Date: Sat, 09 Jul 2022 21:59:06 +0000
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
Precedence: list

Good morning e, and list,

> Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to whi=
ch I was responding.
>
> Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even if it=
 was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced=
, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointed ou=
t. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as i=
t does not with any other good.
>
> The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship re=
sistance, not on price.

To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emissi=
on"):

* Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and on=
e which *had* a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible o=
r zero.
* Now consider a censoring miner.
  * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner=
 loses out on the fees of those transactions.
  * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from th=
e censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
  * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s small relative to the total earnings of each block.
  * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i=
s large relative to the total earnings of each block.
  * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains fro=
m the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situati=
on.

Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erod=
es the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.
But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are =
censored or not censored.
Thus, there is no incentive, considering *only* the block subsidy, to not c=
ensor coin movements.
Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.


Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy *must*=
 be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a ma=
jority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions wi=
thout community consensus.
Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to=
 deploy.


Regards,
ZmnSCPxj