Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 651448F5 for ; Tue, 23 May 2017 09:47:51 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-it0-f47.google.com (mail-it0-f47.google.com [209.85.214.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C51C21B3 for ; Tue, 23 May 2017 09:47:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-it0-f47.google.com with SMTP id o5so15976033ith.1 for ; Tue, 23 May 2017 02:47:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=yBhY0vjCWEjOSrOF4P0Pjzq/d93xWKAh447xDHHRV98=; b=V9vJYEZ+MyfeLDUgSzm5s/D4ePoYjhb5tARmmSCKQj3gqXQQrak/kypOrCtG1X9dPH zmQFgpZ9rbD475BmcEXGi8288RPUT7Ym9hWBb9eT4QPo6FrB9PJSxC54ATzH1YNLMc5/ vX7hkMeRBf0Z7yx2IaMVhABaqdncLxuAgJRkFxRG/6AT+UuXbS9uzGN90ieQL19wW3Oq p6olPukPBDD4gla8UmI1hiaf3PeXu8IUmNHMXMDRKAGYl3fNOe4AhPItumdWzJis/GLe W2GSfTUZtUSWC0nmlIDpgZy2i8FhBSN03t3XxfU+HU3rwzx59T1/mq4n4p7Bb3kRvPXI OOQA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=yBhY0vjCWEjOSrOF4P0Pjzq/d93xWKAh447xDHHRV98=; b=PdSJSJHb3PBCJCnxBU+8PE1Vfo7fxWqs5OYHkJLER918yOWdEmkBKaoWLCTQDwElX6 pmkfEXsoAUipK7KOfecsi6ToHKEdpmiQoq18lkpAOj1MZSeb0Oi3ls9vewWkA8g/ilww nt2eaMOxVECCig6JpvT5Pd23iK2zehtCI+5L67+6PLQOIKKeW/TPEE2ysIwrHpDZH85M I4MAc2P5UoPhs6kYziThpA0MNj/D38PwvPeDgJbjCWy/5+s5CYtbVxQyQJ+0hNBNXTaq CDe6FTTNv54+1O6iQH+/q3w6CnrXqe1Nzrdp1Efmrkexd7ay5n02csdMCEE3e4oFFxd3 5p9g== X-Gm-Message-State: AODbwcABV8oMxcBNZx3sIbUKLPTPvSre9oH61h1cp8LIx6fsTAS9Nd7q VH1T+A1TOge/HjNuwtNmT/S1ULJF3g== X-Received: by 10.36.66.67 with SMTP id i64mr1821621itb.22.1495532869136; Tue, 23 May 2017 02:47:49 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.3.205 with HTTP; Tue, 23 May 2017 02:47:48 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: =?UTF-8?Q?Hampus_Sj=C3=B6berg?= Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 11:47:48 +0200 Message-ID: To: Steven Pine Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a11449d226a3ab605502de12e" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.5 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] I do not support the BIP 148 UASF X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 09:47:51 -0000 --001a11449d226a3ab605502de12e Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > Who are we protecting users from, themselves? Are you protecting core? from what? I am somewhat genuinely befuddled by those who can't even allow a user config switch to be set. Indeed. It seems silly. If you're activating the switch, you're most likely fully aware of what you're doing. I also saw some very harsh rhetoric being used against BIP148, which seems unjustified as we have no idea yet how it all will play out. We can only guess. Hampus 2017-05-23 6:03 GMT+02:00 Steven Pine via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: > I'm glad some discussion has been moved back here. > > Correct me if I am wrong, but currently core developers are arguing over > whether or not to allow an optional configuration switch which defaults off > but signals and enforces BIP148 when used. Who are we protecting users > from, themselves? Are you protecting core? from what? I am somewhat > genuinely befuddled by those who can't even allow a user config switch to > be set. > > I guess I find it all incredibly silly, but perhaps I suffer from some > basic confusion. > > > > On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 3:23 PM, Suhas Daftuar via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> I also do not support the BIP 148 UASF, and I'd like to add to the points >> that Greg has already raised in this thread. >> >> BIP 148 would introduce a new consensus rule that softforks out >> non-segwit signalling blocks in some time period. I reject this consensus >> rule as both arbitrary and needlessly disruptive. Bitcoin's primary >> purpose is to reach consensus on the state of a shared ledger, and even >> though I think the Bitcoin network ought to adopt segwit, I don't think >> that concern trumps the goal of not splitting the network. >> >> Many BIP 148 advocates seem to start with the assumption that segwit >> already has a lot of support, and suggest that BIP 148 does as well. >> However I don't think it's fair or correct to separate the activation >> proposal for segwit from the rest of the segwit proposal. The deployment >> parameters for segwit are consensus-critical; assuming that some other >> deployment has consensus because it would result in the rest of the segwit >> proposal activating is an unjustified leap. >> >> Even if there were no feasible alternate segwit deployment method >> available to us, I would hesitate to recommend that the network adopt a >> potentially consensus-splitting approach, even though I firmly