Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 14:17:36 +0000
To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
From: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
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Hi ZmnSCPxj,


> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must=
 be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a ma=
jority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions wi=
thout community consensus.
> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier =
to deploy.

`consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] can=
 be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to=
 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure =
if this will be a soft fork.

I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and pre=
dictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. M=
aybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being =
'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.

[1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L66
[2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply


/dev/fd0

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------- Original Message -------
On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-d=
ev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> Good morning e, and list,
>
> > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to w=
hich I was responding.
> >
> > Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even if =
it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produc=
ed, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointed =
out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as=
 it does not with any other good.
> >
> > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship =
resistance, not on price.
>
>
> To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emis=
sion"):
>
> * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and =
one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible o=
r zero.
> * Now consider a censoring miner.
> * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner=
 loses out on the fees of those transactions.
> * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from th=
e censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
> * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s small relative to the total earnings of each block.
> * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s large relative to the total earnings of each block.
> * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains fro=
m the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situati=
on.
>
> Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy er=
odes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.
> But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved ar=
e censored or not censored.
> Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not c=
ensor coin movements.
> Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.
>
>
> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must=
 be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a ma=
jority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions wi=
thout community consensus.
> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier =
to deploy.
>
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
> _______________________________________________
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