Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YLye0-0002M1-VV for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 18:37:45 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.181; envelope-from=allen.piscitello@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com ([209.85.212.181]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YLydu-00078G-Kb for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 18:37:44 +0000 Received: by mail-wi0-f181.google.com with SMTP id r20so6638704wiv.2 for ; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 10:37:32 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.79.226 with SMTP id m2mr10651398wjx.60.1423766252580; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 10:37:32 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.194.48.105 with HTTP; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 10:37:32 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <54DCECE4.3020802@riseup.net> References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org> <356E7F6E-300A-4127-9885-2183FB1DE447@gmail.com> <54DCECE4.3020802@riseup.net> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 12:37:32 -0600 Message-ID: From: Allen Piscitello To: Justus Ranvier Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bf0c538ba77d3050ee8691a X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (allen.piscitello[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YLydu-00078G-Kb Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 18:37:45 -0000 --047d7bf0c538ba77d3050ee8691a Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 You cannot close Pandora's box. Whether or not this type of patch should exist is irrelevant. It does, and there are incentives to use it by miners. These are the bounds we have to deal with and the world we must adapt to. On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Justus Ranvier wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > On 02/12/2015 05:24 PM, Oleg Andreev wrote: > > > >> I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of > >> replace-by-fee is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable. > >> Currently people can "get away" with 0-confirms but it's only > >> because most people arent actively double spending, and when they > >> do it is for higher value targets. Double spend attacks are > >> happening a lot more frequently than is being admitted here, > >> according to Peter from work with various clients. > >> > >> Like single address reuse, people have gotten used to something > >> which is bad. Generally accepting 0-conf is also a bad idea(tm) > >> and instant confirmation solutions should be sought elsewhere. > >> There are already interesting solutions and concepts: > >> greenaddress for example, and CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY micropayment > >> channels for example. Rather than supporting and promoting risky > >> 0-confirms, we need to spend time on better alternative solutions > >> that will work for everyone and not during the honeymoon phase > >> where attackers are fewer. > > > > Here's value-free assessment of the issue here: > > > > 1. Zero-conf txs are unsafe. 2. We'd all want to have a safer > > instant payments solution if possible. 3. As a social artifact, > > today zeroconf txs happen to work for some people in some > > situations. 4. Replace-by-fee will break #3 and probably hasten > > development of #2. > > > > The discussion boils down to whether we should make #2 happen > > sooner by breaking remnants of #3 sooner. > > > > I personally would rather not break anything, but work as fast as > > possible on #2 so no matter when and how #3 becomes utterly broken, > > we have a better solution. This implies that I also don't want to > > waste time debating with Peter Todd and others. I want to be ready > > with a working tool when zeroconf completely fails (with that patch > > or for some other reasons). > > > > TL;DR: those who are against the patch are better off building a > > decentralized clearing network rather than wasting time on debates. > > When we have such network, we might all want this patch to be used > > for all the reasons Peter has already outlined. > > You've left out of the discussion that many (or all) proposed > solutions for 2 either reduce privacy, or security, or both. > > That fact should not be ignored or swept under the rug. > > There's also no mention of the degree to which child-pays-for-parent > achieves the stated aims of the original proposal (clearing mempool of > stuck transactions, increasing payee assurance of conformation) > without introducing incentives to double spend or forcing people into > privacy/security sacrifices. > > > - -- > Support online privacy by using email encryption whenever possible. > Learn how here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bakOKJFtB-k > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJU3OzkAAoJECpf2nDq2eYjDM8P/1a4bNa5s0ryMZHBxyhGcVk5 > 6hTSPpUF2/Y81JaC/EqzH8MMKqnPVcLxoikKoO5tIUxeo5bwC5OO8YyGk4NrpeCM > HTmROR+4XFOULi1dsUs5LP5oBQ+sPu1uNOZKn2fPCgtkO0xj8/w3mCdlVlf7g+v4 > bYt6rSmSCzyCY0qFQVYvyBoYeSVt6icdz45D54BvyNsEtlT+HvbNdG/SznT7QsLF > 2rOZezp5zbIyhbhaV5KtCKwYzATFYr0nWFHVnBkYWcOY3mJdPg6zODUO5ocbGs45 > RHEB8KMsKtrD+gnCwCoSb+J6TNlA8y//ilKemPb+gRSVVM1JJpHBwv7fc8jUu2Ap > V9YNKOVOrmoGb5X2sCctAZ6474p8HCUgZh50OluQph01tGtq3uC1djJUvnVCP232 > FQD47AU2LhU3wPjWSGEDIGtpeAk91+6huRCzv600xnIISd5KpryKpD6qWC3M4MGs > G4omAZhHjW5/E8CO/CH21nbPA2P1wozrGE5N8UTc2kwias/4Vn+v3IedjnSiS+IF > n37MzlyCVs9qXyT7WylT4UAnc9exxHwGXKrvcCUaIAw7FOFEHjiHYLjZFIrVWmpM > 7qxjMD/yM3kDmd/+YxCbITAERsHh04k4PITLVbnOyXY+axi+Xuow9v5HvwqERvt8 > XjbkwrkFIuKfUJyfIuR+ > =ony0 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website, > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is > your > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/ > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --047d7bf0c538ba77d3050ee8691a Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
You cannot close Pandora's box.=C2=A0 Whether or not t= his type of patch should exist is irrelevant.=C2=A0 It does, and there are = incentives to use it by miners.=C2=A0 These are the bounds we have to deal = with and the world we must adapt to.