believe that >> the ideas behind segwit are fundamentally good ones. But fortunately that >> is not the situation we are in; we have substantially less disruptive >> methods available to us to activate it, even if the current BIP 9 >> deployment were to fail -- such as another BIP 9 deployment in the future, >> or perhaps a BIP 149 deployment. >> >> If we do pursue a "user-activated" deployment of segwit, I'd recommend >> that we do so in a more careful way than BIP 148 or 149 currently suggest, >> which as I understand would otherwise make very few changes to the current >> implementation. However, due to the BIP 9 activation assumption, the >> Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 - 0.14.0 segwit implementation largely lumps together >> the idea that miners would both enforce the rules and mine segwit blocks. >> However, we can separate these concerns, as we started to do in the Bitcoin >> Core 0.14.1 release, where mining segwit blocks is not required in order to >> generally mine or signal for segwit in the software. And we can go further >> still: without too much work, we could make further improvements to >> accommodate miners who, for whatever reason, don't want to upgrade their >> systems, such as by improving block relay from pre-segwit peers [1], or >> optimizing transaction selection for miners who are willing to enforce the >> segwit rules but haven't upgraded their systems to mine segwit blocks [2]. >> >> If we would seek to activate a soft-fork with less clear miner signaling >> (such as BIP 149), then I think such improvements are warranted to minimize >> network disruption. In general, we should not seek to censor hashpower on >> the network unless we have a very important reason for doing so. While the >> issues here are nuanced, if I were to evaluate the BIP 148 soft-fork >> proposal on the spectrum of "censorship attack on Bitcoin" to "benign >> protocol upgrade", BIP 148 strikes me as closer to the former than the >> latter. There is simply no need here to orphan these non-signalling blocks >> that could otherwise be used to secure the network. >> >> To go further: I think BIP 148 is ill-conceived even for achieving its >> own presumed goals -- the motivation for adding a consensus rule that >> applies to the version bits on blocks is surely for the effect such bits >> have on older software, such as Bitcoin Core releases 0.13.1 and later. >> Yet in trying to bring those implementations along as segwit-enforcing >> software, BIP 148 would risk forking from such clients in the short term! >> If one really cared about maintaining consensus with older, segwit-enabled >> software, it would make far more sense to seek segwit activation in a way >> that didn't fork from them (such as BIP 149, or a new BIP 9 deployment >> after this one times out). And if one doesn't care about such consensus, >> then it'd be far simpler to just set (e.g.) August 1 as the flag day >> activation of segwit, and not play these contortionist games with block >> version bits, which carry no useful or intrinsic meaning. Either of these >> two approaches should have the advantage of reduced fork risk, compared >> with BIP 148. >> >> Of course, everyone is free to run the software of their choosing. I >> write this to both generally convey my opposition to a careless proposal, >> which I believe represents a way of thinking that is detrimental to >> Bitcoin's long run success, and specifically explain why I oppose inclusion >> of this proposal in the Bitcoin Core implementation [3]. The Bitcoin Core >> project hasn't been, and shouldn't be, careless in deploying consensus >> changes. Instead, I think the Bitcoin Core project ought to stand up for >> the best practices that our community has learned about how to deploy such >> changes (specifically for minimizing chain-split risk when deploying a soft >> fork!), and I think we should all avoid adoption or encouragement of >> practices that would depart from the high standards we are capable of >> achieving. >> >> >> [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin- >> dev/2017-March/013811.html >> [2] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9955 >> [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/10428#issuecomment-303098925 >> >> >> --Suhas Daftuar >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 3:56 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> I do not support the BIP148 UASF for some of the same reasons that I >>> do support segwit: Bitcoin is valuable in part because it has high >>> security and stability, segwit was carefully designed to support and >>> amplify that engineering integrity