The economic majority is defined as th= e will of those who actually use Bitcoin as a payment system.

= No matter what the miners want, if users and merchants refuse to accept the= ir fork, then the fork loses and cannot be considered the "true" = bitcoin fork.

The problem is that it is easy to measure a mine= r vote.=C2=A0 The economic majority is not so easy.

The relati= ve value of two forks could be compared by adding a system similar colored = coins.

These contracts could be added with a soft fork li= ke the P2SH one.

OP_IF
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <fork_id= 1> <fork_id2> OP_DROP OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash script 1> OP_= EQUAL
OP_ENDIF

OP_IF
=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 <fork_id3&g= t; OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash script 2> OP_EQUAL

OP_ENDIF=

This works like P2SH and is template matching.=C2=A0 You= can have as many entries as you want.

In the example, th= e output can be spent on fork 1 and fork 2 by the owner of <hash script = 1> and can be spent on fork 3 by the owner of <hash script 2>.
=

Until the deadline, the value on each fork must be preserved= when spending the output.=C2=A0 If you provide the key(s), you are allowed= to consolidate entries.=C2=A0 You can also consolidate multiple outputs to= the same key even if you don't have the key.

<= div>This means that split outputs are a little more hassle to use and the t= ransactions are larger.=C2=A0 This doesn't matter much, since measuring= the relative value of the two sub-coins only requires some of them to be t= raded.

If someone wants to propose a hard fork= , they create a new fork id and deadline and release software that implemen= ts the hard fork at the given deadline (no miner vote needed).

To prevent spam, there could be a cost to create a fork-id (BTC paid = to OP_RETURN) and the deadline could have a max time in the future (say 2 y= ears).

After the deadline, core will allow con= version of outputs that pay to the core fork-id (probably 1) to be converte= d into unencumbered outputs by the person with the core-id script.=C2=A0 Li= kewise, the fork software will allow outputs that pay to the fork id to be = converted.=C2=A0 Legacy bitcoin that haven't been "split" wil= l be spendable on both sides equally.

This means that use= rs can convert x legacy bitcoin into x fork-bitcoins and x core-bitcoins in= advance of the fork.

This means that Exchanges could sup= port trading between the two.=C2=A0 The side that trades with the most valu= e is the one that is supported by the economic majority.

= As it becomes clear which side is going to win, the price of coins on the l= osing side should drop.=C2=A0 It is unlikely that the two would stay at exa= ctly the same value without one side winning.

Users who w= ant to to use the losing rules are free to do so but the economic majority = will have made its decision.