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From: Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <558F583C.1000500@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 21:54:04 -0700
Message-Id: <2A94BDF7-F265-4D36-B438-DC4F432E1C67@gmail.com>
References: <1164261435450448@web14h.yandex.ru> <558F583C.1000500@gmail.com>
To: Patrick Strateman <patrick.strateman@gmail.com>
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Original Vision
Precedence: list


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Fraud proofs actually don=E2=80=99t need to be made super =
efficient=E2=80=A6but they do need to be secure, of course.

The trick is aligning incentives. In order for fraud proofs to be widely =
available there needs to be a market for them - there must be a way to =
buy one (because producing one is not free). What makes such a scheme =
actually practical is that very few of these fraud proofs ever need to =
actually be executed - it=E2=80=99s a classical Nimzowischian case of =
the threat being much stronger than the execution.

- Eric Lombrozo

> On Jun 27, 2015, at 7:13 PM, Patrick Strateman =
<patrick.strateman@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended
> organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity =
to
> light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of =
the
> user base.
>=20
> Satoshi also believed that fraud proofs would be widely available and
> practical.
>=20
> If fraud proofs were practical SPV client security would be much =
closer
> to full node security than it is today.
>=20
> Unfortunately no design for fraud proofs which is both efficient and
> secure has been proposed; much less implemented and deployed.
>=20
> In building a system as new and innovative as bitcoin certain things
> will be wrong.
>=20
> The perception that SPV clients could be made nearly as secure as full
> nodes is one example of something that was wrong.
>=20
> On 06/27/2015 05:14 PM, Santino Napolitano wrote:
>> There is much heated debate going on right now and I know it can be =
very stressful but I'd like to point out that it is really amazing how =
passionately so many feel about this once very small project. Let's not =
forget there is something really special going on here and we're all =
part of it.
>>=20
>> The current debate has little to do with block size or hard-forks, =
IMO. It's about the nature of Bitcoin and what it means to people and =
how it will grow. I would like to take a moment to share my =
interpretation of the original author's intent based on everything I =
could find and read from this person. This is not to say their original =
vision is paramount-- or even that I got it completely correct but I =
think it might do us some good to think about.
>>=20
>> It seems as though the incentive conceived of for running a full =
network node was that it would enable mining. The proceeds from mining =
(new coins and transaction fees) would be the reward and provide a =
reason to continue operating these nodes. If fees are ever to be a =
sufficient reward and still allow for a practical and useful system the =
size of the blocks must grow significantly as must the user base. I'm =
not sure that this is really contested but I haven't exhaustively =
reviewed everyone's opinion so please excuse me if I have marginalized =
you. If you do contest that I would be interested in hearing it.
>>=20
>> Further, it appears clear that the original author intended =
organizations operating full network nodes would provide connectivity to =
light clients and these light clients would make up the majority of the =
user base. This is completely consistent with current trends in Internet =
consumption, e.g. tablets and phones are becoming more preferred to even =
owning a traditional computer. Having the system be entirely =
decentralized and trustless for every client does not appear to me to be =
the original design goal. Yes, the whitepaper speaks of the design goal =
as not having a need for a trusted third party but it does not say that =
some amount of trust won't be preferred by a majority of users. In fact, =
in the SPV section it implies some amount of localized trust is perhaps =
a necessary trade-off and maybe businesses should still run their own =
full network node if they want the stronger completely trustless =
guarantee. The global decentralized consensus appears meant to make the =
network
>  r
>> esilient to a single government or other adversary's ability to shut =
the network down. If you really want to trust no one it is your option =
at a cost and should be possible by design. The author further gives =
evidence that they believe Moore's observation would keep the idea of =
running a full network node a practical one at global scale for =
perpetuity. It does not appear as if they intended for every individual =
to run one at home nor in their pocket.
>>=20
>> If my interpretation seems incorrect please do point it out. I hope =
this hasn't been too off-topic and distracting. The original author's =
engineering ingenuity is what gave me any interest in this project so =
re-visiting their design and scaling intentions might be helpful for us =
to move forward-- together.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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