that people can count on now and >>> into the future. >>> >>> I do not feel the the approach proposed in BIP148 really measures up >>> to the standard set by segwit itself, or the existing best practices >>> in protocol development in this community. >>> >>> The primary flaw in BIP148 is that by forcing the activation of the >>> existing (non-UASF segwit) nodes it almost guarantees at a minor level >>> of disruption. >>> >>> Segwit was carefully engineered so that older unmodified miners could >>> continue operating _completely_ without interruption after segwit >>> activates. >>> >>> Older nodes will not include segwit spends, and so their blocks will >>> not be invalid even if they do not have segwit support. They can >>> upgrade to it on their own schedule. The only risk non-participating >>> miners take after segwit activation is that if someone else mines an >>> invalid block they would extend it, a risk many miners already >>> frequently take with spy-mining. >>> >>> I do not think it is a horrible proposal: it is better engineered than >>> many things that many altcoins do, but just not up to our normal >>> standards. I respect the motivations of the authors of BIP 148. If >>> your goal is the fastest possible segwit activation then it is very >>> useful to exploit the >80% of existing nodes that already support the >>> original version of segwit. >>> >>> But the fastest support should not be our goal, as a community-- there >>> is always some reckless altcoin or centralized system that can support >>> something faster than we can-- trying to match that would only erode >>> our distinguishing value in being well engineered and stable. >>> >>> "First do no harm." We should use the least disruptive mechanisms >>> available, and the BIP148 proposal does not meet that test. To hear >>> some people-- non-developers on reddit and such-- a few even see the >>> forced orphaning of 148 as a virtue, that it's punitive for >>> misbehaving miners. I could not not disagree with that perspective any >>> more strongly. >>> >>> Of course, I do not oppose the general concept of a UASF but >>> _generally_ a soft-fork (of any kind) does not need to risk disruption >>> of mining, just as segwit's activation does not. UASF are the >>> original kind of soft-fork and were the only kind of fork practiced by >>> Satoshi. P2SH was activated based on a date, and all prior ones were >>> based on times or heights. We introduced miner based activation as >>> part of a process of making Bitcoin more stable in the common case >>> where the ecosystem is all in harmony. It's kind of weird to see UASF >>> portrayed as something new. >>> >>> It's important the users not be at the mercy of any one part of the >>> ecosystem to the extent that we can avoid it-- be it developers, >>> exchanges, chat forums, or mining hardware makers. Ultimately the >>> rules of Bitcoin work because they're enforced by the users >>> collectively-- that is what makes Bitcoin Bitcoin, it's what makes it >>> something people can count on: the rules aren't easy to just change. >>> >>> There have been some other UASF proposals that avoid the forced >>> disruption-- by just defining a new witness bit and allowing >>> non-upgraded-to-uasf miners and nodes to continue as non-upgraded, I >>> think they are vastly superior. They would be slower to deploy, but I >>> do not think that is a flaw. >>> >>> We should have patience. Bitcoin is a system that should last for all >>> ages and power mankind for a long time-- ten years from now a couple >>> years of dispute will seem like nothing. But the reputation we earn >>> for stability and integrity, for being a system of money people can >>> count on will mean everything. >>> >>> If these discussions come up, they'll come up in the form of reminding >>> people that Bitcoin isn't easily changed at a whim, even when the >>> whims are obviously good, and how that protects it from being managed >>> like all the competing systems of money that the world used to use >>> were managed. :) >>> >>> So have patience, don't take short cuts. Segwit is a good improvement >>> and we should respect it by knowing that it's good enough to wait for, >>> and for however its activated to be done the best way we know how. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > > -- > Steven Pine > (510) 517-7075 > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11449d226a3ab605502de12e Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> Who are we pr= otecting users from, themselves? Are you protecting core?=20 from what? I am somewhat genuinely befuddled by those who can't even=20 allow a user config switch to be set.

