Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Sh1a1-0000Ro-JA for Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Jun 2012 16:47:01 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 74.125.82.175 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.175; envelope-from=socrates1024@gmail.com; helo=mail-we0-f175.google.com; Received: from mail-we0-f175.google.com ([74.125.82.175]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Sh1Zy-0004Af-F9 for Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Jun 2012 16:47:01 +0000 Received: by werg55 with SMTP id g55so5216936wer.34 for ; Tue, 19 Jun 2012 09:46:52 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.180.94.4 with SMTP id cy4mr4901249wib.2.1340124412181; Tue, 19 Jun 2012 09:46:52 -0700 (PDT) Sender: socrates1024@gmail.com Received: by 10.217.2.207 with HTTP; Tue, 19 Jun 2012 09:46:52 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 12:46:52 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: xRkqSG3FKtSodSxG-I6fV-SpS24 Message-ID: From: Andrew Miller To: Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Spam-Score: -1.2 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (socrates1024[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (socrates1024[at]gmail.com) 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Sh1Zy-0004Af-F9 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Ultimate Blockchain Compression w/ trust-free lite node X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 16:47:01 -0000 > Peter Todd wrote: > My solution was to simply state that vertexes that happened to cause the > tree to be unbalanced would be discarded, and set the depth of inbalance > such that this would be extremely unlikely to happen by accident. I'd > rather see someone come up with something better though. Here is a simpler solution. (most of this message repeats the content of my reply to the forum) Suppose we were talking about a binary search tree, rather than a Merkle tree. It's important to balance a binary search tree, so that the worst-case maximum length from the root to a leaf is bounded by O(log N). AVL trees were the original algorithm to do this, Red-Black trees are also popular, and there are many similar methods. All involve storing some form of 'balancing metadata' at each node. In a RedBlack tree, this is a single bit (red or black). Every operation on these trees, including search, inserting, deleting, and rebalancing, requires a worst-case effort of O(log N). Any (acyclic) recursive data structure can be Merkle-ized, simply by adding a hash of the child node alongside each link/pointer. This way, you can verify the data for each node very naturally, as you traverse the structure. In fact, as long as a lite-client knows the O(1) root hash, the rest of the storage burden can be delegated to an untrusted helper server. Suppose a lite-client wants to insert and rebalance its tree. This requires accessing at most O(log N) nodes. The client can request only the data relevant to these nodes, and it knows the hash for each chunk of data in advance of accessing it. After computing the updated root hash, the client can even discard the data it processed. This technique has been well discussed in the academic literature, e.g. [1,2], although since I am not aware of any existing implementation, I made my own, intended as an explanatory aid: https://github.com/amiller/redblackmerkle/blob/master/redblack.py [1] Certificate Revocation and Update Naor and Nissim. 1998 http://static.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/nissim/nissim.pdf [2] A General Model for Authenticated Data Structures Martel, Nuckolls, Devanbu, Michael Gertz, Kwong, Stubblebine. 2004 http://truthsayer.cs.ucdavis.edu/algorithmica.pdf -- Andrew Miller