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From: Chris Priest <cp368202@ohiou.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 16:03:16 -0700
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To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>, 
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capital Efficient Honeypots w/ "Scorched Earth"
 Doublespending Protection
Precedence: list

How does your system prevent against insider attacks? How do you know
the money is stolen by someone who compromised server #4, and not
stolen by the person who set up server #4? It is my understanding
these days most attacks are inside jobs.

On 8/24/16, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 01:37:34AM +1000, Matthew Roberts wrote:
>> Really nice idea. So its like a smart contract that incentivizes
>> publication that a server has been hacked? I also really like how the
>> funding has been handled -- with all the coins stored in the same address
>> and then each server associated with a unique signature. That way, you
>> don't have to split up all the coins among every server and reduce the
>> incentive for an attacker yet you can still identify which server was
>> hacked.
>>
>> It would be nice if after the attacker broke into the server that they
>> were
>> also incentivized to act on the information as soon as possible
>> (revealing
>> early on when the server was compromised.) I suppose you could split up
>> the
>> coins into different outputs that could optimally be redeemed by the
>> owner
>> at different points in the future -- so they're incentivzed to act lest
>
> Remember that it's _always_ possible for the owner to redeem the coins at
> any
> time, and there's no way to prevent that.
>
> The incentive for the intruder to collect the honeypot in a timely manner
> is
> simple: once they've broken in, the moment the honeypot owner learns about
> the
> compromise they have every reason to attempt to recover the funds, so the
> intruder needs to act as fast as possible to maximize their chances of
> being
> rewarded.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>