Indeed. It seems= silly. If you're activating the switch, you're most likely fully a= ware of what you're doing.
I also saw some very harsh rhetoric being used against BIP148, which=20 seems unjustified as we have no idea yet how it all will play out. We=20 can only guess.

Hampus

2017-05-23 6:03 GMT+02:00 Steven Pine via bitcoin-dev= <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>= :
I'm glad some disc= ussion has been moved back here.

Correct me if I am wron= g, but currently core developers are arguing over whether or not to allow a= n optional configuration switch which defaults off but signals and enforces= BIP148 when used. Who are we protecting users from, themselves? Are you pr= otecting core? from what? I am somewhat genuinely befuddled by those who ca= n't even allow a user config switch to be set.=C2=A0

I guess I find it all incredibly silly, but perhaps I suffer from so= me basic confusion.



On Mon, = May 22, 2017 at 3:23 PM, Suhas Daftuar via bitcoin-dev &l= t;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I also do not support the BIP 14= 8 UASF, and I'd like to add to the points that Greg has already raised = in this thread.

BIP 148 would introduce a new consensus = rule that softforks out non-segwit signalling blocks in some time period.= =C2=A0 I reject this consensus rule as both arbitrary and needlessly disrup= tive.=C2=A0 Bitcoin's primary purpose is to reach consensus on the stat= e of a shared ledger, and even though I think the Bitcoin network ought to = adopt segwit, I don't think that concern trumps the goal of not splitti= ng the network.

Many BIP 148 advocates seem to sta= rt with the assumption that segwit already has a lot of support, and sugges= t that BIP 148 does as well.=C2=A0 However I don't think it's fair = or correct to separate the activation proposal for segwit from the rest of = the segwit proposal.=C2=A0 The deployment parameters for segwit are consens= us-critical; assuming that some other deployment has consensus because it w= ould result in the rest of the segwit proposal activating is an unjustified= leap.

Even if there were no feasible alternate se= gwit deployment method available to us, I would hesitate to recommend that = the network adopt a potentially consensus-splitting approach, even though I= firmly believe that the ideas behind segwit are fundamentally good ones.= =C2=A0 But fortunately that is not the situation we are in; we have substan= tially less disruptive methods available to us to activate it, even if the = current BIP 9 deployment were to fail -- such as another BIP 9 deployment i= n the future, or perhaps a BIP 149 deployment.

If = we do pursue a "user-activated" deployment of segwit, I'd rec= ommend that we do so in a more careful way than BIP 148 or 149 currently su= ggest, which as I understand would otherwise make very few changes to the c= urrent implementation.=C2=A0 However, due to the BIP 9 activation assumptio= n, the Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 - 0.14.0 segwit implementation largely lumps tog= ether the idea that miners would both enforce the rules and mine segwit blo= cks.=C2=A0 However, we can separate these concerns, as we started to do in = the Bitcoin Core 0.14.1 release, where mining segwit blocks is not required= in order to generally mine or signal for segwit in the software.=C2=A0 And= we can go further still: without too much work, we could make further impr= ovements to accommodate miners who, for whatever reason, don't want to = upgrade their systems, such as by improving block relay from pre-segwit pee= rs [1], or optimizing transaction selection for miners who are willing to e= nforce the segwit rules but haven't upgraded their systems to mine segw= it blocks [2].

If we would seek to activate a soft= -fork with less clear miner signaling (such as BIP 149), then I think such = improvements are warranted to minimize network disruption.=C2=A0 In general= , we should not seek to censor hashpower on the network unless we have a ve= ry important reason for doing so.=C2=A0 While the issues here are nuanced, = if I were to evaluate the BIP 148 soft-fork proposal on the spectrum of &qu= ot;censorship attack on Bitcoin" to "benign protocol upgrade"= ;, BIP 148 strikes me as closer to the former than the latter.=C2=A0 There = is simply no need here to orphan these non-signalling blocks that could oth= erwise be used to secure the network.

To go furthe= r: I think BIP 148 is ill-conceived even for achieving its own presumed goa= ls -- the motivation for adding a consensus rule that applies to the versio= n bits on blocks is surely for the effect such bits have on older software,= such as Bitcoin Core releases 0.13.1 and later.=C2=A0 Yet in trying to bri= ng those implementations along as segwit-enforcing software, BIP 148 would = risk forking from such clients in the short term!=C2=A0 If one really cared= about maintaining consensus with older, segwit-enabled software, it would = make far more sense to seek segwit activation in a way that didn't fork= from them (such as BIP 149, or a new BIP 9 deployment after this one times= out).=C2=A0 And if one doesn't care about such consensus, then it'= d be far simpler to just set (e.g.) August 1 as the flag day activation of = segwit, and not play these contortionist games with block version bits, whi= ch carry no useful or intrinsic meaning.=C2=A0 Either of these two approach= es should have the advantage of reduced fork risk, compared with BIP 148.

