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.177; envelope-from=natanael.l@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f177.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f177.google.com ([209.85.212.177]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1XAiGk-0000SL-Iw for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:22:56 +0000 Received: by mail-wi0-f177.google.com with SMTP id ho1so1272330wib.16 for ; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:22:47 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.80.70 with SMTP id p6mr6834366wix.22.1406305366319; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:22:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.24.132 with HTTP; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:22:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.24.132 with HTTP; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:22:46 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <53D1AF6C.7010802@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:22:46 +0200 Message-ID: From: Natanael To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d04428358ce2dd804ff06fbdc X-Spam-Score: 0.4 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (natanael.l[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 1.0 FREEMAIL_REPLY From and body contain different freemails X-Headers-End: 1XAiGk-0000SL-Iw Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Time X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:22:56 -0000 --f46d04428358ce2dd804ff06fbdc Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Probably because the network isn't designed for interactive proofs. Most interactive algoritms AFAICT requires that some machine holds a secret state (or at least continuous and untampered state, but you still need to verify you're falling to the right machine), otherwise the machine can be mimicked and "rewound" to earlier states. Without a challenge-response that can't be faked, you've got problems. There's no trusted machines here that you can rely on. The certainty of having the right blockchain is a statistical one over longer periods of time, not enough for a PIN you want verified right now. So you can always be shown an old copy, and if your node isn't up to date yet then it can also be shown fake chains further into the future. Maybe you could throw in some kind of Secure Multiparty Computation among the miners to enable challenge-response, with state saved in the blockchain (so it can't be rolled back), but that would be fragile. How do you select what nodes may participate? How do you prevent the secret state from leaking? And performance would be absolutely horrible, and reliability is a huge problem. Den 25 jul 2014 18:03 skrev "Mike Hearn" : > Sorry, you're right. I'd have hoped a delay that doubles on failure each > time up to some max would be good enough, relying on the p2p network to > unlock a PIN feels weird, but I can't really quantify why or what's wrong > with it so I guess it's just me :-) > > > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote: > >> The problem is if someone moves system time forward between app launches. >> The lockout period doesn't have to be all that precise, it just makes you >> wait for the next block, then 5, then 25, and so on. Using a well >> known time server over https would also be a good option, but the wallet >> app already has the chain height anyway. >> >> >> On Friday, July 25, 2014, Mike Hearn wrote: >> >>> Given that the speed at which the block chain advances is kind of >>> unpredictable, I'd think it might be better to just record the time to disk >>> when a PIN attempt is made and if you observe time going backwards, refuse >>> to allow more attempts until it's advanced past the previous attempt. >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:56 AM, Aaron Voisine >>> wrote: >>> >>>> It's based on the block height, not the block's timestamp. If you have >>>> access to the device and the phone itself is not pin locked, then you >>>> can jailbreak it and get access to the wallet seed that way. A pin >>>> locked device however is reasonably secure as the filesystem is >>>> hardware aes encrypted to a combination of pin+uuid. This was just an >>>> easy way to prevent multiple pin guesses by changing system time in >>>> settings, so that isn't the weakest part of the security model. >>>> >>>> Aaron Voisine >>>> breadwallet.com >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:21 PM, William Yager >>>> wrote: >>>> > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:39 PM, Gregory Maxwell >>> > >>>> > wrote: >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> Is breadwallet tamper resistant & zero on tamper hardware? otherwise >>>> >> this sounds like security theater.... I attach a debugger to the >>>> >> process (or modify the program) and ignore the block sourced time. >>>> >> >>>> > >>>> > It's an iOS application. I would imagine it is substantially more >>>> difficult >>>> > to attach to a process (which, at the very least, requires root, and >>>> perhaps >>>> > other things on iOS) than to convince the device to change its system >>>> time. >>>> > >>>> > That said, the security benefits might not be too substantial. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index >>>> and >>>> > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck >>>> > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code >>>> > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. >>>> > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds >>>> > _______________________________________________ >>>> > Bitcoin-development mailing list >>>> > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>>> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and >>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck >>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code >>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. >>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list >>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> Aaron Voisine >> breadwallet.com >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --f46d04428358ce2dd804ff06fbdc Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Probably because the network isn't designed for interact= ive proofs. Most interactive algoritms AFAICT requires that some machine ho= lds a secret state (or at least continuous and untampered state, but you st= ill need to verify you're falling to the right machine), otherwise the = machine can be mimicked and "rewound" to earlier states. Without = a challenge-response that can't be faked, you've got problems.

There's no trusted machines here that you can rely on. T= he certainty of having the right blockchain is a statistical one over longe= r periods of time, not enough for a PIN you want verified right now. So you= can always be shown an old copy, and if your node isn't up to date yet= then it can also be shown fake chains further into the future.

Maybe you could throw in some kind of Secure Multiparty Comp= utation among the miners to enable challenge-response, with state saved in = the blockchain (so it can't be rolled back), but that would be fragile.= How do you select what nodes may participate? How do you prevent the secre= t state from leaking? And performance would be absolutely horrible, and rel= iability is a huge problem.

Den 25 jul 2014 18:03 skrev "Mike Hearn&quo= t; <mike@plan99.net>:
Sorry, you're right. I'd have hoped a delay that d= oubles on failure each time up to some max would be good enough, relying on= the p2p network to unlock a PIN feels weird, but I can't really quanti= fy why or what's wrong with it so I guess it's just me :-)


On Fri, Jul 2= 5, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:=
The problem is if someone moves system time forward between app launches. T= he lockout period doesn't have to be all that precise, it just makes yo= u wait for the next block, then 5, then 25, and so on. Using a well known= =C2=A0time server over=C2=A0https would also be a good option,= but the wallet app already has the chain height anyway.


On Friday, July 25, 2014, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
Given that the speed at which the block chain advances is kind of unpredict= able, I'd think it might be better to just record the time to disk when= a PIN attempt is made and if you observe time going backwards, refuse to a= llow more attempts until it's advanced past the previous attempt.


On Fri, Jul 2= 5, 2014 at 7:56 AM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.co= m> wrote:
It's based on the block height, not the block's timestamp. If you h= ave
access to the device and the phone itself is not pin locked, then you
can jailbreak it and get access to the wallet seed that way. A pin
locked device however is reasonably secure as the filesystem is
hardware aes encrypted to a combination of pin+uuid. This was just an
easy way to prevent multiple pin guesses by changing system time in
settings, so that isn't the weakest part of the security model.

Aaron Voisine
breadwallet.com


On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:21 PM, William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com<= /a>> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:39 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmai= l.com>
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Is breadwallet tamper resistant & zero on tamper hardware? oth= erwise
>> this sounds like security theater.... I attach a debugger to the >> process (or modify the program) and ignore the block sourced time.=
>>
>
> It's an iOS application. I would imagine it is substantially more = difficult
> to attach to a process (which, at the very least, requires root, and p= erhaps
> other things on iOS) than to convince the device to change its system = time.
>
> That said, the security benefits might not be too substantial.
>
> ------------------------------------------------= ------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index an= d
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest cod= e
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/= sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitco= in-development
>

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/b= ds
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment



--

A= aron Voisine
breadw= allet.com


-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -------
Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/b= ds
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-develo= pment@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

--f46d04428358ce2dd804ff06fbdc--