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From: Bram Cohen <bram@chia.net>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 14:54:10 -0800
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To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Improving RBF policy
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Gloria Zhao wrote:

>
> This post discusses limitations of current Bitcoin Core RBF policy and
> attempts to start a conversation about how we can improve it,
> summarizing some ideas that have been discussed. Please reply if you
> have any new input on issues to be solved and ideas for improvement!
>

Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF is normal behavior and
disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is mostly there to appease
some people's delusions that zeroconf is a thing? It seems a bit overdue to
disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of always assuming it's on.


> - **Incentive Compatibility**: Ensure that our RBF policy would not
>   accept replacement transactions which would decrease fee profits
>   of a miner. In general, if our mempool policy deviates from what is
> economically rational, it's likely that the transactions in our
> mempool will not match the ones in miners' mempools, making our
> fee estimation, compact block relay, and other mempool-dependent
> functions unreliable. Incentive-incompatible policy may also
> encourage transaction submission through routes other than the p2p
> network, harming censorship-resistance and privacy of Bitcoin payments.
>

There are two different common regimes which result in different
incentivized behavior. One of them is that there's more than a block's
backlog in the mempool in which case between two conflicting transactions
the one with the higher fee rate should win. In the other case where there
isn't a whole block's worth of transactions the one with higher total value
should win. It would be nice to have consolidated logic which handles both,
it seems the issue has to do with the slope of the supply/demand curve
which in the first case is gentle enough to keep the one transaction from
hitting the rate but in the second one is basically infinite.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Gloria Zhao wrote:</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
This post discusses limitations of current Bitcoin Core RBF policy and<br>
attempts to start a conversation about how we can improve it,<br>
summarizing some ideas that have been discussed. Please reply if you<br>
have any new input on issues to be solved and ideas for improvement!<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF =
is normal behavior and disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is m=
ostly there to appease some people&#39;s delusions that zeroconf is a thing=
? It seems a bit overdue to disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of alw=
ays assuming it&#39;s on.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">- **Incentive Compatibility**: Ensure that our RBF p=
olicy would not<br>
=C2=A0 accept replacement transactions which would decrease fee profits<br>
=C2=A0 of a miner. In general, if our mempool policy deviates from what is<=
br>
economically rational, it&#39;s likely that the transactions in our<br>
mempool will not match the ones in miners&#39; mempools, making our<br>
fee estimation, compact block relay, and other mempool-dependent<br>
functions unreliable. Incentive-incompatible policy may also<br>
encourage transaction submission through routes other than the p2p<br>
network, harming censorship-resistance and privacy of Bitcoin payments.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are two different common regimes whi=
ch result in different incentivized behavior. One of them is that there&#39=
;s more than a block&#39;s backlog in the mempool in which case between two=
 conflicting transactions the one with the higher fee rate should win. In t=
he other case where there isn&#39;t a whole block&#39;s worth of transactio=
ns the one with higher total value should win. It would be nice to have con=
solidated logic which handles both, it seems the issue has to do with the s=
lope of the supply/demand curve which in the first case is gentle enough to=
 keep the one transaction from hitting the rate but in the second one is ba=
sically infinite.</div></div></div>

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