Of course, everyone is free to run the software of = their choosing.=C2=A0 I write this to both generally convey my opposition t= o a careless proposal, which I believe represents a way of thinking that is= detrimental to Bitcoin's long run success, and specifically explain wh= y I oppose inclusion of this proposal in the Bitcoin Core implementation [3= ].=C2=A0 The Bitcoin Core project hasn't been, and shouldn't be, ca= reless in deploying consensus changes.=C2=A0 Instead, I think the Bitcoin C= ore project ought to stand up for the best practices that our community has= learned about how to deploy such changes (specifically for minimizing chai= n-split risk when deploying a soft fork!), and I think we should all avoid = adoption or encouragement of practices that would depart from the high stan= dards we are capable of achieving.


= =C2=A0[1]=C2=A0https://lists.linuxfounda<= wbr>tion.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-March/013811.html
=C2=A0[2]=C2=A0https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9955<= /div>


--Suhas Daftuar


On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at= 3:56 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev= @lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I do not support the BIP148 UASF for some of the same reasons = that I
do support segwit:=C2=A0 Bitcoin is valuable in part because it has high security and stability, segwit was carefully designed to support and
amplify that engineering integrity that people can count on now and
into the future.

I do not feel the the approach proposed in BIP148 really measures up
to the standard set by segwit itself, or the existing best practices
in protocol development in this community.

The primary flaw in BIP148 is that by forcing the activation of the
existing (non-UASF segwit) nodes it almost guarantees at a minor level
of disruption.

Segwit was carefully engineered so that older unmodified miners could
continue operating _completely_ without interruption after segwit
activates.

Older nodes will not include segwit spends, and so their blocks will
not be invalid even if they do not have segwit support. They can
upgrade to it on their own schedule. The only risk non-participating
miners take after segwit activation is that if someone else mines an
invalid block they would extend it, a risk many miners already
frequently take with spy-mining.

I do not think it is a horrible proposal: it is better engineered than
many things that many altcoins do, but just not up to our normal
standards. I respect the motivations of the authors of BIP 148.=C2=A0 If your goal is the fastest possible segwit activation then it is very
useful to exploit the >80% of existing nodes that already support the original version of segwit.

But the fastest support should not be our goal, as a community-- there
is always some reckless altcoin or centralized system that can support
something faster than we can-- trying to match that would only erode
our distinguishing value in being well engineered and stable.

"First do no harm." We should use the least disruptive mechanisms=
available, and the BIP148 proposal does not meet that test.=C2=A0 To hear some people-- non-developers on reddit and such-- a few even see the
forced orphaning of 148 as a virtue, that it's punitive for
misbehaving miners. I could not not disagree with that perspective any
more strongly.

Of course, I do not oppose the general concept of a UASF but
_generally_ a soft-fork (of any kind) does not need to risk disruption
of mining, just as segwit's activation does not.=C2=A0 UASF are the
original kind of soft-fork and were the only kind of fork practiced by
Satoshi. P2SH was activated based on a date, and all prior ones were
based on times or heights.=C2=A0 We introduced miner based activation as part of a process of making Bitcoin more stable in the common case
where the ecosystem is all in harmony.=C2=A0 It's kind of weird to see = UASF
portrayed as something new.

It's important the users not be at the mercy of any one part of the
ecosystem to the extent that we can avoid it-- be it developers,
exchanges, chat forums, or mining hardware makers.=C2=A0 Ultimately the
rules of Bitcoin work because they're enforced by the users
collectively-- that is what makes Bitcoin Bitcoin, it's what makes it something people can count on: the rules aren't easy to just change.
There have been some other UASF proposals that avoid the forced
disruption-- by just defining a new witness bit and allowing
non-upgraded-to-uasf miners and nodes to continue as non-upgraded, I
think they are vastly superior. They would be slower to deploy, but I
do not think that is a flaw.

We should have patience. Bitcoin is a system that should last for all
ages and power mankind for a long time-- ten years from now a couple
years of dispute will seem like nothing. But the reputation we earn
for stability and integrity, for being a system of money people can
count on will mean everything.

If these discussions come up, they'll come up in the form of reminding<= br> people that Bitcoin isn't easily changed at a whim, even when the
whims are obviously good, and how that protects it from being managed
like all the competing systems of money that the world used to use
were managed. :)

So have patience, don't take short cuts.=C2=A0 Segwit is a good improve= ment
and we should respect it by knowing that it's good enough to wait for,<= br> and for however its activated to be done the best way we know how.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




--
Steven Pine
(51= 0) 517-7075

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--001a11449d226a3ab605502de12e--