On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Justus Ranvier <= span dir=3D"ltr"><justusranvier@riseup.net> wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 02/12/2015 05:24 PM, Oleg Andreev wrote: >
>> I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of
>> replace-by-fee is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable.
>> Currently people can "get away" with 0-confirms but it&#= 39;s only
>> because most people arent actively double spending, and when they<= br> >> do it is for higher value targets. Double spend attacks are
>> happening a lot more frequently than is being admitted here,
>> according to Peter from work with various clients.
>>
>> Like single address reuse, people have gotten used to something >> which is bad. Generally accepting 0-conf is also a bad idea(tm) >> and instant confirmation solutions should be sought elsewhere.
>> There are already interesting solutions and concepts:
>> greenaddress for example, and CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY micropayment
>> channels for example. Rather than supporting and promoting risky >> 0-confirms, we need to spend time on better alternative solutions<= br> >> that will work for everyone and not during the honeymoon phase
>> where attackers are fewer.
>
> Here's value-free assessment of the issue here:
>
> 1. Zero-conf txs are unsafe. 2. We'd all want to have a safer
> instant payments solution if possible. 3. As a social artifact,
> today zeroconf txs happen to work for some people in some
> situations. 4. Replace-by-fee will break #3 and probably hasten
> development of #2.
>
> The discussion boils down to whether we should make #2 happen
> sooner by breaking remnants of #3 sooner.
>
> I personally would rather not break anything, but work as fast as
> possible on #2 so no matter when and how #3 becomes utterly broken, > we have a better solution. This implies that I also don't want to<= br> > waste time debating with Peter Todd and others. I want to be ready
> with a working tool when zeroconf completely fails (with that patch > or for some other reasons).
>
> TL;DR: those who are against the patch are better off building a
> decentralized clearing network rather than wasting time on debates. > When we have such network, we might all want this patch to be used
> for all the reasons Peter has already outlined.

You've left out of the discussion that many (or all) propos= ed
solutions for 2 either reduce privacy, or security, or both.

That fact should not be ignored or swept under the rug.

There's also no mention of the degree to which child-pays-for-parent achieves the stated aims of the original proposal (clearing mempool of
stuck transactions, increasing payee assurance of conformation)
without introducing incentives to double spend or forcing people into
privacy/security sacrifices.


- --
Support online privacy by using email encryption whenever possible.
Learn how here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DbakOKJFtB-k
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -------
Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,
sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is you= r
hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a<= br> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/
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